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Foreword 
The work presented in the first three volumes of Studio poetica 
as a team-work at the University of Szeged is now continued 
after an inevitable pause. The team has been expanded, between 
1982-1984 the following colleagues will work together: 
Dr. Á. Bernáth, Dr. A. Bókay, Dr. G. Bonyhái, Dr. K. Csuri, 
Dr. Z. Kanyó, A. Kertész, Dr. P. Kocsány, É. Kocziszky, 
P. Müller and L. Tarnay. They work in Budapest, Debrecen, 
Pécs and Szeged and represent a kind of community in Hungary 
interested in literary-theoretical research. However, it 
does not mean a homogeneous school but a possibility for 
exchanging views, which sometimes differ sharply, on.impor-
tant topic.- of modern literary theory. We intend that scholars 
should have the democratic right to formulate and to defend , 
i 




Die Arbeit, die durch die ersten drei Bände der Studio poetica 
als eine Szegeder Team-Arbeit identifiziert und bekannt wurde, 
wird nun nach einer zwangsmässigen Unterbrechung fortgesetzt. 
Das Team hat sich erweitert, zwischen 1982-84 arbeiten fol-
gende Kollegen mit: Dr. Á. Bernáth, Dr. A. Bókay, Dr. G. Bonyha 
Dr. K. Csuri, Dr. Z. Kanyó, A. Kertész, Dr. P. Kocsány, 
É. Kocziszky, P. Müller und L. Tarnay. Die neuen Mitarbeiter 
sind in Budapest, Debrecen, Pécs und Szeged tätig und sie 
bilden eine Art literaturtheoretische Forschungsvereinigung 
in Ungarn. Dies bedeutet jedoch keineswegs eine einheitliche 
Schule, sondern eher die Möglichkeit, ernsthafte Diskussionen 
zwischen den verschiedenen Ansichten zu führen. Wir sind der 
Meinung, dass auch Literaturwissenschaftler das demokratische 
Recht haben sollen, ihre souveränen Auffassungen, sofern sie 
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NARRATIVE AND COMMUNICATION 
AN ATTEMPT TO FORMULATE SOME PRINCIPLES FOR A THEORETICAL ACCOUNT 
OF NARRATIVE 
ZOLTÁN KANYO 
A. József University Szeged 
1. One of the main problems in narrative theory is the theory 
itself. The rather elementary decision of how to relate certain 
facts to a theoretical hypothesis seems to be highly contro-
versial in this field and the different theories available 
appear in some respect to be so barely reliable scientifically 
that under such circumstances any substantial improvement can 
hardly be expected. This negative appraisal applies not only 
to the more old-fashioned traditional views, but even to 
up-to-date ones - first of all to the different structuralist 
approaches and to the application of speech act theory which 
have exerted a decisive influence on modern tendencies in 
narratology and in literary theory or poetics in general. If 
we wish to convince ourselves that this opinion is not only a 
subjective prejudice but an objective and realistic statement 
concerning the theoretical and methodological perspectives of 
the present conceptions in narratology, then we have to 
investigate the modern trends just mentioned. If they prove 
to be unsatisfactory, we shall have to try to set up an 
alternative standpoint on the basis of different insights into 
narrative structure spelled out in different fields of human 
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knowledge. 
2. As to the different structuralist conceptions, this task 
has been for the most part completed in the theoretical 
discussions of the last few years: the theoretical and metho-
dological postulations of this trend have been submitted in 
some studies to a thorough scrutiny and some? of the primordial 
ones have revealed themselves to be badly - founded or 
unacceptable. The main objection to structuralist theory is 
labelled the "poetic language" fallacy''". "This fallacy 
asserts that there is a single unified phenomenon 'literature' 
marked by a property 'literariness' which in turn is expressed 
or constituted by a special 'literary' or 'poetic' 'language' 
or 'discourse'. The proponents of this view venture to specify 
the linguistic character of literary discourse with varying 
degrees of exactness, the most extreme detailing being 
2 
Jakobson's famous (1960) formula" Like most of the tradi-
tional literary critics and aesthetes the structuralists 
assumed that there was a homogenous class of objects that could 
be named as a whole as literature or even art and they wished 
to define this class by means of a distinctive property 
characterizing all elements of this class and if possible -
nothing other than the elements of this class. This program 
has failed, however, since we have no distinctive features at 
our disposal for the definition of the class "Literature" 
or "art" and we have no hope of solving this problem in the 
future either, since the failure was due to the neglect of some 
fundamental conditions. The concepts "literature" and "art" 
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are historical categories, they represent abstract unities 
(family-resemblance notions) of language-games, respectively 
semiotic games of which human communities could be aware 
only at a certain level of their cultural and economic 
development. The content and extension of these concepts have 
been continuously changing, and an allembracing definition 
cannot be given contained within this real historical process. 
This means that the postulated unity of class remains 
problematic and if the existence of the class itself raises 
doubts it seems an ontological audacity to assume that there 
are distinctive properties defining thé elements of the class 
which, may be, does not exist. The impossibility of the 
structualising aim is explicitly stated in the following 
theses of Searle: "First, there is no trait or set of traits 
which all works of literature have in common and which could 
constitute that necessary and sufficient conditions for being 
a work of literature. ... 
Secondly ... 'literature' is the name of a set of attitudes 
we take toward a stretch of discourse, not a name of an 
internal property of the stretch of discourse... 
3 
Third, the literary is continuous with the nonliterary." 
The fact that these alleged features are concieved of as elements 
of a special poetical language has to do with the metho-
dological hypothesis that linguistic procedures can be 
applied in an analogical way to literary structures. Beyond 
doubt it is owing to the use of linguistic and other semiotic 
methods that structuralist poetics and narratology have 
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achieved their most important results, however the structuralist 
conception of language-and its analogical application to 
literature and narrative have led necessarily to certain 
contradictions preventing the discovery of the inner connec-
tions of literary and narrative structure. The main thesis 
consists of the idea that literary features, just like 
grammatical ones, function as elements of an abstract system, 
a variant of the Saussureian langue which, over and above the 
fact that it has been realized, has no connections with the 
sphere of living discourse, its phenomena being cut off from 
the world of parole. Since the pragmatical turn in linguistic 
theory this conception is no longer considered even inside 
linguistics as generally valid and although it is possible to 
grasp in this way certain poetic relations, by this principle 
we are compelled not to take into consideration on the level 
of theory any socio-cultural factor and thus we can offer only 
a very one-sided picture of our topic. These objections to 
theory and praxis in literary and narrative structuralism are 
certainly not new and some of the representatives of this 
approach seem to have been aware of the theoretical 
shortcomings of this trend for a comparatively long time but 
they seem to assume that for this field of research there is 
4 
no better method available. Others, meanwhile, do not lose 
their faith in the scientific and humanistic significance of 
structuralism^. Since we agree with the criticism of 
structuralism carried out from a pragmalinguistic standpoint 
we cannot claim that clinging to structuralist positions is 
a prosperous strategy. In spite of valuable results, narrative 
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theory, conceived of on a structuralist basis, needs a 
thoroughgoing theoretical revision. 
3. It is a symptom of the dependance of poetic and narrative 
theories on linguistic theory that this criticism of structuralism 
in poetics is a consequence of the already mentioned pragmatical 
turn in linguistics and not an issue of investigations in this 
so eminently pragmatically determined field of research. This 
pragmalinguistical turn applies, not to a well-founded and 
explicit theory of language based on pragmatic categories, but 
to a diversity of several trends and fields of research such 
as sociolinguistics, text theory, Wittgensteinian linguistic 
philosophy, speech act theory, etc. Although most of these 
pragmatically-oriented schools are far from the solution, 
sometimes even for from a satisfactory theory formulation of 
their own specific problems, they have exerted in one way or 
another a certain influence on literary theory. Thus one may 
detect the importance of Labov's, Sacks's, Tchegloff's etc. 
sociolinguistic research for the new poetic project in 
Fowler (1979) or Pratt (1977), or One may extrapolate the 
consequences of a general text model like Petofi (in print) for 
a literary theory, and one may appraise the attempt at a 
systematization of the different pragmatical tendencies in 
Schmidt (1980). However, of all these conceptions only the 
speech act theory was able to impress literary study in a way 
that we can now speak about an international trend influenced 
by speech act theory in this field. It is certainly not 
accidental that exactly this approach has been gaining ground: 
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it offers a plausible explanation for che connection between 
linguistic phenomena and human interactions and has introduced 
in this way the very realistic point of view in linguistics, 
that linguistic utterances should be considered not only as 
manifestations of an abstract system but in the last analysis 
as- goal-oriented, actions. It seems rather needless to account 
for the different positive theoretical innovations invented 
by speech act theory - they are generally known and acknowledged -
but on the contrary, before giving an appraisal of the applica-
tion of speech act theory to literary and narrative theory we 
should like to formulate some general caveats against certain 
badly founded suppositions. This reservation nothwithstanding, 
we do esteem the endeavours of speech act theory in revealing 
the inner relations between speaking and doing. In full 
agreement with Bierwisch (1979) we find that speech act theore-
tical research strategy is based upon some questionable 
postulates. Bierwisch pointed out that proponents of this 
theory assume that the specification of the illocutionary 
force connected with the utterance often is a linguistic task 
which can be carried out through the analysis of the illocu-
tionary force indicating device (IFID) contained in t. However 
the interaction conditions identified by IFID represent only a 
special part of a whole, the structures and functions of which 
cannot be grasped under the aspect of this part; on the 
contrary, the part is accessible only through full knowledge 
of the whole. This means that there is missing here a theoretical 
accounting for linguistically relevant interactions comparable 
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to the conception worked out for action theory in Castañeda 
(1975) and there are no means available in speech act theory 
to overcome this difficulty. It is another question whether 
the required theory of interactions should be considered as 
an integrated part of linguistics or rather as a special 
non-linguistic theory having certain correlations with lingui-
stic research: a general overview is needed anyway if a special 
detail has to be elucidated. A second remark applies to the 
characteristic conflict between the pragmatical point of view 
of the analysis and the attempt to formulate generally valid 
relations, that is, independent from pragmatical considerations. 
We certainly do not mean correct formulations of universal 
quantification in a pragmatic context but the fallacy of 
which most of the representatives of the theory seem not to 
be aware is that they require a greater generality, for their 
theses than is due to them. 
4. In the application of speech act theory that should be here 
investigated as a representative of the pragmatically oriented 
conceptions we have to face a rather controversial trend: 
there is no agreement about fundamental definitions, the goals 
that should be achieved and the methods that should be applied. 
These difficulties seem to be connected with the special use 
of language in the different poetic language games which are 
highly divergent from uses of language considered as normal in 
speech act theory. Searle declares even the existence of 
fictional discourse to be a paradox from this point of view.6 
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4.1. First of all we have to be conscious of the fact that 
Searle's above mentioned position concerning the indefinability 
of literature is not at all a generally accepted thesis in the 
speech act theory of literary research, and the majority of 
representatives of this trend would like to define the essence 
of literature according to the old tradition. The novelty 
consists in that the definition should not be carried out by 
means of distinctive features of the poetic text class alone 
but mainly in view of its characteristic use. In Austin's 
classical series of lectures' this use is defined as a sort 
of deviation, as an "etiolation of language" a use which is 
"parasitic upon normal use" and a line of research can be 
characterized as an attempt to force a practically applicable 
concept from this negativity. So Ohmann connects the notion of 
the speech act with the rather old, but hotly debated concept 
of "mimesis" in his special term for literary texts "Imitation 
speech acts". Its introduction can be explained by the fact 
that the conditions of appropriacy for speech acts fail to 
apply to literary utterances since the latter do not have 
illocutionary force - for unlike a statement in a scientific 
text a statement in a literary text does not count as an 
undertaking to the effect that the propositionai content 
represents an actual state of affairs. "A literary work is a 
discourse whose sentences lack the illocutionary forces that 
would normally attach them. Its illocutionary force is 
mimetic. By 'mimetic' I mean purportedly imitative. Specifically, 
a literary work purportedly imitates (or reports) a series of 
- 15 -
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speech acts, which-in fact have no other existence." This 
mimetic function of literary texts is, according to Ohmann, 
due to the suspension of normal illocutionary forces which 
"tends to shift a reader's attention to the locutionary acts 
themselves and to their perlocutionary effects."''"^ Describing 
literary discourse as a quasi speech act Ohman has double 
aims, for on the one hand he would like to demonstrate the use 
of the speech act theory for literary analysis, and on the 
other he has to account for the obvious contradiction between 
literary language use and language uses that are considered 
as conforming to the norms specified in speech act theory. In 
this way we are permitted to rewrite the text as series of 
quasi speech acts and we can formulate some correlations 
derivable from the speech act transcription of the text.^ 
This treatment of the text is(however, burdened with a lot of 
serious theoretical problems. We are told that the speech acts 
in literary texts are imitated and it happens that the reader 
imagines a speaker, a situation, a set of ancillary events, 
and among other things the intention of the speaker. The text 
in itself - especially if it is presented in written form, 
without the background of the communicative situation, the 
addresser, the objects which have been referred to etc. - does 
not represent a sufficient base to determine unambigously the 
intended type of illocutionary act and a consensus seems to be 
completely impossible if the reconstruction of the communica-
tion situation considered to be fictional is surrendered to the 
individual readers. Dolezel is right if he speaks in connection 
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with the literary application of speech act theory about 
"intentional fallacy* and points outs "Impercéptably the 
speech act concept has been assimilated to the traditional 
12 
concept of the intentionalist critics." The formula offered 
by Searle for fictional discourse the homogenity of which 
incidentally seèms to be rather questionable viz. "a pretence 
13 ' ' to perform a speech act" can be considered a variant of 
the above-mentioned conception. 
4.2. Another important source for a theoretical explication 
and analysis of literary discourse conceived of as a social 
act that manifests itself in à special use of language can be 
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found in Grice's lecture Logic and Conversation Where a 
general Cooperative Principle has been formulated for 
conversations carried out in natural language and special 
implications, not derivable through pure lpgical methods, were 
accounted for as different sorts <>£ infringements of the. Maxims 
of the Principle. Grice's conception is without doubt a valuable 
contribution to the explanation of language, and thé fact that 
Castañeda starting from quite different connections came to 
very similar dialectical principles concerning language use*5 
underlines the rationality of this approach. The above-mentioned 
problem of intentionality that cannot be ignored in connection 
with the understanding of utterances can be successfully solved 
to some extent. It is, however, rather questionable whether 
Grice's conception can function as a model for literary theory. 
Although Grice's lecture ascribes rather too much validity and 
generality to its maxims and principle we can find even in 
Grice's text some argument against such an application of 
his Cooperative Principle. Grice declares namely "that 
observance of the CP and maxims is reasonable (rational) 
along the following lines: that any. one who cares about the 
goals that are central to conversation/communication (e.g., 
giving and receiving information, influencing and being 
influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, 
given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk 
exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that 
they are conducted in general accordance with the CP and the 
maxims."^6 Conversation defined in this way does not apply to 
any type of exchange but only to a class of exchange and the 
CP with the maxims can be regarded as a pragmatical code 
identifying this special genie of communication of which types 
'•• 17 like quarreling and letter-writing are. explicitly excluded. 
To maintain that the same principle and the same maxims apply 
to literature means that literature belongs to the above-defined 
class of talk exchanges. That is exactly the main point in 
Pratt (1977) where, with reference to identical features in 
the literary and non-literary use of language, it is generally 
cenied that there is any essential difference in communicative 
respect between literature and "normal" communication, therefore 
literature cannot lay claim to represent a.separate, form of 
communication and is in its entirety explained by the Cooperative; 
Principle and its various infringements rendered possible by 
supplementary pragmatical conditions and realized as different 
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sorts of implicatures. This view is, however, completely 
erroneous. First, it is clear that the special class of 
exchanges labelled as conversation applies to a face-to-face 
communication which is characterized by a special type of . 
communicative situation, that is, by the simultaneous presence 
of addresser and addressee under circumstances permitting 
natural and direct oral and kinetic communication. Literary 
communication cannot be identified as such even if we 
disregard its possible realization through print and the 
mass-media and cling to primordial oral transmission. Pratt 
believes her endeavour to reduce the poetic and conversational 
use of language to a common theoretic basé is threatened only 
by the structuralist dichotomy of "poetic language" versus 
"ordinary language" and fails Lo take into consideration all 
the empirical facts which contradict such a unification. As a 
matter of fact the structuralist theory does not represent 
in the communicative respect a real counterpole to Pratt's 
ideas, since poetic and ordinary communication have been 
accounted for by the same communication schema, the differences 
being attributed to the different distribution of the communica-
tive factors principally present in both cases of communica-
tion. Instead of this communication model which is rather 
insensitive to the factual aspects of communication we should 
consider the attempts to formulate a typology of utterances 
on the basis of certain variable factors of the communicative 
situation. Such an approach can be found in Wunderlich (1970). 
Wunderlich works with binary features some of which apply to 
the characteristics of the message such as + fiction, + dialogue, 
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+ order, others determine the space-time relation of addresser 
and addressee by + delay, + distance. We are given fifteen 
different communication forms altogether, each of them 
characterized by a set of features. The representative class 
for literature mentioned here as "novel, play, poem" takes the 
form 
(+ delay) (+ distance) (+ fiction) (- dialogue) (- order) 
while conversation is denoted in the following way: 
(- delay) (- distance) (- fiction) (+ dialogue) (- order) 
There is a difference in all but one feature, therefore it 
is precisely the communicative factors which preclude the 
possibility of the unification. One may certainly wonder how 
relevant the classification presented in Wunderlich (1970) 
actually is. Are these features sufficient in number? Sandig 
takes twenty into account instead of the five mentioned here, 
but success or failure of a classification does not depend 
on the number of the reflected elements alone. Are the features 
chosen in a consistent way? For want of a satisfactory theory 
of the communicative situation we are inclined to consider the 
above model as a provisory solution, as it is certainly 
unacceptable to define literature as a whole,semantically as 
a class of fictional texts. We do not wish to continue the 
18 
discussion of the problems of this approach. . We should like 
to point out that in spite of its theoretical failures and 
its vagueness it succeeds in spelling out by the cooccurrence 
of the features (+ Delay) (+ Distance) which are in fact 
determined by actual factors of the communicative situation 
- 20 -
an old truth of literary theory with discernment, namely 
that addresser and addressee in a literary communication 
are obviously not characterized by the same space-time 
coordinates. Consequently literary communication cannot be 
subsumed to face-to-face communication or its subclass, 
conversation. A second argument is connected with the 
semantical content of the definition of conversation. We have 
seen that the Cooperative Principle has been stated in 
respect of certain purposes. "I have stated my maxims as if 
19 
this purpose were a maximally effective information." 
Information is taken here not in the generality which applies 
to it as a term of information theory, but as a message 
related to the actual world. The conversation" has truth-
-conditions for the actual world. In a way there exists a 
possibility of reinterpreting the terms "informative" or 
"true" in the different maxims in a different way, so as to 
include a dada poem and a rational answer in a conversation 
and event that a narrator believes to be true in his fictional 
world, but this would annihilate the rationally distinguished 
class of conversation. On the other hand if the definitions 
are taken in their original sense, since most literary forms 
are not interested in conveying information about the actual 
world in a direct way, none of the maxims can be applied 
felicitously to them, that is, the formulation of the 
Cooperative Principle itself excludes its general application 
to literary communication. An example for a reinterpretation 
of the Cooperative Principle for literary communication was 
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offered in van Dijk (1976), but according to our arguments 
this cautious way of integrating Grice's conception is as 
mistaken as its direct application in Pratt (1977). The 
full array of the different attempts at a poetological ren-
dering of speech act theory has not at-all been exhausted by 
this short analysis, (cf. in this respect Fanto (1978)) 
We hope nevertheless that we could make comprehensible the 
main problems of the whole approach which can summed up in 
that the original framework of speech act theory does not 
provide for the complexity of literary communication, 
therefore there is no real theoretical base underlying 
statements concerning poetical or narrative structures which 
in the majority of cases rest on an analogical inference. 
5. We have considered an example of each of the two main 
tendencies determining contemporary research in poetics and 
narratology, the one laying stress upon the correlations of 
a basic abstract system, the other upon pragmatic determina-
tion of language in the sense of use and action; however, 
the results have been in both cases rather discouraging. What 
is surprising is that our objections apply in each of these 
rival trends to the insufficiency of grasping the pragmatic 
factors of the communication, therefore if we want to 
formulate an alternative theoretical standpoint we should put 
this question in the foreground. In expounding our ideas about 
narrative and communication we proceed in the apparently 
cautious way that we start by refering to the highly valuable 
scientific results of some research-groups which have deait 
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with different problems of literary communication and narra-
tion. The explicit citation of these impressive conceptions 
is meant to be more than a due fullfilment of an obligation. 
In a way it is astonishing that as far as literary theory is 
concerned the same discussions that are going on nowadays 
between representatives of structuralism and pragmalinguistics 
have already been held and, as to their intellectual level, 
the contemporary ones could be considered as mere preliminaries 
to some studies written half a century ago. This abnormal 
situation proves the insufficient interest of present research 
in the history of science and it can be overcome only if the 
relevant conceptions are taken into consideration in an 
appropriate way. 
5.1. These remarks concern first of all the activity of the 
Bakhtin-circle expressing from the early 20's on a very 
individual synthetization on a semiotic basis of the two 
important trends in Soviet literary theory: Formalism and the 
sociological approach. Communication and socio-culturally 
determined uses of language are central categories of this 
conception that takes a stand on primary pragmatic causality 
in literary works and comes in this way into collision with 
Formalism documented in different critical studies.^0 Bakhtin, 
VoloS'inov and Medvedev pointed out that the Formalists 
main reference point .in linguistics is based on the concept 
of a unique and abstract linguistic system and can therefore 
elucidate only some secondary traits of literary works, since 
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the latter do not rest upon this highly idealized linguistic 
concept but upon the socio-culturally determined uses of 
language in different communities. Instead of the linguistics 
of langue of the formalist-structuralist tradition there 
now appears, with reference to Humboldt, a multilingual 
conception of word (slovo) which should not be confused with 
the Saussurian parole as it is conceived to be out of the 
scope of linguistics and to represent a sort of paralinguistics 
reflecting all those socio-cultural settings in which 
communication proceeds. The sphere of slovo mirrors the reality 
of communication in its pragmatic setting. Its multilingual 
character can be explained by the fact that the dialectical, 
etc. varieties spoken in different socio-cultural communities 
are not considered any more as parole-phenomena, that is they 
are not derived from an underlying abstract langue-structure, 
but their heterogeneity corresponding to sociocultural, 
ideological and other pragmatical stratifications of the 
langue-user communities is held to be a primordial fact serving 
as a starting point for any theoretical and practical analysis 
of language. The substitution of the unique and abstract 
langue-system by a multitude of systems reflecting the different 
pragmatic relations between the communities offers new 
perspectives in most branches of linguistic and paralinguistic 
research; in some this change makes it possible to formulate 
a theory of a completely new.type. To this set of candidates 
for a theoretic reformulation belongs stylistics: the idea of 
an ensemble of pragmatically determined linguistic systems 
seems to be very illuminating,for stylistic correlations and 
- 24 -
some recent suggestions aiming at an embracing account for 
21 
stylistics through pragmatic connotation can be considered 
as formally fuller variants of this basic supposition. Due 
to its sensitivity to the world of slovo stylistics becomes 
in any case a very important field of research for the 
22 
Bakhtin-circle, stylistic analysis plays here in some 
respects the same role that was given to linguistics in the 
formalistic approach. The new pragmatic orientation has great 
importance for narratology as well. Some of its genres - certain 
novel-types - are identified as an expression of social 
consciousness of the multilingual character of the verbal means 
of communication and, besides this circumstance, other factors 
of the communicative model have contributed to the elabora-23 
tion of valuable typologies. Let us quote a characteristic 
passage: "The fundamental types of compositional-stylistic 
units building up in general the novel as a whole are the 
following: 
1. Author's direct literary-artistic narration (in all its 
different varieties), 
2. different stylized forms of oral every-day narration 
('skaz'), 
3. different stylized forms of semi-literary (written) every-day 
narration (letter, diary, etc.), 
4. different forms of the author's literary, but not artistic 
discourses (ethical, philosophical, scientific exposition, 
rhetoric declamation, ethnographic description, statement 
in an official report, etc.), 
5. stylistically individualized discourse of the heroes. 
- 25 -
After having got into the novel these stylistic units of 
different origin form a well organized artistic system and 
are submitted to the higher order stylistic unity of the 
whole which itself cannot be identified with the units 
24 
underlying it." A novel is accordingly multilingual not only 
in the sense that it can mediate the vernacular of different 
communities.but also by the fact that it is modelled on a 
series of primordial communication forms conventionalized in 
the use of certain groups. Since the elucidation of complex 
forms depends on the clear distinction and explication of 
the constituents we have first of all to account for these 
primary forms in narratology together with some other basic 
problems. 
5.2. The investigation of these primary forms leads us to 
evaluate the endeavours of ethnography to define some 
elementary genres in oral literature and discourse in general. 
Jolles (1930) offers on a morphological.basis a theory of 
so-called simple forms, that is the nine natural, universal 
and ultimate genres that have generated all the other Kinds 
of literature. This "theory of the formation and transformation 
of genres" is based "on three fundamental ideas: 
1. Language has an inherent ability to transform words into 
forms, under precise conditions. This process is a 
fundamental activity (GeistesbeschSftigung). 
2. Words crystalize into forms centering aroung distinct 
fields of meaning (Bedeutungsfeld). 
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3. The genre is transformed into a new, often more complex, 
25 type which.corresponds in meaning to the earlier kind." 
Jolles's idea of deriving the immense variety of 
folkloric genres from a limited number of primordial simple 
forms and to account for the variety by transformation sounds 
in some respects very tempting, however he could justify the 
necessity and sufficiency of the chosen forms of the repertoire 
only in view of metaphysical meditations that have nothing 
to do with the empirical facts which can be observed in 
connection with the communication of these genres. There are. 
26 
a lot of other theoretical and methodological problems: 
here we mention only the postulated universality of simple 
forms: it can be maintained only if the subsistence of an 
inborn paralinguistic deep structure determining all simple 
forms is presumed that is differently realized according to 
linguistic and cultural codes. We do not wish to repeat our 
arguments against the pragmatic insensitivity of structuralist 
theories, therefore we take only some late reformulations of 
the genre-concept, of simple forms respectively, into account 
which lay stress upon the communication. The main trend of 
these endeavours, in some respect largely prepared by several 
27 * structuralist essays . , is to substitute the metaphysical . 
postulations by well-founded theories based on empirical 
facts and to. give up the use of notions whose existence is 
ontologically suspect. Hymes (1972) is a rather characteristic 
attempt in this sense: he tries to give a theoretic account 
of the notion, "communicative competence" in applying the main 
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categories of generative transformational grammar to the 
interaction of language and social life. Hymes' point of 
reference is not an idealized native speaker, but a concrete 
speech community defined as "a community sharing rules for 
the conduct and interpretation of speech and rules for the 
28 
interpretation of at least one linguistic variety." Speech 
is defined as an activity carried out by the members of the 
socially defined community in a speech situation. A realiza-
tion of such an activity governed by rules or norms for the 
use of speech is a speech event and its minimal term is a 
speech act - its relation to the central term of speech act 
theory is not clarified. Hymes distinguishes different speech 
styles and ways of speaking. In the process of communication 
the following "components of speech" are differentiated: 
1. Message form, 
2. Message content, 
3. Setting (time and place of a speech act) 
4. Scene (psychological setting), 
5. Speaker, 
6. Addressor, 




11. Key (tone, manner, spirit in which the act is done), 
12. Channels (choice of the medium of transmission or speech), 
13. Forms of speech (dialect, code varieties), 
14. Norms of interaction, 
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15. Norms of interpretation, 
29 16. Genre 
Some of these components need not be realized in each speech 
event by a special factor, so for example, substituting the 
rigid and traditional division between speaker (sender) and 
hearer (reciever) specifications for participants given in 
5-8. represent possible roles that are according to genre-
-specific requirements differently realized: "Some rules of 
speaking require specification of three participants (addressor, 
addressee, hearer (audience), source, spokesman, addressee, 
etc.), some of but one, indifferent as to role in the speech 
event, some of two, but of speaker and audience (e. g. a 
child), and so on."^® The component genre has a double func-
tion: its introduction as a component of speech reveals that 
any intelligible speech event should be conceived of as being 
classifiable to some conventionally determined genre,^ on the 
other hand it is not considered as a component like the others, 
but should be derived from the information offered by the 
other components. In this sense genre signifies competence 
concerning the whole communication process, comprising not 
only the ability to formulate a text of a certain type but 
also the consciousness of social and behaviorial norms 
connected with utterances of a certain type in a given speech 
situation. In consequence of the reference to language use 
in socioculturally determined communities, the central 
category of generative transformational grammar, competence 
reflects connections that were originally thought to belong 
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to performance and in this way we can grasp some important 
characteristics of these special forms of communication. 
Of the three important structural levels in folklore forms 
- structure of materials, dramatic structure, and structure 
of context - the genre continuum presented in Abrahams (1969) 
is situated on the last, that is, it considers the possible 
relationships of speaker and listener. "... the range of 
performer-audience relationships ... runs from the personal 
interactions of conversation to the total distance or 
'removal' of performer from audience, as in the presentation 
of objects of art like a folk painting. Between the poles of 
interpersonal involvement and total removal are four discernible 
segments of a spectrum into which folklore genres tend to 
group themselves in terms of describable traits of performance. 
These are conversational genres, play genres, fictive genres, 
and static genres. The progress from the more interpersonal 
to the more removed involves a passage from the smaller and 
more intimate forms as part of direct and spontaneous discourse 
to the larger and more symbolic genres, which rely upon a 
profound sense of physic distance between performer and audience. 
The shorter forms employ fairly direct strategies that rely 
on the intensity and color and concision of manipulated 
materials to do their convincing. Though all folklore calls 
for a sympathetic relation between formal object (the item of 
folklore) and audience, the longer genres increasingly draw 
upon vicarious, rather than immediate, involvement to induce 
32 the sympathetic response" We have consequently to distinguish 
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two different structures: the one is contained in the. text 
conveyed during the communication, the othër applies to the 
participants of the speech event; speaker, addressor, hearer, 
addressee are in some way involved in a game that should be 
played according to the conventions that are valid in the 
community. The main point is that genre is constituted on 
this second level. In a sense Grice's notion of conversation 
defined by his principle and maxims can be concieved of as a 
genre, belonging to a different genre signifies having to 
apply different criteria of appropriateness: "When a person 
in our society retracts his words by saying" I was only 
joking', he actually redirects his words via another genre. 
Whatever he said violated the rules of regular conversation 
but is allowed in the genre.joke.Therefore in investigating 
genres we have to state social and behavioral norms and 
34 
beliefs connected with the use of utterances of that type, 
but at the same time we have to rely - especially in the case 
of encoded shorter forms - on specific features of the 
linguistic structure.^ 
5.3. Finally we have to encounter the question of how a 
communication can be enacted that is characterized by 
distance and delay. Since we are considering oral communica-
tive forms no special instrumental storage from writing to 
mass-media can be taken into account, these technical means 
having brought about historically secondary forms of 
communication in view of which our highly important question 
is generally dismissed. The problem in the foreground is the 
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special organization of the primary oral forms of the 
communication of genres that are commonly summed up in an 
unsatisfactory way by the term literature and this is 
connected with a bundle of historical, cultural, sociological, 
ethnological, informational, theoretical etc. questions 
applying to diverse aspects of this social activity. A 
theoretical account of this problem can be offered only on the 
basis of empirical field research carried out in order to 
reveal in a certain respect some general traits of this 
connection. Important results have been achieved in this 
respect by Parry's and Lord's oral formulae school, classically 
resumed in Lord (1960); after having performed intensive 
empirical work in communities with a living oral tradition . 
they pointed out the idleness of modelling oral forms of 
literary communication on face-to-face communication in a 
conversation or on secondary instrumental forms and they 
offered a genuine explanation for this theoretic foundation 
giving a remarkable impulse to a wide range of examinations 
from literary history to sociology of thought. The main idea 
is that the singer's (narrator's, addresser's) activity cannot 
be satisfactorily characterized as the performance of a text 
which has been previously composed by one or more authors 
(speakers), "the performance is a moment of creation for the 
36 
singer". In spite of the conventionalized characte'r of content 
and form of the conveyed text and the close connections of its 
use to special social events and communicative conditions - as 
in the Yugoslavian héroic songs where the precondition was a 
special gathering of men in a coffee house or a tavern mainly 
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37 on holidays . - All the same this sort of communication seems 
to be a direct one like a face-to-face communication; it 
requires, however, special learning and training: not every 
member of the community has of the ability to perform a song 
according to the norms, rather the mastery of this poetic 
self-expression is reserved for some specialists. Due to his 
individual sensitivity to linguistic expression and to his 
continuous practice the singer is capable of using freely a 
language which is understandable and in principle learnable 
for all, although in reality it is not acquired on a high 
degree except by a few. The most important constituent of 
the grammar of this special "poetic" language is, according 
to Parry and Lord, the formula, that is, a metrically, 
rhythmically, syntactically, semantically, etc., regular 
unit of speech; speaking the poetic language means composing 
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a coherent whole out of a number of different formulae. 
The formula with all the varieties derivable from it can be 
conceieved of in the sense of a generative grammar: 
corresponding "phrases would be considered not a closed 
'system' but an cpen-ended 'family', and each phrase in the 
group would be considered an allomorph, not of any other 
existing phrase, but of some central Gestalt ... which is 
the real mental template underlying the production of all 
such phrases. The Gestalt itself ... would seem to exist on 39 
a preverbal level of the poet's mind." 
We become aware of the importance of the explanation of this 
special communication form if the latter is considered as a 
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social institution carrying out the storage and transmission 
of different regulations which constitute the special way of 
life in a community having no instrumental facilities of 
communication. In connection with the preliterary Greek culture 
Havelock (1977) points out: "This information could be carried 
only in the form of statements imprinted upon the memories of 
individual brains of living Greeks ... these statements 
preserve themsleves without alteration, and so retain 
authenticity ... if they are cast in metrical form, for only 
as language is controlled by rhythm can it be repeated with 
anything like the uniformity that is available in documenta-
tion. ... What we call 'poetry' is therefore an invention of 
immemorial antiquity designed for the functional purpose of 
40 
continuing record in oral cultures." The birth of poetry 
that is in general traditionally accounted for in magic and 
irrationalistic terms is explained here in a rather illuminating 
and rationalistic way and not only rationality speaks for this 
solution but a number of observations and psychological ex-
41 
periments. As a matter of fact the challenge manifested in 
social needs in effective storage and continuous transmission 
of different kinds of socially important information could 
be met in a reorganization of the conveyed message in the oral 
communication process: it was necessary to work out a selec-
tion mechanism to optimally guarantee memorizable messages 
and these were texts complementarily structured by different 
sorts of repetitions at the same time avoiding the effect of 
banality. This means that the set of rules identified as the 
sphere of the alleged poeticity investigated by structuralists 
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as an immanent realm of literary form reveals there is a 
consequent strategic answer given by the community in a zero-
-sum game against Nature. Thus poetry and the grammar of 
poetry lose their aura of immanence, they have to be thought 
of rather as the products of some socially intended actions 
having their origin in social needs and dangers. 
This- insight gives us the possibility of arriving at a 
realistic reconsideration of the structuralist - pragma-
linguistic discussion that served as the starting point of 
our explanations. The position óf "either - or" seems to be 
out pf place,,since the two view points do not represent in 
the last analysis contrary standpoints. Accepting the 
priority of the' socio-cultural determinism of poetic language 
games does not require us to give up our knowledge concerning 
abstract linguistic and poetic rule-systems, because they 
reflect and explicate real social knowledge. Although as an 
explanation of language and literature the structuralist 
view proves to be too narrow and methodologically in need of 
revision it represents the most valuable and living tradition 
in literary theory. Pragmalinguistics should not mean a 
completely new beginning, but an órganic and at the same time 
critical continuation of this tradition. 
6. This unusually large introduction which has given us the 
opportunity of explaining the main aspects of our conception 
on a number q£ question makes it possible for us to formulate 
our ideas in a short and concise way on some theses. In a sense 
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they represent the recapitulation of our previous exposition. 
1. Narrative is generally used as a structuralist term and is 
applied as such to delimitate or characterize syntacti-
cally-semantically a certain class of texts disposing of 
an action structure and having agents and patients as 
grammatical subjects and objects. 
1.1. Narrative has no pragmatic reality and just like 
literature represents a family-ressemblance notion 
2. Pragmatically an utterance appears to be an action 
carried out by the participants in and through the 
communication. 
2.1. The type of the action is called genre and is defined 
according to the textual and behavioral strategies 
applied during the communication. 
3. The primary pragmatic characterization of an utterance 
consists of its identification as a genre, which means 
accounting for the criteria of appropriateness, social 
and behaviorial norms etc. under which the communica-
tion of the utterance counts as successful. 
3.1. The syntactic-semantic term narrative is abstracted 
from a series of pragmatic genres. 
3.2. Although some syntactic or semantic features of 
different genres may coincide, the systematic 
syntactic-semantic analysis is reasonable only within 
the generic framework. 
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As regards their constitution genres can be divided 
into comparatively simple and complex ones. 
In addition to their homogenous syntactic-semantic 
structure simple genres are characterized by a unique 
and delimited strategic move in the language game in 
which the participants are engaged (e. g. to make the 
addressee laugh in the case of a joke, to offer him a 
commonly approved general solution in the case of a 
proverb, etc.), complex genres embrace several 
strategic moves of the partners and join up different 
simple genres in a special unity. 
The investigation of simple genres has methodological 
and theoretical priority over the systematic research 
of complex genres. 
In view of their pragmatic and other capacities there 
are sensible différencies between certain simple genres. 
We distuingish: 
a/ primary simple genres having a fully specific 
behaviorial and linguistic code of appropriateness. 
As examples we mention here the Griceian rationalistic 
conversation with its cooperation principle, the joke, 
the fictional tale, and - if we leave the complexity 
of action structure out of consideration - ritual 
and magical formulae that can be conceieved of as 
42 
speech acts based upon analogy. In each case the 
rules of the game followed by the participants differ 
sensibly from the another. 
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b/ secondary simple genres are subordinated to primary 
ones as they have no special code of appropriateness 
and thus are compelled to apply the norms formulated 
for some fundamental communicative form. In this 
sense the proverb represents a secondary simple 
genre, as its use conforms to the rules of conversa-4 3 
tion. 
7. Simple genres - be they primary or secondary ones - rep-
resent the institutionalized solutions for storage and 
continuous transmission of socio-culturally relevant 
information by means of special reorganization of oral 
communication and corresponding social norms for the 
acquisition, training and transference of special 
communicative forms. 
7.1. The "grammar" of these simple genres reflects above all 
rational social decisions concerning the formulation 
of the text in view of memorizability. 
7.2. The simple genres can preserve their original function 
even if oral communication has ceased to be the only 
possible form of social conservation of relevant informa-
tion and the importance of the genre is therefore sensibly 
diminished. The grammar of oral transmission maintains 
its prestige even if there is no direct social or 
communicative need of interest in using it, and if the 
poet undertaking this old oral tradition without any 
direct practical social goal appears to be carrying out 
an irrationally free act without any practical interest 
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with the only aim to please. This, idea of poetic 
freedom not only proves to be originally false 
through the explanation of poetic grammar as a product 
of an intentionalized social action motivated by 
social needs, but even as an illumination for literature 
in the artistic period, since each poetic manifestation, 
is deeply embedded in stylistic, artistic and ideological 
codes of communication in the historical process. 
8. Taking part in social games has a double sense for 
narrative (simple) genres: as for any genre it signifies 
on the one hand their actual way of existence and on 
the other it points to the structure they reflect 
syntactically and semantically. 
Notes 
1 viz. Posner (1976), Pratt (1977), Fowler (1979) 
2 Fowler (1979) pp. 535-536. 
3 Searle (1975) p. 320. 
4 cf. the impressive critical survey of structural narratology 
in Bremond (1973) and Bremond's subsequent studies on 
narrative analysis. 
5 cf. "At a time when the very existence of literature and 
other forms of art is threatened by commercialism and 
ideologies, the role of structural poetics as a major force 
of resistance is becoming more and more important." 
Dole^el (1979) p. 529. 
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6 cf. Searle (1975) p. 319. 
7 Austin (1962) 
® ibid p. 22. 
9 Ohmann (1971 a) p. 14. 
1 0 ibid p. 17. 
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1 4 Grice (1975) 
1 5 Castañeda (1975) p. 64. 
1 6 Grice (1975) p. 49. 
1 7 cf. Grice (1975) p. 48. 
1 7 a Wunderlich (1970) p. 101. 
18 * 
cf. in this respect Baumgartner (1969) where the feature 
(+ fiction) is substituted by (+ poetry) signifying that "the 
text has been estimated by an institution in the largest 
sense of the word to belong to poetry" Baumgartner (1969) 
p. 389. However, this proposition is inconsistent with the 
central aim of the typological approach as, if we have the 
feature (+ Poetry), we do not need any other features, for 
poetry will then be defined not by a complex of supposedly 
primitive features, but by the feature (+ Poetry) alone. Cf. 
in this respect the commentary in Ihwe (1972) p. 213f. 
1 9 Grice (1975) p. 47. 
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2 0 cf. Bakhtin (197!? a), Medvedev (1929). In connection with 
some general consequences of the Bakhtin-critique cf. 
Kanyo (1980) 
2 1 Bierwisch (1975), Kanyo (1977) (1982) 
2 2 cf. Volo^inov (1929) 
2 3 cf. Bakhtin (1975 c) 
24 Bakhtin (1975 b) p. 75.my own translation 
25 Ben-Amos (1976) p. xxviii. 
2 6 cf. Ben-Amos (1969), Kanyo (1981). 
27 cf. Kongas-Maranda - Maranda (1971) 
28 
Hymes (1972) p. 54.in this terminology "speech is ... 
taken as a surrogate for all forms of language", ibid p. .53. 
2 9 cf. Hymes (1972) p. 59ff. 
3 0 Hymes (1972) p. 58-
3 1 The questions of innovation and transformability of genres 
cannot be treated in this respect here cf. Kanyo (1977) 
(1980) and (1981) 
3 2 Abrahams (1969) p. 200. 
3 3 Ben-Amos (1969) p. 225. 
3 4 cf. Ben-Amos (1969) . Kirschenblatt-Gimblett (1975) , Scheub 
(1977) 
3 5 cf. Permjakov (1970), Kanyo (1981) 
3 6 Lord (1960) p. 14-
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3 7 viz. Lord (1960) p. 14ff 
lO 
cf. Lord (1960) p. 30ff 
3 9 Nagler (1967) p. 281. 
4 0 Havelock (1977) p. 370. 
4 1 cf. Colby - Cole (1973), Finnegan (1973), Goody (1977) 
42 
cf. Tambiah (1973), and an interesting structuralist 
analysis in Todorov (1973) 
4 3 cf. Kanyo (1981) 
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As to the influence of oral literature on written 
expressions cf. Finnegan (1973) 
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THE TRICKSTER STORY 
(Its Structure and Heroes) 
G.L. PERMYAKOV 
Zhukovsky, USSR 
Wise and subtle as he is, the folk-tale prankster, or, as he 
is usually referred to by specialists in folklore, the 
"trickster", represents one of the most lifelike and amiable 
folklore characters. One can hardly find a plot in which, in 
one form or another, there is no amusing or serious, kind or 
malicious, cheerful or gloomy trickster story. Thus, the 
trickster myth must be considered an inseparable and 
especially important part of world narrative folklore. This 
fact itself has led to great attention being paid to trick-
sters and a thorough investigation of them being made. This 
explains why an article on trickster stories may be not simply 
entertaining but useful too: since it conveys some idea 
about certain characteristic features of narrative folklore 
in general. 
1. Notes on the Structure of Trickster Stories 
Probably every one of us remembers from his childhood 
the amusing German tale (by the Grimm Brothers) telling how 
two hedgehogs, standing at opposite ends of a ditch, "had a 
race" with a hare. This fable can be regarded as one of the 
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most typical examples of contest stories which exist all 
over the world. Perhaps there is not a single group of 
people in whose folklore one cannot meet at least one or 
two myths, tales, fables or anecdotes with the same or a 
similar plot.. This makes contest stories fairly convenient 
for our purposes, the more so since these stories, as a rule, 
are very, short in length. 
Following the study of a great many stories of this kind it 
is now possible to state a series of peculiarities concerning 
tricksters. I had the opportunity to discuss some of these 
features in the book "From Proverb to Folk-tale". In this 
study it was shown that contest stories and, in particular, 
stories about races, similarly to all other folklore texts 
of the same structural level, can be viewed from at least 
three planes or aspects: a) from their external (compositional) 
structure; b) from their semantic message (logical structure)j 
and c) from their object-image (realia) plane. It was emphasized 
that all the above three planes appear to be not only 
interdependent but to some degree autonomous. Thus, the animals 
taking part in a contest as competitors together with the 
setting for the competition may vary from one story to another 
whereas the course and the message of the story remains 
unchanged. In order to see this it is sufficient to compare 
the Micronesian tale about the Sargan-fish and the Crab, the 
Tuvinian fable about the Fox and the Burbot or the Simalur one 
about the Snail and the Monkey, the Puerto Rican tale about 
the Frog and the Mouse or the fable of the Guayana Indians 
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about the Deer and the Tortoise. At the same time, stories 
that are so similar in the characters taking part in the 
competition or stories that are so much alike in the terms 
agreed upon, do not always and necessarily coincide as far 
as their message is concerned. In some cases a story may 
arrive at the moral that intelligence (cunning) is more 
important than strength (speed), but other tales may have a 
totally different sense: "perseverance always wins'1 or 
"conceit never pays", etc. It can be demonstrated by the 
Latvian tale "The Hedgehog and the Hare" or the Syrian fable 
of the same name and other similar stories. Finally, the 
method used by the weaker side to gain victory over the 
stronger opponent and the corresponding development of the 
plot may also vary with the text, still having one and the 
same main message. It can readily be seen from a comparison 
of a series of tales such as the Negro one named "The Tortoise 
and the Hare" or the Japanese fable "The Cat and the Crab". 
Both these types of tales are intended to demonstrate that 
cunning is more important than strength, but cunning is used 
in different ways: in the first case the weak or slow animal 
uses its outward resemblance to its own kin, posting them all 
along the route from start to finish; in the second type it 
makes use of the physical strength of its opponent by imper-
ceptibly clinging to its tail. 
It is notable that different structural elements 
("motifs") of any of the planes, for instance those of the 
compositional or of the realia plane occuring in texts of the 
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type mentioned may exist apart from these texts, too, in a 
significantly different relation. Thus, a crayfish that 
clings to the tail of a stronger animal can also be seen in 
the Bulgarian anecdote "The Performing Dog" telling how a 
shrewd Gabrovo citizen managed to steal a crayfish from a 
market-woman with the aid of a dog, or the Polish fable named 
"The Horse, the Ox, the Rooster, the Cat and the Crayfish", 
similar in its plot to "The Bremen Musicians" (in the fable 
the Crayfish clings to the tail of the Ox in order to travel 
round the world). And two hares, one placed at the beginning 
and the other at the end of the route, can be met not only 
in tales about races but also in stories about tricks performed 
by Nasruddin and other tricksters (compare, for example, the . 
Azerbaijan tale narrating how Molla sold the ruler a "wise" 
hare "capable" of giving orders to others). All these and 
similar facts - of which one may collect any amount - once 
again underline the relative measure of autonomy enjoyed by 
the different planes (levels) of folklore texts. 
I now wish to continue to set forth the observations made 
in the treatise "From Proverb to Folk-tale". 
If one enlarges the circle of texts to be studied, it turns 
out that the contestant does not exceptionally use its 
outward resemblance to its own kin or its opponent's strength 
so as to gain victory, but it can resort to other tricks as 
well: in one case it posts a fleet-footed stand-in in its 
place (for example, a "younger brother", i.e. a hare, lying 
under a bush, as does for instance Ivanko-Medvedko in a 
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Russian tale), sometimes it arranges for the opponent to 
fall in to a pit (as is the case in the race between the Fox 
and the Wolf in the corresponding European fables), or it 
uses magic invocation and witchcraft (like the Chameleon in 
the Hausa tale "The Antelope and the Chameleon) etc. No matter 
what kind of a trick the trickster resorts to, the main 
message and the characteristics of the stories themselves, 
however, remain unchanged in principle. The same holds true 
for the analysis of stories about competitions in "strength" 
(outbalancing, fighting), in reaching the highest point 
(flights, jumps) and also in other skills (who eats the most, 
who catches sight of the Sun the earliest, and so on cf, e.g. 
the North American Negro tale "How Brer Turtle Came to Be the 
Strongest of All?", the Surinam Negro fable "Who Flies the 
Highest of All?" and the Kazakh "The Happiest Year" together 
with a number of similar tales of other peoples). 
In this way, it appears that all stories about contests between 
weak but clever (cunning) and strong but foolish protagonists 
represent a uniform common tale in the world, albeit that the 
concrete manifestations dispose of numerous national, 
geographical, social and other specific variants. It must be 
added that in his time the Soviet scholar V. J. Propp arrived 
at a similar conclusion after investigating different folklore 
material.. 
Applying Propp's method, I found that stories about contest 
together with other types of folktales are identically submitted 
to certain regularities. Thus, the structure of contest tales 
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is also divisible into individual structural elements and 
blocks. In a tale about competition the number of structural 
elements is constant and is. even less than in a fairy tale -
only twelve, with seven functions and five compositional 
elements. The functions are as follows: meeting of the 
competitors, agreement to compete, preparation for the contest, 
the course of the competition, victory of one competitor, 
awarding the prize to the winner and punishing.the loser. 
Compositional components are: orientation in space and time, 
characterisation of the participants, repetition of the competi-
tion and, finally, the etiological element ("since then it has 
been the way..."). Furthermore, all thèse elements are arranged 
in a strict pattern: first come the time and place of the 
event (orientation) then the competitors are described (this 
is sometimes combined with the next element); then come the 
first five functions cited above (in that order); they are 
followed by a second competition (usually at the loser's 
request); then come the two last functions; and, finally, the 
etiological element. Like fairy-tales, tales about contests 
have their own special set of characters with c\i early, delineated 
functions. The difference is that in this folk-tale type the 
number of characters is not seven but four: the two 
contestants, a stand-in for one of the contestants and the 
referee. Sometimes their functions (most often that of the 
stand-in) are distributed among several persons. 
Naturally, I have described an "ideal" contest story. In fact, 
each text lacks one or more Of the above mentioned features: 
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sometimes a referee is not included in the tale, in other 
cases a prize is not awarded to the winner or there is no 
repetition of the competition, and so on. Yet there is a 
great number of more or less complete contest stories. 
A typical example of such tales could be the Zunian tale 
"How the Gopher Had a Race with Runners from Kiakime", 
which possesses - with the exception of a repetition of the 
competition - all structural elements beginning with orienta-
tion ("The event took place in the Valley of Shivin at the 
time when Kiakime inhabitants were famous for their strength 
and high speed...") and ending with the etiological element 
("Since then up to this time Zunian youngsters when preparing 
for a competition in running have taken with them the sacred 
yellow pollen and red paint and painted beautiful red plumelets 
for the gophers dwelling by the path for running..."). 
Almost the same can be said of the Vietnamese tale "The Tiger 
and the Mollusc", the German story named "The Hare and the 
Hedgehog", the Eskimo fable "The Elk and the Goby" and the 
Shoshonean Indian folktale "The Wolf and the Frog" and of 
many, many others as well. 
On the other hand, among contest stories there can be found 
certain tales in which the potential existance of a complete 
set of structural elements is actually precluded. Such is the 
case in fables of the Russian "The Fox and the Crayfish" 
type, in which the weaker side uses its opponent's strength 
and, as a result, can do without a stand-in and even without 
a referee."Similar texts (i.e. those incapable of being 
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complete as far as their total number of structural elements 
is concerned) I have singled out into a distinct "constructive 
type 2" in order to distinguish them from those theoretically 
capable of being complete in this respect. 
Furthermore, contest stories have other, more prominent 
peculiarities not dealt with in the book "From Proverb to 
Folk-tale". After a study of other texts it appears that, 
apart from the above-mentioned properties, tales possess 
some other features as well. In particular, these texts 
together with others observed earlier in this paper form a 
de finite system of semantic (or logical) transformation very 
much similar to the one I described earlier in connection with 
proverbial phrases as well as fablettes, one-scene anecdotes, 
fables and Schwanke, i.e. in connection with all synthetic 
(or, in other words, those allowing of extended interpreta-
tion) folklore clichés of other compositional levels. 
It must be noted that, whereas some of the tales about 
contests demonstrate that intelligence (cunning) is better 
(more important) thafi strength (speed), others show the 
opposite: the stronger opponent undoubtedly wins against the 
weaker one. Moreover, there are tales in which neither of the 
protagonists or, on the contrary, both of the contestants 
turn out to be the winners. Finally, there are texts from 
which it is not clear which of the opponents is the winner, 
after all. Such tales usually end with an appeal to the listener 
(reader) suggesting that he himself give the answer to the 
- 57 -
question. This type of stories can be illustrated by the 
Hausa Schwank (plot anecdote) "Who Is the Most Skilful?". 
It must be noticed that contest stories of the last three 
types (i.e. when the stronger wins, when no one gains victory 
and when it is not known who is to be considered the winner) 
exist not only as exceptions. This is far from the case. 
True, contest stories ending with a question occur relatively 
scarcely. None the less there is a fairly large number of 
tales in which it is the stronger participant that manages 
to be the winner. These stories are frequently met not only 
on their own but also as episodes within the limits of some 
longer narrations. For example, one can recall many stories 
narrating how the hero, having procured a magic horse, takes 
the upper hand, outruns or "outjumps" his contestants and 
marries the princess. However, since such ("honest") tales 
describe ordinary things, they do not attract great attention 
and it may even occur to the inexperienced observer that it is 
the other ones, i.e. those that have the weaker side win, 
that prevail. 
Characteristically, after having recourse to a sufficiently 
representative collection' of tales (such as that of the 
Brothers Grimm, J. Harris or A.V. Afanasyev, etc.), one can 
discover all or almost all the abovementioned semantic 
variants .(logical transformations) not only in world folklore 
as a whole but also in the folklore stock of each distinct 
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people. 
And, what is particularly noteworthy is as follows: all the 
said logical transformations are practically equivalent in 
the sense that none of them can be considered as being any 
more right than the rest. In the foregoing I shall mark them 
with the letters A, B, C, and D, respectively. Transformation 
A will refer to texts "demonstrating" that it is the 
strongest who wins; transformation B will denote cases with 
the most intelligent (cunning) opponent; transformation C 
where neither (or both) of the contestants gains victory; 
transformation D will designate stories in which it is vfticlear 
who is to be considered the winner. Of course, these types 
are certainly demonstrated (told or recalled) in different 
situations. Thus, the tale about the Hare and the Hedgeheg 
may be remembered by a German when, in the course of a 
dialogue, an incident is mentioned with reference to a weak 
but cunning man who gains victory over a strong but foolish 
one. On the contrary, the same German may think of the tale 
about the Eagle and the Wren or the Herring and the Flounder 
if the situation is just the opposite." There is nothing 
strange in this, since most of the contest stories, especially 
all tales, fables and Schwanke of this type, as well as all 
other types of folklore texts with a didactic function, 
represent different life and logical situations. Let us 
consider a very realistic, i.e. not phantastical episode in 
fairy tales, for example a man is sitting on a bough and 
this bough cuts wood with it:> own hand. Such an episode is 
naturally impossible in real life. But in fairy tales we 
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often meet such events (consider the stories about Nusreddin, 
Al.'U-Hassan and other tricksters) . And here they do not appear 
meaningless, but they contribute to the formulation of the 
content. In order to understand this significance we should 
not interpret the text in a literal, but in a metaphorical 
sense. In this case we can immediately tackle and solve the 
problem of the relevance of the fairy tale to everyday life: 
how often men cut the. wood on which they are sitting! 
Let us turn back to the question of the logical transfor-
mations. 
First of all, it must be stated that the abovementioned 
system of logical transformation concerns not only contest 
stories but also folklore texts of other structural and 
semantic types, such as, for example, tales, fables and 
anecdotes about judgements. The numerous folk-tales about 
clever and righteous judgements (just remember the "judgements 
of Solomon") stand in contrast to the likewise numerous 
stories about stupid and mistaken judgements (e.g. the judge-
ment on the Pike that was sentenced to be drowned, or the 
famous "Shemyakin judgement"). Among stories about judgements 
there is a fairly great number of tales in which both sides 
turn out to be equally right. Yet another type of story about 
judgements is the so-called "dilemma story", which generally 
carry no assertion as to the question of which side is right: 
they merely end with a question addressed to the listener. An 
example of stories of this type is afforded by the Liberian 
riddle-question named "The Beautiful Youngster" and also by 
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analogous African text cited in the anthology compiled by 
Alta Yablow ("Yes and No"). 
Furthermore, transformation spreads over all components of 
folklore texts including distinct structural elements and 
blocks as well as characters. The latter can be well observed 
in the examples of those folklore heroes to whom cycles of 
differing extents are devoted. The same Fox that could be . 
deceived with so much skill by the Crayfish in the above con-
test tale appears in a series of other European and Asian 
tales and fables as the most clever and cunning animal. 
In this connection there is no significant difference between 
the Fox and the shrewd and witty Deer of the Indonesian tales 
or Brer Rabbit of the American Negro tales, which are 
"outraced" (in fact, accompanied) by the Snail and the Turtle, 
respectively. Semantic transformation is even more manifest in 
the case of the anthropomorphic heroes, such as Abu Nuwds, 
Ahmet Ahay, Burbal, Kemine, Kim Son Dal and Nasruddin. All 
these characters appear to be either clever or stupid, rich 
or poor, religious or atheist, kind or malicious, and so on, 
and so forth. 
Finally, semantic transformation of folklore stories is 
a rather early phenomenon. It manifests itself already in the 
most ancient layers of folk art, e.g. in the archaic myths 
about the so-called "culture" heroes who acquire for mankind 
such blessings of civilisation as fire, working tools and the 
like. In this way, the mythical character ("culture" hero or 
- 61 -
creator-demiurge) of the Koryaks and Itelmens (Kamchadals), 
viz., the clever and ever so mighty Raven acts as a trickster 
or a goose in some cases. Incompatible features are allotted 
to the mythical hero of the Americal Indians of the Great 
Basin, namely, the Coyote, or to the hero of the ancient 
Ossete epos, Syrdon, and to almost all other characters of 
archic peoples's art. It is in stories about twin brothers, 
which figure prominently in the mythology of many peoples all 
over the world, where the semantic "dualism" of archaic folk-
lore becomes especially apparent. One of the brothers, as 
a rule, is benevolent and sharp-witted, whereas the other is 
usually stupid and muddle-headed. The creation of all good 
things, natural phenomena and customs is ascribed to the first 
brother while all the bad, unnecessary things, beginning with 
harmful insects and ending with death are attributed to the 
second. An example to illustrate this is offered by the twin 
brothers To-Kabinana and To-Purgo or To-Karvuvu, the Melanesian 
folklore characters of New Britain. Nevertheless, the semantic 
differences in question reveal a somewhat different quality 
in myths as compared to tales, fables or anecdotes resulting 
from the myths themselves being basically different from the 
texts mentioned. Myths proper, just like other analytical 
clichés (omens, economic, legal and medical sayings) have only 
one concrete meaning and allow of no extended interpretation 
of any kind. 
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On the subject of semantic transformations of folk 
stories there is yet one important point to be made. In my 
discussion of the relative autonomy of the different planes 
of folklore texts, it was pointed out that several stories 
about competitions in running, similar from the point of 
view of the competitors and the terms of the contest agreed 
upon, do not always coincide as far as their main message is 
concerned: some of them maintain that intelligence (cunning) 
is more important than strength or fleet-footedness, the 
others firmly state that conceit does not lead to success, 
and so on. And later, when I was dealing with the problem of 
logical text transformations and was singling out transforma-
tional types A, B, C and D, it might have seemed as though 
I was trying to give an explanation of the existing lack of 
semantic coordination. This is in fact, far from being the 
case. Stories about races with different messages, (e.g. the 
Latvian tale "The Hare and the Hedgehog" and the Syrian fable 
of the same name) do not represent logical transformations 
of identical ideas and situations. The difference between 
them is of some other origin. Here the texts are built up of 
one and the same structural elements, the texts themselves 
belonging to markedly different structural-logical types, i.e. 
the texts modelling far from identical types of situations. 
It must be added that from this point of view (as well as from 
many others) narrative folklore texts approach proverbial 
phrases (of e.g. the Vietnamese and Chinese proverbs emerging 
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from one and the same realia but different in their logical 
structure: "If there is no fish crabs are welcome" and 
"Where there are crabs there must be fish, too.") 
2. The Problem of Preference 
In the tale of the Caddo Indians titled "The Coyote and 
the Turtle" it is the Turtle that makes a fool of the Coyote 
in the same way as it outwits Brer Rabbit in the American 
Negro tale named "How Brer Rabbit and Brer Turtle Had A Race?". 
In the Latvian tale about the Fox and the Crayfish it is the 
Crayfish that happens to be the more cunning, and, in the 
Simalur fable about the Snail and the Monkey and in the 
Cambodian one about the Snail and the Hare it is the weaker 
animal, viz., the Snail, that gets the better of its feet-footed 
opponent. Taking into account some other stories with one or 
both of the above characters, however, it becomes apparent 
that in many other cases it is the animal fooled in the above 
examples that turns out to be the most intelligent and cunning 
of all. The same is true of the contestant taking part in 
competitions of strength, skill and all the rest. 
But who is, after all the most cunning of all tricksters? 
Who is, then, the strongest of the strong? And, on the whole, 
which of these folklore characters is the most successful 
and undetectable? 
It is not at all simple to answer these questions. This 
is so not only because different characters are considered to 
be the most successful in the folklore of different countries 
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and peoples, but also because this phenomenon is peculiar to 
almost every distinct folklore of each separate people. 
Thus, the American Negrous think of the turtle and the 
rabbit as the cleverest of the animals, while Latvians think 
in the same way of the fox and the hare. The folklore of 
many peoples has several ingenious tricksters, either 
anthropomorphic or zoomorphic. 
The Turkmenians, for example, have many tales or anecdotes 
about famous tricksters and fun-makers (such as Kemine, 
Esenpolate, Mirali, Karu-Ate and Effendi Nasruddin. There 
exist cycles of tales or fables about cunning trick performed 
by a hyena, a jackal, a hare, a turtle or a spider, as 
manifested in the folklore of Sudan. 
Moreover, if one observes thoroughly the obtainable 
folklore texts of one separate people, it appears that 
there - in accordance with all the rules of transformation 
described in the previous section - each character is presented 
to the listener (reader) either as witty or simple-minded, 
strong or weak, undefeatable or defeated, etc. As a result, 
each folklore hero can be attributed to any value system of 
folklore characters as its best and at the same time worst 
element. It becomes extremly apparent in the case of the 
"ring-like" cumulative tales, such as the Vietnamese tale 
named "Who Is the Strongest?" It goes like this: 
"The strongest of all in the world is the king: 
! 
By his order a thief is 
caught and executed immediately. 
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Nevertheless, the thief is .strong, too: 
he can steal a rooster 
and cook it for dinner. 
Yet, the rooster is strong, of course: 
It can swallow worms with much skill. 
But the worm has its strength, too: 
It eats away the leg of the throne 
and the king flies to the ground. 
Who is the strongest of all in the world?" 
Symbolically the interrelation between the king (K), the 
thief, (T) , the rooster (R) and the worm (W) in the above 
tale can be shown in the form of a chain: 
K > T > R > W > K , 
where ''>" serves to signal preference (superiority) and reads 
as "stronger than" or "better than", "preferred to" etc. It 
can be easily recognised that the given chain is endless and 
that it can be schematically presented in the form of a ring 
each link of which is superior to the one following it and the 








One can find analogous superiority ring, - either big 
or small, simple or "figured" - in the folklore of any people. 
Let us turn to the example of the Latvian animal epos. 
There are fables among the Latvian tales about animals in 
which the Fox gains victory over the Cat, the Wolf, the Bear, 
the Lynx, the Raven the Rooster, the Dog, the Goat, and 
several other animal characters as well as the Man. In the 
same collection one can also find tales in which it is the 
Fox that turns out to be the loser, being conquered by the 
Heath-cock, the Rooster, the Hare, the Ravan, the Crayfish, 
the Hawk, the Cat and the Man. On the other hand, the Hare, 
for example, is stronger (or more cunning) than the Fox, the 
Wolf, the Lion, the Dog and the Man. The Man wins against 
the Bear, the Wolf, the Fox, the Hare, the Gadfly, the Bird, 
the Fish, the Worm. The Wolf is recognised as being inferior 
to the Dog, the Sheep, the Hare and the Pig and so on. 
On the basis of the above relationships it is possible 
to construct a series of chains and rings of superiority. 
Here are some of them: 
Elementary 
1/ Fox > Rooster > Fox; 2/ Fox > Raven > Fox 
3/ Fox > Cat > Fox 4/ Fox > Man > Fox. 
Complex 
1/ Man > Fox > Lion > Hare > Dog > Cat > Pig > Wolf > Sheep 
> Man; 
2/ Fox > Rooster > Fox > Cat > Fox > Hare > Fox > Raven > Fox. 
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It is convenient to depict schematically such complex 
chains in the form of rings; the letters stand for the names 
of the animals, respectively, RA denoting "Raven" as opposed 
to R "Rooster": 
G > M F 
J < /j A. 
W F RA R 
A . V A v 
P H F F 
N • V ^ V 
C L H C 
V . ¿- ^ k D F 
Scheme 2 Scheme 3 
If some of the links of the big rings are replaced by 
corresponding and equivalent rings of a smaller size, the 
scheme will have the following appearance: 
G > M > RA 
-7 4 i> 
W F 
-1 \J A 
p H M 
^ 
C L 





Many links can be substituted for each other by simply 
changing their places or the things of preference (>) can be 
turned as to point in the opposite direction, - yet the scheme 
will remain relevant to the folklore material. 
\ 
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What, then, are we dealing with here? 
To be honest, we cannot be absolutely certain. 
Is it the case that, to a certain degree, the versatility 
of these heroes can be explained by the existing cunning of 
the animals, by their admirable fitness to conditions of 
existence which is reflected so truthfully in the folklore? 
Maybe. At any rate, it is commonly known that many animals are 
''apt to be cunning". How skilfully hares double back when 
running away from their pursuers! Or chameleons, changing the 
colour of their body according to the colour of their 
environment, also hide from their enemies in an extremely 
"witty" manner. Plovers sitting on their eggs pretend to be 
injured whenever a man approaches and, dragging their "wounded" 
wings on the ground, they attract the unbidden guest away from 
their nests. Even more cunning is the way in which tree 
sparrows act in building their nests in the wall of the nests 
of their worst enemy the falcon: falcons do not hunt near 
their nests and they do not let other birds and beatst of 
prey come close to the nests. And this is what experts on 
octopuses say: if an octopus cannot open a shell in order to 
regale itself on a mollusc, it waits until the shell itself 
opens, and at that moment the octopus places a piece of 
stone or coral into the opening. 
These and similar facts and data, however, cannot account 
for the extant lack of agreement in the estimation of intelli-
gence and other properties of animals, i.e., what we call 
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qualitative trans formation of folklore characters, or, in 
other words, the circumtance in which the clever and the 
foolish heroes of the stories take each other's places even 
within the limits of one and the same plot. Earlier I cited 
examples of the clever and of the foolish Nasruddin. Here I 
shall list several analogous examples concerning animal 
characters. A tale of the Dinka people of Sudan narrates how 
the Hyena deceived the Lion. The two animals once managed to 
acquire some meat (by killing an antelope). The Hyena said 
that the meat had to be fried and sent the Lion to fetch fire. 
The Lion set out towards the Sun but returned with nothing. 
While the Lion was on his way, the Hyena ate the meat. Then 
it told the Lion that the meat had been eaten, most likely, 
by the god of the Earth. Kanurin people from "West Africa 
tell an identical tale about the Weasel and the Hyena. In this 
tale it is the Weasel that deceives the stupid (!) Hyena in 
the same way as above, the only difference being that the 
Weasel blames people for committing the crime. There is no 
doubt that it is impossible to explain the transformation of 
the Hyena's image by any biological argumentations. 
It is possible that the appropriate answer to the 
question lies in the field of ethnography, viz., in ancient 
customs and beliefs? Well, this seems very likely to be the 
case. At any rate, similar suppositions have already been 
made. 
According to one, folklore stories about clever and 
cunning (and, as a rule, good) animals go back to religious-
-magical texts intended for these very animals. These texts 
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were once narrated in order to propitiate the animals in 
question or to lull their vigilance thereby ensuring the 
success of the hunt. Regardless of all its advantages, the 
above hypothesis is, however, incapable of explaining why 
animals like frogs, spiders, lizards, flies and other animals 
lacking any trade or, at least, economic significance, appear 
to be good animals. 
Another supposition seems considerably more convincing. 
According to this theory zoomorphic folklore characters go 
back to the totemic ancestors of a given ethnic group. Many 
Australian, Oceanic, South American and African tribes still 
continue to consider certain animals to be their kinsmen, 
worship and make sacrifices to them and forbid their killing. 
In New Caledonia, for example, it is strictly forbidden to 
kill lizards: the inhabitants think of them as the embodiment 
of their own ancestors. Analogous situations are narrated by 
the Papuan fratrias (marriage classes) with regard to kangaroos, 
cassowaries, dogs, wild-boars, eagles, cormorants and other 
local animals as well as certain kinds of plants. It can 
readily be conceived that parallel to the consolidation of 
some genera and tribes as larger ethnic entities such as the 
Iroquois League, their ancient totemic ancestors become the 
objects of a wider reverence, being worshipped by whole 
peoples, -i.e. they become converted into gods and demigods. 
The latter are driven into the background or, like the first 
come to belong to the common national pantheon. Later, at 
approximately the time when monotheism is being established, 
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earlier tribal gods turn into different kinds of cherubs and 
seraphim or evil spirits. 
If however, the supposition about the totemic origin of 
zoomorphic characters can provide an answer as to why one or 
other animal is given predominance in the folklore of one and 
the same people, it is hardly capable of yielding an explana-
tion of the preference of certain anthropomorphic characters 
to others. It may be the case that the latter ones (i.e. human 
characters) also go back to ancient tribal archi-ancestors, 
"culture" heroes that once used to be worshipped as protectors 
of ethnic groups and, naturally, were considered the 
cleverest, the strongest and the best of all. This hypothesis 
still cannot give an adequate and overall explanation of the 
above facts. Amongst folk-tale tricksters and wise men there-
is a good number which appeared as characters relatively 
recently, probably 300-500 years ago, whereas folklore itself 
has existed for thousand of years. Above all, these tricksters 
and wise men are also, as has been demonstrated in the previous 
section, frequently presented as foolish and simple-minded 
characters. 
True, the latter factor is thought by some specialists 
in folklore (not without grounds) to be the result of deliberate 
or undeliberate-parodying of old and outdated notions. Hand 
in hand with social and "cultural development people's opinions, 
too, undergoe transformation and as a result, the notions that 
once were good later turn bad and vice versa. Thus., together 
with the establishment and stabilization of the Ossete patri-
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archal customs, their ancient folklore characters undergo 
radical transformation. The noble Nart Sosrukp (Soslan), the 
great hero of the old Ossete legends turns into a cowardly 
and treacherous man in the later versions, and his mother 
Satana, the demigoddess mother of the Narts is later presented 
as an evil witch. A number of such examples can be cited from 
the folklore of any people. Yet all of them put together are 
insufficient to give an adequate evalution of the diversity 
of th^. transformative forms or, in particular, of the cases 
of twin brothers, so frequently met in the archaic folklore, 
where one of the twins makes a parody of the others deeds. 
After all, both twin brothers act simultaneously, so that an 
explanation based on the evolution of people's opinion has no 
place here. 
Most probably the reason lies in something else. All our 
rings of superiority as well as the whole diversity of the 
qualitative variants of folklore characters are connected with 
the system of logical transformations of the texts dealt with 
in the previous, section. In fact, whereas folklore stories 
(either as a whole or considered separately) model facts and 
situations on real life, the totality of these stories 
repeats (as a model) the totality of life situations and 
facts themselves. Facts and situations occuring in life may 
be and frequently are most heterogenous; they may be observed 
in their different ralations to each other, they may be valued 
from many sides, and this alone can make them seem different 
in each of their real-iife situations (and, when considered 
in folklore» in each of their folklore contexts): they may 
seem good in one case and bad in another, either necessary 
or unnecessary, clever or foolish, that is to say, different. 
In any case, regardless of all the differences in their 
appearance, they may seem quite true to life. It is sufficient 
to observe the legend of Samson and Delilah from the viewpoint 
of the Philistines and all values will at once change to the 
opposite. Delilah, the former traitress will instantly become 
a "positive" heroine and she will in no way differ from a 
certain Beautiful Helen who tries to make Koschei reveal the 
secret of eternal life. Extraordinarily illustrative in this 
respect is the wonderful Dungan tale about two brothers who 
wooed the daughters of Matsun, the teacher. In order to test 
thé intelligence and knowledge of the fiancés Matsun put three 
questions to the brothers. First he askedthe elder brother: 
Why does a goose come dry out of the water and why has it such 
a loud voice? "And the brother answered: The feathers of a 
goose are covered with grease so that water cannot penetrate. 
The loud voice of a goose, is brought about by its long neck 
and wide throat." Then Matsun asked: "Why is one of these 
apples red and the other green?" The elder brother took a 
glance at the apple-tree and answered: "Because one half of 
the apple turns to the Sun and the other half is in shadow." 
Then thé teacher led the fiance to the room in which"the elder 
sister was sitting and asked: "Why has my daughter white skin 
and you - dark?'1 The elder brother replied: "Your daughter is 
- 74 -
white because she sits inside the house all the time but I 
am dark since I spend much time in the Sun." Matsun liked the 
elder brother's answers and assented to give his elder 
daughter in marriage to him. Then the teacher asked the same 
questions from the younger brother who was a fellow of a 
totally different stamp. Answering the question about the voice 
of the goose the younger brother said: "The voice depends 
on the kind of the animal." The teacher remarked: 
"But your wise brother had answered me that a goose had a loud 
voice because it had a long neck." - Oh, no, - protested the 
younger brother, - it is merely a particular case and you 
cannot make a rule of it. A frog, for instance, has a very 
short neck, but is has a very loud voice, all the same." Having 
heard the question about the apple, the younger brother took 
one from the tree, tore it into two pieces and, pointing to 
the seeds he answered: "Everything depends on the seeds, that 
is on the sort of apple." "- But your wise brother said that 
one half of the apple became red because it had been exposed 
to the Sun." - said the teacher. "- Oh, no, - replied the 
younger brother - it is just an exeptional case. There are 
apples equally red on both sides, although they, too, had been 
exposed to the Sun on only one side. Red beet, for example, 
sits in the earth all the time and never sees at all the Sun 
and yet it is red in colour." Finally Matsun led the younger 
brother to his younger daughter and asked him about the reason 
of his. daughter's white skin. The younger brother explained: 
"Her gentle white skin is from Nature." But your wise brother 
explained that my daughters always keep in the shadow." "- Oh, 
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no, - protested the younger of the brothers, - it is a 
particular case. The black insect lives in shadow all the 
time but on this account it will never turn white. Matsun 
admitted that the second brother also give adequate answers to 
his questions and let him marry his younger daughter. 
In the above tale the contradictory deeds of the archaic 
folklore twins reacting in a different manner to identical 
"creative tasks" now seem deeper and more sensible. It is 
possible that this many-sided approach, this intention to view 
phenomena from different angles and not to evalute them 
identically, is the basis of the admirable wisdom of our 
ancient ancestors who fixed their richest life experiences in 
the simple and at the same complex, harmonious and none the . 
less contradictory system of logical transformation reflecting 
the partical logic of common sense. 
(Translated by Károly Fábricz) 
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THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF SOME RUSSIAN RIDDLES 





For a long time people have recognized and appraised 
the didactic nature of riddles. It is not by chance that 
in folklore studies, especially in the studies of peoples 
having little or no written language, much attention is 
payed to riddles. Thus, old men of many tribes in Africa from 
the Ivory Coast (Baule) to Namibia (Ovambo) would gather young 
people from time to time for special evenings of contest in 
riddle-answering. The young participants are then divided 
into groups. An old man tells a riddle. The group whose member 
finds the correct answer first is given a point (forfeit). 
The group that collects the most points is then proclaimed as 
the winner. If no one can give an answer to the riddle (as is 
often the. case), it is the questioner himself who gives the 
answer. Such contests in riddle-answering are of much interest 
even by themselves. But perhaps their, most interesting feature 
is that it is not only the everyday articles of life, natural 
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phenomena, local events, ideas or views of a tribal group as 
expressed by pictures or descriptions that serve as an answer 
to a given riddler (thus resembling traditional Western 
European or Russian answers to riddles), but also different 
clicheized sentences: proverbs, tokens, economic, "juridical" 
and "ethical" sayings (e.g. strictly formulated rules of 
property inheritance, rules of behavior in different situations 
etc.). Memorizing the answers to a certain set of riddles, 
young people gradually learn not only the names of things 
necessary in their lives, but also a number of sayings that 
are indispensable for social intercourse and proper behavior. 
And although in more developed societies with a wide range of 
schooling, books and mass media information it would appear to 
be unnecessary for riddles to be used in such a way, as a 
consequence of which riddles change from "serious", "adult" 
folklore to "children's" folklore, nevertheless their didactic 
role does not disappear. Though in the form of a kind of game, 
they keep on teaching the same things as they used to teach 
earlier. 
The didactic function of riddles has for a long time 
attracted the attention of ethnographers and specialists in 
folklore, paremiologists, in particular. It is not without 
reason that any serious semantic classification of riddles is 
based on .the so-called "thematic" principle, that is it 
actually reveals (describes) those spheres of people's life 
and activities, of macrocosm and microcosm, which are taught 
by way of riddles. As a rule, it includes man and the parts 
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of his body, his dwelling with all its furniture, livestock, 
and handicraft, his trade, public relations, beliefs, natural 
phenomena, the local flora and fauna, the sky and earth, and 
so on and so forth, in a word, everything that a man encounters 
in his everyday life and'in his thoughts about it. 
But riddles teach us not only this. It is striking how 
heterogenous their inner and outer linguistic structures are. 
There are riddles in the form of a direct question, but there 
are also riddles whose first part is expressed by an affirmative 
or a negative sentence, there are riddle tales, riddle 
anecdotes, riddle stories, riddle songs, riddle plays, riddle 
puns, riddle traps, riddle jokes, riddle puzzles, riddle 
sum-doings and many other riddle types. And all of them exist 
in several (sometimes in many) syntactic forms that are 
phenetically and rhythmically built up in a different way. If 
we add to this that all or almost all of the folk riddles are 
well-cut and firmly sewn and, consequently, easy to memorize, 
it becomes evident how important their role is in the 
acquisition of the riches of a mother-tongue. It is well 
known, too, that the majority of riddles are built on a 
metaphor, i.e. their first part describes an object (or a 
phenomenon! which is contained in the second part (in the 
answer) in terms of a different sphere of life. This accustoms 
people to understanding the given trope (and it is extraordinarily 
important from the point of view of human communication) and 
at the same time it enhances the development of fantasy and 
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metaphoric (figurative) thinking. 
Even this is still not the end of the list. Our 
investigations of riddles of eighty peoples in Europe, Asia 
and Africa show that folk riddles differ from one another 
not only in their linguistic form and set of realia used in 
the questions and answers, but also in their logical structure. 
That is to say, every riddle is built up on a certain logical 
model and requires for its answer a corresponding logical 
method. 
As an example, let us compare some simple riddles with 
a direct sense (i.e. not metaphorical). 
(1) There is a cat sitting on the window; its whiskers 
are like those of a cat, its eyes are like those of a cat, 
its ears are like those of a cat, still it is not a cat. 
(Who is it?) 
(2) What horse can see equally well from the front and 
from behind? 
(3) When they started to build Moscow, how did they 
drive the first nail? 
(4) You are my son, but I am not your father. (How can 
it be?) 
(5) There are two of it in a woman, and none in a girl. 
(What is it?) 
(6) A magpie flying, a dog on its tail. (How can it be?) 
(7) There were two fathers, two sons, one grandfather 
and one grandson walking. How many people were there walking 
altogether? 
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(8) A cock cried and woke up three men. How many cocks 
are necessary in order to wake up nine men? 
Each of these riddles can be answered in a different 
way. In order to answer the first riddle, it is not at all 
necessary to call to mind all types of cat-like animals, as 
is usually done by the uninitiated; it is enough to remember 
that the word "koshka" in Russian may refer not only to the 
animal in general, but it may stand for a "female cat" as 
well, in this case being opposed to the word "male cat". The 
correct answer to the riddle will be the word "kot", i.e. a 
he-cat. When answering the second riddle, it is important to 
notice that the expression "equally well" (odinakovo khorosho) 
in Russian means not "well", but "equally", "in the same way". 
And then it becomes clear at once that the question is about a 
blind horse, and it sees nothing from the front, the same as 
from behind. The answer to the third riddle requires finding 
out about the ambiguity of the interrogative "wo ohto", for it 
can have the meaning "in what object", as well as "in what 
part of an object". And since we know of only one thing from 
the text of the riddle that could be hit on (i.e. the nail), 
it is now easy to give the answer: "Hitting it on the head." 
In order to find the answer to the fourth riddle it is sufficient -
to realize that it is not only a father who can have a son, but 
a mother too, (or the other way round: a son can have a father 
as well as a mother); and if someone calls a boy "son" and it 
is not his father, then it means it must be his mother. If we 
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wish to answer the fifth riddle, it is necessary to remember 
that a given object (denotatum) has a name (signification) and 
that this name can be expressed by letters: in the word 
"woman" ("baba") there are two letters "b", whereas the word 
"girl" ("devka") has none. One can give the proper answer to 
the sixth riddle only if he sees that not one object is 
referred to, but two, and they are independent of each other, 
with the riddle itself containing no metaphor: "the magpie 
flies (in the sky), but the dog sits on its (own) tail". 
(This riddle is especially difficult to answer when it is 
asked in a row with metaphorical ones.) The answer to the 
seventh riddle requires that we take into consideration that 
the words "father", "son", "grandfather" and "grandson" do not 
only designate certain people but at the same time they refer 
to relations between them: a man's son may be the father of 
another, etc. Having considered the ambiguous content of 
these words it is easy to see that the riddle talks about 
three men only (a man with his father and his son). The eighth 
riddle makes it necessary to give up the routine approach 
("9:3 = 3") and to understand the specificity of the given 
situation: the cry of a cock is heard equally by everyone 
sleeping and it has nothing to do with the number of cocks. 
As can be seen from this short list (which could be 
significantly extended), each riddle requires a specific 
logical method in its solution. It is very interesting to 
note, that if someone comes across a riddle of a new logico-
-structural type for the first time, he has to face certain 
difficulties, indeed perhaps he cannot even answer the riddle 
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at all (this, by the way, is of no importance, since the 
questioner is only too glad to give the answer), but when 
someone is asked a riddle of this kind for the second time, 
he usually answers it in an easy and simple way. Thus, if one 
knows the answer to the first riddle (the one about the cat 
referring also to a she-cat), then it is easy for him to 
answer an analogous riddle about the dog. Or if we know the 
answer to the fourth riddle (the son and his relation to his 
"not-father"), it presents no problem to answer a similar 
riddle about a daughter and a "not-mother". If we know the 
way the fifth riddle is to be answered, then it is not 
difficult to give the answer to the following riddle: "What 
is in the middle of the earth (zemlja) and at the end of 
thunder [grom)?" The matter is that we already know the method 
with the help of which it is possible to answer a riddle of 
the given logico-structural type. 
Thus, riddles teach people to think by way of providing 
them with the knowledge of different logical methods. And this 
seems to be the most important feature of the didactic func-
tion of riddles. 
It is worth noticing that although folk riddles represent 
an infinite variety, there are comparatively few logical 
models on which riddles are built: according to our preliminary 
estimation there are not more than 40 models. But all of them 
appear to be universal. Riddles of very different peoples are 
constructed in the same way, regardless of the differences in 
language and culture. This suggests that the logical models of 
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riddles and the corresponding logical methods of answering 
them could serve as a base for an international classificatipn 
of paremias of this type. All the rest of the features tradi- . 
tionally used for the classification of riddles - such as 
theme, linguistic and compositional structure, type and 
nature of riddle, motivation of overall meaning, etc. - can be 
included as means of dividing riddles into subtypes and 
categories within the basic logico-structural types. 
Unfortunately neither the logical structure of riddles 
(except for two or three types investigated by E. Kfingas-
-Maranda), nor the set of logical methods suitable for answering 
riddles have been studied so far. Logics and psychology do not 
only lack any classification of logical methods, they do not 
even dispose of a full list of these methods. 
Consequently, N.V. Barabanova's article below is of 
great interest as it deals with some logico-structural types 
of riddles from D.N. Sadovnikov's famous collection "Russian 
Riddles". As can be seen from N.V. Barabanova's study, riddles 
from different sections and parts of the collection may have 
the same invariant model. True, Barabanova has described not 
all the logico-structural types that appear in Sadovnikov's 
book. But those described are sufficient to confirm the above 
idea about riddles helping people to master different logical 
methods of thinking. It is also important that N.V. Barabanova's 
logical structures concern not only Russian riddles, but are 
relevant to riddles of other peoples in the world, too. 
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LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF RIDDLES 
N.V. BARABANOVA 
Moscow, USSR 
Almost all investigators of riddles agree that a riddle 
represents a special logical task for it contains - either in 
an open or a hidden form - a question that has to be answered. 
And according to the findings such tasks are built on. certain 
logical models. 
We have investigated D.N. Sadovnikov's collection 
"Russian Riddles" and satisfied ourselves that its riddles can 
be divided into several groups on the basis of their logical 
models. Let us turn to some examples. 
I. Some riddles from group I. 
No. 1617 It is little, it is white, 
Through the forest jump-jump! 
Through the snow poke-poke! 
(A hare) 
No. 819 Green from above, 
Thick in the middle. 
Thin at the end. 
(A turnip) 
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No. 794 Between beds 
It lies smooth. 
(A cucumber) 
No. 101 It is little, 
A bit pot-bellied 
And guards the whole house. 
(A lock) 
No. 1002 One is walking, 
Dragging four behind him. 
But the fifth is just sitting 
And watching with his both eyes. 
(A horse, a cart and a man) 
No. 959 All over hairy, 
With four pads. 
Itself being whiskered. 
(A cat) 
It is clear that all of these riddles are constructed 
according to one and the same pattern, that is they are 
variants of a logico-structural invariant. The object of the 
riddle is chosen first, then it is provided With a description 
which is not a full one. The omission of some significant, 
elements.of description creates an enigmatic or mysterious 
situation. After this a certain comparison follows, a comparison 
between the possible answer (in the last riddle it is a "cat") 
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and some object (in our case an animal is clearly implied) 
on the basis of a given amount of descriptive elements. 
The correlation between the answer and the object to be 
compared is shown in the following generalized scheme: 
Answer: object P Object to be compared: Q 
("a cat") ("some animal") 
has the elements: has the elements: 
x^ - covered with hair y^ - "hairy" 
X2 - has four pads y2 - "four pads" 
x^ - has whiskers y^ - "whiskered" 
In their logical relation these objects can be presented 
in the form of categories P and Q with the correspoinding 
elements x and y. The correlation of these two objects can be 
illustrated by the relation of the given categories to their 
corresponding elements: 
Q y ^ y 2 Y 3 
This expression is a logical extension of E. K5ngas-
-Maranda's metaphorical formula represented by the equation 
A/B = C/D (see her article "Thè Logics of Riddles" (Logika 
zagadok) in: "Paremiological Collection" (Paremiologi^eskij 
sbornik), Moscow, 1978. pp. 253-255). 
II. In this group we include the following riddles: 
No. 1307 A woman is standing on the 
threshing-floor 
Her mouth full of tobacco. 
(A flour sack) 
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No. 1576 An old man sits on the water 
Shaking his beard. 
(Reed) 
No. 344 I was in a pit, 
I was hit, 
I was at a fire, 






My worthless hones 
Were thrown in a pit, 
Even the dogs do not gnaw them 
(An earthenware pot) 
No. 1834 Two little eggs in moss, 
Plus a carrot up above. 
(A nose and eyes) 
No. 256 Two bellies, 
Four hamlets. 
(A pillow) 
No. 433 New vessel. 
Full of holes. 
(A basket) 
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No. 812 A young girl sitting in a dungeon, 
With her plait out on the street. 
(A carrot) 
The logical relation can be shown as follows (see the 
last riddle) : 
Answer: object P Object to be compared: Q 
("carrot") ("young girl") 
x^ - grows (in the field) y^ - sits 
X2 - its root is in the yj - in a hut ("in a dungeon") 
earth 
x^ - has tops y^ - has a plait 
x4 - tops are above the y^ - plait is not in the 
earth hut ("on the street") 
Comparison of these two objects can be expressed by the 
relation of categories P and Q and'their corresponding 
elements: 
Q Yi y 2 Y 3 Y 4 
Accordingly riddles in the second group show variants of 
another logico-structural invariant. The second invariant 
P 
differs from first one in that it has the relation - ? 1. 
The fantastic picture appearing in the riddle is due to 
the fact that a certain extra category of P is construed. 
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which contains elements from both categories: y^; x^; y^; x^ . 
This group of riddles is the most extensive. It has the 
most subtypes in relation to the remaining two structural 
planes (the first plane being the logico-semiotic), viz., the 
linguistic and the thematical plane or realia plane. (On the 
three basic planes of paremias see G.L. Permyakov's studies: 
"From Proverb to Folk-Tale", Moscow, 1970; "On the Structure 
of Paremiological Fund" in: "Studies in Folklore Typology", 
Moscow, 1975; "Grammar of Proverbs" in: "Oriental Proverbs", 
Moscow, 1979.) 
Ill. Now let us turn to another group of riddles: 
No. ?143 What is sweeter than honey 
And stronger than a lion? 
(A sleep) 
No. 2485 What is nicer than 
One hundred roubles? 
(Two hundred) 
No. 2148 What flies faster than a bullet? 
(Thought) 
No. 2461 What is the easiest thing? 
(To see someone else's defects) 
No. 1939 What is thicker than a forest? 
(Stars) 
No. 2156 What is more precious than money? 
(Health) 
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In this group of riddles both objects to be compared 
have the same peculiarity, but in one of them this peculiarity 
is expressed more intensive (!). There are two categories in 
the last riddle: 
Comparison of the two objects can be shown in the form 
of the relation: 
P x! 
Q x 
IV. Here we have examples from the fourth group of 
riddles: 
No. 1643 What is born without a skin? 
(A farrow) 
No. 1981 What construction was built a long time ago 
And does not tumble down 
And does not need repairing? 
(The World) 
No. 932 What never goes blunt in the world? 
(A pig's snout) 
Answer: object P Object to be compared: Q 
("money") 
x - has a value 
("health") 
x! - has a very high value 
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Answer( object P Object to be compared: Q 
("a pig's snout") ("a certain object") 
x^ - nuzzles (digs) the - nuzzles (digs) the 
earth earth 
x^ - never grows blunt - would grow blunt 
The correlation between the features of objects P and Q 
can be formulated in the following way: "If a pig's snout 
nuzzles the earth, then it never grows blunt." and "If a certain 
object nuzzles (digs) the earth, it will inevitably grow blunt." 
I = X1 : X2 
Q y i:y 2 
It means that the relation of the interdependent elements 
x^ and x2 of category P to the interdependent elements y^ and 
y2 of category Q corresponds to the relation between these very 
categories. 
Let us examine three more riddles from the fourth 
group: 
No. 518 Borne by water, 
It fears water. 
(Salt) 
No. 88 Two gossips bow to each other, 
But together they would not agree. 
(Two doors of a passage) 
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No. 1090 It is thin itself. 
But its head weighs a pound. 
(A hammer) 
Answer: object P 
("a hammer") 
x^ - has a thin body 
(the handle) 
x2 - has a heavy head 
Object to be compared: Q 
("a certain creature or object") 
y^ - thin body 
yj - a head is not heavy 
(does not weigh a pound) 
since it is usually 
proportional to the body 
The categories to be compared here have the same formula 
of relation as in the riddle about the pig's snout. The last 
three riddles differ from the first three only in their 
syntactic structure. Here we have two linguistic subtypes of 
one logico-structural type (invariant), and we can easily 
transform any riddle from one subtype into the other simply 
by changing its syntactic form: 
It is born. 
But without a skin. 
It is thin itself, 




What is born 
Without a skin? 
What has a thin body and 
a head that weighs 
a pound? 
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V. Let us consider another group of riddles: 
No. 2275 A man (ohelovek) has one of it, 
A crow (vovon) has two, 
A worm (ohervjak) and a pig (svin'ja) 
Has none. 
(The letter o) 
No. 2274 People (Ijudi) are standing 
In the middle of the river Volga. 
(The letter I, that is referred to 
by its old school name "ljudi") 
No. 2273 What stands by the side of the earth 
(.zemli) ? 
(The letter i which is a genitive 
morpheme here, added to the r'oot 
of semlja, i.e. zeml') 
No. 2269 It is present in the sky (nebo), 
It is missing from the earth (zemlja), 
A woman (baba) has got two of it, 
A girl (devka) has got none. 
(The letter b) . 
The last riddle allows for the following transforma-
tions: 
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A B C D 
sky earth woman girl 
(nebo)-, (zemlja) (baba) (devka) 
x x 2x x 
present missing two none 
A" B" C' D" 





- substitution of 
categories: things 
replaced by words 
- -corresponding substitution 
of elements of categories 
The correlation between the categories and their elements 
is shown below: 
A B C D x x 2 x x 
A' B" C" D' x' x" 2x" x" 
VI. Here is another group of riddles: 
No. 2412 Why does the goose swin? 
(Otohego 'why' can mean 'from where', 
so the answer From the bank is appropriate) 
(From the bank) 
No. 2363 Two little puppies. 
But they have eaten out the whole floor, 
('have eaten out" = iz''jeli, whereas 
iz jeli means 'made of fir') 
(The whole floor is made of fir) 
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No. 2406 What is it that one cannot 
Throw over a gate? 
(In Russian s Aljonoj means 'with Alyona' 
while soljonyj, pronounced in very much 
the same way means 'pickled'!) 
(A cucumber with Alyona) 
No. 2338 Where is water precious? 
('precious' = dovoga, pronounced equally 
with da roga = 'and the norns'. Thus 
(The horns are where the cow is' drinking) 
the answer below is appropriate.) 
Answer: object P Object to be compared: Q 
("place where the cow is ("any other place") 
drinking") 
x y - water that is not precious 
horns or water, but with no horns 
With the help of element 
x the transformation x" 
water and the horns 
can be performed 
We can observe the following correlation between 




VII. Now we shall try to analyse riddles that 
belong to group VII: 
Ny father's son, but not my brother. 
(I myself) 
There go godfather and godmother 
Carrying a baby that is not a son 
Of the father and the mother. 
(A daughter) 
I was walking on the road and 
I saw a baby that said: "I have 
A father and a mother but I am 
Not their son". 
(A daughter) 
The logical structure of the last riddle in this 
group contains the following categories: 
Answer: object P . Object to be compared: Q 
("children") ("parents") 
x - son y — father and/or mother 
But in terms of the given riddle 
element x undergoes a transformation: 
x - not son, i.e. daughter 
Hence the formula of logical invariant in the last 







In the given group it is essential to take into 
consideration the differences in sex with regard to the 
objects. Here it appears to be inevitable to introduce the 
notion of "the sphere of permissible meanings" (SPM) because 
if x is son, then x (not son) can have the only possible 
meaning daughter. Due regard for SPM is decisive from the 
point of view of answering riddles of this type. As far as 
brother (or sister) is concerned, x can have two meanings: 
sister (brother) or himself (herself) . 
We have investigated seven groups or seven logico-
-structural types of riddles. These groups include many 
riddles from Sadovnikov's collection. Vie argue that analysis 
of other Russian riddles in the light of the methodology 
suggested here (that is, singling out categories and elements 
and from them deriving logical expressions) helps to set up 
new logico-structural types. The other two planes of riddles, 
namely the linguistic and the thematical or realia pláne, 
could serve as a base for the unification of riddles in 
relevant subtypes within a logico-structural invariant. 
(Translated by Károly Fábricz) 
Notes 
1 The word "skhodjatsja" in Russian means both 'agree' and' 
'meet'..(The translator) 
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A GAME-THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF RIDDLES 
LÁSZLÓ TARNAY 
A. József University Szeged 
1. Introductory Remarks: Games and Literature 
There is hardly another field of what is termed literature in 
which the main features of games could be more conspicuous 
than in riddles; most native and foreign observers of the riddles 
of primitive peoples have given accounts of the hour-long 
sessions, when the community splits into two groups, one a 
riddle-poser the other a riddle-solver, and an almost infinite 
sequence of utterance pairs would follow. These empirical 
facts quite naturally convey the idea of there being two 
players to make their moves in a game. What at first sight 
seems problematic is how the possible outcome of such an infi-
nite process can be defined. But concerning the relationship of 
two utterance pairs almost nothing is known - the sequence of 
pairs can at any point be interruptedtor taken up again -, if 
we restrict the use of 'game' to a single pair, the outcome 
of such a game should be clear: the title of winner or loser 
is assigned either to the riddle-poser or to the riddle-solver 
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if the riddle is left unsolved or is correctly answered 
respectively. From this it is already clear that the basic 
problem is whether one and the same type of game is being 
played all through a. given sequence. 
If the identification of the elements of a game with the 
elements of a riddle can be allowed, then some very natural 
theoretical assumptions follow; 
(CI) Riddles are a kind of face-to-face game, in which 
physical contact is required to hold the two players 
together. 
(.02) What counts as a move in such a game is an utterance. 
(C3) The outcome of a game is intentional in that it is 
the intention of the player making the first move 
to determine what can count as a correct move in 
response. 
From CC1) - (C3) it follows that 
(C4) Riddles have the form of a dialogue, 
from (CI) - (C4): 
CC5) The possible roles of Speaker and Hearer are 
assigned to the two players respectively. 
Finally, from (CI) - tC5) we conclude that 
(C6) Riddles are °a special kind of language game. 
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We dub (C2) as the Semantic Condition and (C3) as the Pragmatic 
Condition of Riddles (SCR, PCR), and call (CI) - (C6) the 
Language Game Criteria of Riddles (LGCR). Now, what further 
conclusions result if we consider riddles as a subdomain of 
literature? Accepting Abrahams' conception of folklore genres,* 
three important claims need stating; from (CI) it is clear that 
(C7) Riddles belong to what are called conversational 
genres. 
Sc we dub (CI) as the Conversational Condition of Riddles (CCR). 
Moreover, from (CI) - (C7) we have: 
(C8) Riddles as a genre always contain the Hearer, without 
the possible moves of which they cannot be considered 
as such, neither can they be transmitted or even 
written down by any other means, either. 
This would mean that riddles are a special sub-domain of 
literature in that the Hearer (or the Reader, respectively) is 
not only encoded in them but is an integral part of their 
semantic structure. It adds up to the claim that was first 
stated by Lord and Parry in connection with epic poetry about 
performances happening once for all. This with (C8) amounts to 
saying: 
(C9) Riddles are highly performative in that the Hearer 
and the Addressee coincide in them. 
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This we dub as the Performative Condition of Riddles (PFCR). 
What it says is that "the performance is a moment of creation" 
not only "for the singer" but for the audience, too. But if a 
move in a riddle game is basically characterized by (CCR) and 
(PFCR), there seems to open an abysmal gap between riddles and 
any other literary form; this is because riddles cannot be 
assigned a whole semantical unit unless they are embedded in a 
game, in which the audience will react with a move to each move 
of the Speaker; whereas in case of other genres the Hearer or 
the Addressee is just one of the many pragmatic factors to be 
possibly considered as what can give a communicative aspect to 
either a text or a virtually pre-existing set of formulae. 
s 
Genre is then pragmatic and must be construed while taking 
stock of anything that could be pragmatically relevant in the 
case of a literary utterance. Even if we accept this principle 
as correct, and let alone genre as such, we would like to 
inquire into the justification as to what can be taken stock 
of; whether it is right to consider the role of the Hearer as 
merely pragmatic and to construe the semantic model of the text 
with the assumption of an ideal Reader. We term 'the Pragmatic 
Fallacy' of literature as an affirmative answer to the above 
question. Here, in the forthcoming pages we would like to 
argue thait, given the introduction of game-theoretical elements 
into one of the sub-domains of literature, a tentative theory 
to provide a general explanation of what we call literature will 
bear out the involvement of concrete Hearers in the construction 
of any possible semantic model of a literary text; i.e. the gap 
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between riddles and other sub-domains of literature must needs 
/ 
be bridged. To prove this we aim at finding what can properly 
serve as formulae in case of riddles. Our use of 'formula' does 
not deviate from that of Lord, i.e. from "a regular unit of 
speech" but it deepens it in a very important sense: it shows 
how reference is involved in it and how the mapping of correct 
individuals relies on what the Hearer has chosen as his strategy. 
Before developing our idea about riddles we should make cl'ear 
what justifies the introduction of game-theoretical elements 
into the analysis of a literary genre. We have already mentioned 
some empirical observations that could strongly support such an 
approach. They tell us that orally riddles come into being as a 
result of certain games, i.e. they are played. This means that 
(CI) - (C3) are empirically justified. But there a theoretical 
justification can be found for them, too. The argument, from 
which this justification can be drawn, can be termed as the 
Variability of Surface Forms. To heavily empirically biased 
scientists (VSF) may sound too general. But we think that a 
careful reading of Eigen-Winkler's famous book about games 
played with/in Nature would make such an argument reasonable. 
The introduction of game-theoretical strategies into scientific 
explanations raises two problems; one is whether there should 
be always something substantially manifested in Nature as a 
player at the same time that there is something to correspond 
to each move in the game? The strategies then would go back to 
what are somewhat imperfectly dubbed as 'players'. This 
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imperfection is the uncertainty in determining why a given 
strategy has been chosen. And behind this question lies another 
question regarding the formulation of a possible causal chain: 
whatj makes what2 do whatNow, in game-theory we substitute 
moves into what^ and players into whatWhat-^ is defined as the 
higher or lower degree of the reasonableness of choosing a 
strategy; this amounts to a probability factor. But what can 
justify my saying that moves are determined by the reasonable 
acknowledgement of a probability factor? Only that there is a 
more-or-less reasonable player. But how can this player be 
empirically detected? Only through and by the moves he makes; 
nothing else can I know of him but by what he does. To eliminate 
.what 2 as a player we would have to totally conditionalize it, 
i.e. we would have to know all the conditions that have a role 
in the coming into being of what y then we could reduce "what^ 
makes what2 do what into "what-y makes what , which is 
identical with "what^ causes what3". For instance, in case of 
a Life-and-Death game I could claim to know all the c ^ , • • • , c n 
conditions required for eliminating the probability factor of 
an e^ event that has corresponded to a move in the original 
game, and consider their sum total CKc^c^t • •• a cause 
of e^. Then the idea of player may seem redundant: I could speak 
of some organic process in cells as causing e-̂  instead of 
speaking of Life as choosing a certain strategy. Although there 
are serious troubles about knowing C, i.e. whether C is enough 
to cause e., it will always allow a new question to a rise: 
while it reduces "what^ makes what ̂  do what^" into "what^ 
makes what " it asks for the extension of the latter into 
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"what4 makes what^ do what; e.g. why are some chemical 
substances such that they cause e/l find then there seems to be 
no way out of this infinite regress as the same extension can 
be applied to any what^ element of a causal chain. The only 
reasonable solution appears to be to revert to some game-
-theoretical device considering all newly made extensions as 
infinite conditionalizing and making each chain correspond to ' . " 
an information processing. Our games then will be information-
-dependant; conditionalizing is made with respect to two 
possible moves of the players. The other point, which the 
introduction of game-theory seems to emphasize, is what we called 
(VSF). While the argument of causal chains may at least theore-
tically satisfy us, when applied to (VSF) it appears very 
unpromising; for as long as we deal with events we have to 
decide between two alternatives: it either comes down or not: 
if it does, we may;more-or-less be happy with our definition of 
C and need not bother with a possible negative answer: but 
when we deal with structures we have almost infinite alternatives, 
and what we would like to do is decide why certain alternatives 
are preferred and others neglected. To apply the causal chain 
argument here would be an irremediable failure since it would 
never be able to account for the problem of mutated variants. 
For, to solve it we should also examine all possible variants, 
some of which need not be instantiated, or if so, we should 
not have come across any of them; and there can be no causal 
chain for possible structures which have never been observed 
to hold. The way-out again appears to be game-theoretical: to 
/ 
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decide whether a mutation is preferable is strategy-dependant. 
Preference naturally relied on some pre-conditions C', but no 
possible extension of it can amount to explaning why a certain 
preference relation prevails. The most a heavily empirically' 
biased scientist could say is that they are "out there". 
From the two arguments above it is clear that game-theory blurs 
the distinction between a "de dicto" and a "de re" reading; 
for, appealing to the causal chain argument we arrive at a pro-
cess of infinite conditionalizing of probabilities, and in this 
case a recurrance to strategies covers a lack of "de dicto" 
knowledge; whereas appealing to (VSF) we arrive at a preference 
selection of certain mutations and the probability of their 
survival, which is not information-dependent, and then recurrence 
to strategies would explain away a "de re" selection of forms. 
The ambiguity, or on the contrary, the disambiguation of 
ambiguities, is a characteristic feature of game-theory. From 
both arguments it follows that game-theory is adopted as a 
means to examine relations differently manifested and not con-
crete individuals, although it is always a concrete case that 
the theory can be applied to. And this seems to be the major 
advantage of game-theory; i.e. being thoroughly general it 
gains body from each new collection of data. The supposition 
of there being players making moves does not then require 
any substantial formulation, but it is the price we have to 
pay for the failure of founding all our theoretical knowledge 
on the principle of induction. And we consider it is a very 
\ 
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small price to pay. 
Now, how does this bear on the assumptions we have to make when 
we introduce game-theory into the field of humanities, the 
subject matter of which is basically characterized by the use 
of language? It is an ironical assertion that game-theory has 
been neglected in a field where a metaphysical reading of 
players would be once and for all excluded, while it has been 
being developed over since its first formulation in such fiedls 
as biology, mathemetics and abstract languages where the concept 
of player can never be defined in a philosophically satisfying 
way. The identification of the Speaker and the Hearer with 
the two players, then, is almost trivial. Where the trouble 
seems to lurk is in the value-assignment of possible moves or 
in the testing of the reasonableness of a given strategy. And 
even if we succeeded in this, it would always remain a hopeless 
effort to account for the players as being governed by a 
reasonable choice from their possible moves. What (PCR) tells 
us is just that speaking is intentional in that possible 
outcomes of games always rely on the expectations of the 
players. Although by -stating some such expectations as pre-
-conditions of games wo could achieve a pragmatic disambiguation, 
our semantic model is left inevitably ambiguous. For any method 
to restrict ambiguities would lead either to too narrow models 
(we simply exclude problematic data as irrelevant or erroneous) 
or to the introduction of some philosophically dubious entities 
(like possible, worlds) in an infinite number. So, while we could 
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successfully substitute into the second two elements of a 
"whaty - what2 - whatchain, the interpretation of what^ 
remains inadequate in a sense that no causal relationship should 
be assumed to hold between vwhat^" and "wKat^'i whereas in the 
natural sciences we can have a good probability factor. This 
means that even if any of the players tends to be reasonable 
taking into consideration the probability of a given move, it 
may not guarantee the successfulness of his move for the inten-
tion of his opponent my still aim at something quite different: 
he may put in: ''My move was not what you made it out!"; whereas 
in other games from chese to economics we have in a sense a 
direct understanding of what a previous move can be. But as 
language games are basically governed by something like our 
(PCR) and as we have no means to detect what takes place in the 
human mind, what intention a player has just conceived when 
making his move, although the move of his opponent is going to 
be a reaction to what he deems his intention to be, games 
played with linguistic utterances are two times open to failures 
(i) moves contain not just utterances but the interpretations 
of them, (ii) even an unambiguously counted interpretation 
cannot be put into a causal relationship with a given intention 
of the player. The first problem has arisen from the non-unique 
predictability of a reasonable move, and brings home the idea 
what a semantic game can be about: the uncertainty of a value-
-assignment of a move; while the second problem calls for a 
means of pragmatic disambiguation of the semantic uncertainty. 
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But how can we assign values to moves at all? Even if we might 
not know why or which value-assignment, i.e. interpretation, 
is being intended by a given move, we can try to evaluate it. 
Here we encounter something similar to what we can know about 
a player: only his action; to decide what the value-assignment 
of an utterance can be an action of seeking and finding is 
required with respect to a given individual who is thought to 
belong to one or more predicate-assignment contained by the 
utterance. It is always on the basis of certain predicate-
-assignment that an individual can be found out there in 
reality. But what if this individual is not found or it does 
not exist? Did we make a move by choosing a predicate-assignment 
all the same? Of course we did; we must have done, or else we 
should dispense with the idea of playing. But when can we make 
sure of the non-existence of an individual? Possibly never; 
for, we cannot limit our search to a certain domain unless it 
is an empirical one containing a deictic term as "this world", 
"this house", etc.; or else it being linguistic like "the A. which 
are B", we can get lost again in an infinite procedure of 
finding at least one representative of class B which is also A. 
But we are going to argue that it need not be a counter-argument 
against game-theory as a language game for, as there is no 
causal relationship involved in such a game, we can very easily 
say that in- case of an infinite seeking and finding games get 
blocked and play is interrupted. But if so, we must have some 
means of constructing what a possible course of a game may be 
regardless of whether it can be concluded with a successful 
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search or not. To accomplish this we need (VSF); linguistic 
structures and their mutations in speech, together with the 
wide range of their possible interpretations, closely parallel 
the variability of forms in nature; in both cases we have to 
consider possible variants. We should be able to describe this 
semantic openness and how conflicting or correct selections from 
them are being realized. What we cannot do is predict without 
uncertainty whether a given selection will be realized as far 
as the players are concerned. But we do not see how else we 
could map the infinite variability of forms into concrete 
realisations other than game-theoretically. 
The most extensive treatment of a field basically characterized 
by the use of language along the lines of game-theory has been 
3 
accomplished by J. Hintikka and his followers. So it may seem 
natural that in trying to apply game-theory to such an over-" 
-discussed problem as a literary genre we should go back to 
their major achievements in the field. There must be a very 
natural sense in which the strategies in ordinary communicative 
situations bear on the possible strategies of the riddle-poser 
and the riddle-solver respectively. This would not mean that 
there is nothing else in the latter that cannot be traced in 
the former. But the divergencies that can crop up would belong 
to what we called the pragmatic pre-conditions of games or to 
what can .enter into the definition of a literary genre. But 
there should be a common semantic structure - let us term it 
'Semantic Strategic Possibility' (SSP), which would run on 
parallel lines with our argument of (VSF). We call this 
possibility semantic because it involves reference. It should 
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add to the fact why Hintikka's game-theoretical semantics turns 
on games for quantifiers in a language. The interpretations of 
certain terms are then defined by the application of some of 
the strategies of any of the two players as different substitu-
tions of individuals. The disambiguation of different readings 
can easily be understood as a constraint on individual selection; 
at the-same time one and only one individual is to be chosen, 
for to understand a predicate-assignment both empirically and 
psychologically can only be possible if one single individual 
is being considered at a time. We will not understand "All men 
are clever" or "The murderer must be insane" unless we take 
concrete individuals from the class of men and examine them one 
by one whether he is clever or not, or we take an individual of 
whom it is true that he is the murderer and examine whether he 
is also insane. It is important to emphasize that this is how 
we can understand these sentences, but we need not pursue the 
quest till we can find such an individual. For the quest can 
atany time be interrupted and the play abandoned. Then we are 
left with a sentence in some way connected with the vague idea 
of an individual, of whom we can have no direct perceptual 
knowledge. But we sti°ll have to understand the sentence, and 
our behaviour in understanding it is characterized by (SSP). 
So, we no longer need the distinction between definite and 
indefinite, notional and referential, 'de dicto' and 'de re' 
readings just because they are external to language. Of course, 
we can always add phrases like "Whatever he be", "I do not think 
there exists such a person", etc. but they would not tell us 
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anything about the meaning of the original sentence; they 
rather inform us about the Speaker's attitude or his intention 
in communicating the sentence. (Cf. the Speaker's intention in 
ordinary communication to specify referenti'ally even if he 
has only some means of notional specification vs what we have 
called 'secret' as being a deviation from it, when he intends 
the Hearer not to specify referentially although he (the Hearer) 
has a conflicting intention to do so even if he (the Hearer) has 
only some means of notional specification.) 
From the above passage it results that in some way we cannot 
neglect the problem of reference in cases of what should be 
called literature, although reference in fiction has turned 
out to be an almost insurmountable problem. But what the ar-
gument of (SSP) along (VSF) has taught us lies in that just as 
a mutated variant can never be causally linked to any of the 
players (although it is "out there") no player can be made 
a 
responsible for causally blocking the reference of expressions 
used in fictional discourse. Of course, he may intend to do so, 
or intend this intention to be recognized by his opponent in 
the game, but the posibility of a different move is already 
contained by (SSP). (SSP) is then a basic criterion of literature 
for it embraces (VSF) for the interpretations of utterances, 
without which no game for literature can have a beginning; 
otherwise it turns out to be like ordinary communication, in 
which unambiguous results, the lowest possible degree of 
variability, are expected. 
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To sum up our basic claims we can say the following: if we 
wish to apply game-theory in literature basically characterized 
by the use of some language, and if a game-theoretical model of 
semantics involves different intepretations of sentences, 
literature must be viewed as a possible extansion of divergent 
interpretations. This amounts to stating our (SSP), which, should, 
in a very natural way, explain away every possible mutated variant 
that can crop up in a game. Moreover, if.literature is considered 
from a game-theoretical point of view, then the answer to what 
can count as a formula in a given genre is forthcoming: each 
game can be defined by constructing a matrix or a fragment of a 
matrix which will contain what the players believe, i.e. the 
interpretations that are available for them. Such a matrix is 
a regular unit of speech in that it generates possible variants 
that belong to a given genre. 
2. The Variability of the Surface Forms of Riddles and their 
Possible Logics 
In the works of different ethnologists riddles have turned out 
to be such a complex phenomenon that even the categorizations 
of the variants appear divergent or conflicting; besides the 
term 'riddle', occasionally 'enigma', 'pun', and 'puzzle' are 
equally used to cover a range of utterances in which something 
is to be found out. In some cases 'enigma' is defined so that 
it should comprise data figuring in folk narrative' e.g. 
Flahault4 seems to appeal to this kind of use, but later in 
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his paper he uses the French 'devinette' almost interchangeably 
with 'enigme'. We feel that a distinction between riddles and 
enigmas as being narrative in character should be adequately 
grounded. Enigmas would then make up a different genre comprising 
stories that are ciphered in a certain way. But this is not 
all; for.there are some Hungarian legends or folktales, which 
contain special utterances ordering particular actions to be 
carried out, but to do so they first need to be deciphered. We 
may dub them as 'enigmatic orders'. Somewhat similar to them 
are some childish sayings giving the order to draw what one 
can make out of them so that they might be deciphered. What 
all these examples have in common is that one needs to decipher 
them is a certain way to comprehend what they say. Something 
must be found 
out. This naturally relates to the problem of 
codes: we somehow do not seem to understand them at first 
sight. So, there is a unique character underlying each of-these 
utterances, i.e. the way they can be comprehended. If to be 
understood they need to be decphered, the modes of deciphering 
them should reveal the modes of understanding that play an 
important part in their comprehension. And these modes should 
reflect the possible logics that can be applied to them. By 
giving a logical form to riddles, then, we should aim at -
developing a procedure governing our minds in comprehending 
them. And. this procedure should give us the deciphering clues. 
This procedure is what a strategy in a game can prescribe. The 
procedure of finding a solution is a particular content of an 
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algorithm by which it can be. computed. When we choose such an 
algorithm to cipher a.given utterance,. we make a move in a 
language game. This language game differs.in a very important 
sense from games for quantifiers: we do not select an individual 
at once and go over to see whether he instantiates a certain 
property, but we select a clue called algorithm, and as it is 
a language game, this clue has to be identified linguistically, 
i.e. it has to be an expression, be it a predicate or a term, v. 
for we have to be able»to communicate it or make it manifest 
as a move, and what else can be communicated other than what 
can be part of an utterance? Seen from this point every 
utterance that would require the use of an algorithm will belong 
to a field characterized by the question of something to be 
found out. But the 'thing' itself should not enter into the 
definition of the algorithm; i.e. we have now a logical procedure 
in which all the former analyses of riddles can be reintegrated. 
These analyses are determined by the underlying question: What 
is there to be deciphered in a given utterance? Then a question 
for the clue is a question for the type of data it can be 
applied to. From this it follows that there should be as many 
logical forms of riddles as there are ways for the above 
question to be answered. According to Barabanova^ there are not 
more than forty. From an entirely different point of view, 
Faik-Nzuji6 enlists three different structures of riddles while 
specifying some sub-classes for each. E. KttngSs-Maranda7, on 
the other hand, deals with one single structural type which is 
included in Barabanova's list. We give some of the criteria they 
can have used in setting up their categories in order to show 
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how our game-theoretical approach can reintegrate them. 
(i) . Now many objects are described? 
(ii) What kind of a relationship is there between the 
predicates and the object introduced first? 
(iii) What kind of a relationship is there between the predi-
cates and the object introduced second? 
(iv) What kind of a relationship is there between the two 
objects? 
(v) How much of this relationship is taken up by the predi-
cates? 
(vi) What kind of a relationship is there between the predi-
cate themselves? 
(vii) What kind of a relationship is there between the predi-
cates given for the object introduced first and the 
predicates - that may not have been communicated - of 
the objects introduced second? 
(viii) How does the relationship mentioned in (vi) relate to 
the object and/or its predicates introduced second? 
(ix) Do meta-linguistic considerations play any part in the 
riddle? 
(x) Does the riddle hint.at a mathematical computation? 
(xi) Does the riddle contain a question-word? 
It is clear that any sort of combinations of these criteria 
would lead to different types of logical form. Naturally, the 
greatest problem is that other similar.criteria can be added 
to the above (i) - (xi)j e.g. we can define 
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(xii) Is an action other than speaking part and parcel of 
what a riddle says? 
(xiii) Should an action other than speaking precede linguis-
tic comprehension? 
(xiv) Is there a narrative involved in what should be 
deciphered? 
It is not that we do not admit any grounds for these criteria; 
they very well reflect some of the basic linguistic and extra-
-linguistic structures riddles can have, but it would be a 
mistake to identify a linguistic structure with logical form as . 
such. If the underlying character of riddles proves to be 
algorithmic, then what we have to do is show in some straight-
forward sense how an algorithm is used in computing a solution 
to a riddle. Our approach then will be a further contribution to 
what Hintikka called the need for a fresh symbolism. He hinted 
at the possibility of this but never developed it. To achieve 
this aim we think it promising to resort to mathematical game-
theory. Of course, we have no room here to work out everything 
in detail, so instead we rather present the mainlines of a 
transcriptional procedure in connection with a sub-domain of 
literature with the assumption that it can easily be generalized. 
This relates to the place of reference in literature or in 
fiction. Reference in case of riddles has always been an 
underlying problem; considering some of the criteria we have 
defined we note that objects enter into the picture that 
riddles describe. This would call for them to have a naming cha-
racter, as to what can be named a straightforward answer is a 
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class. This idea gathers force when a second term is introduced 
to name another class and the riddles are taken to be answered 
if an utterance of this term follows. This is the way in which 
E. Kongas-Maranda's analysis is developed; it puts forward the 
view that riddles unfold the possible connections of the two 
classes named respectively in the two parts of their utterance. 
Formulated in this way however it would lead to a meta-linguis-
tically-biased theory of riddles asserting similarities and 
identities of classes. We have already given a critical account 
of' such an approach and have pointed out the absurdities that g 
might follow. We do not want to reproduce our argument here; 
suffice to say that riddles can neither be wholly extensional 
nor express intensional or meta-linguistic identity; Riddles do 
not assert an identity between mere extensions of classes for it 
cannot be permitted that one and the same object is referred 
to by any of its terms, i.e. the two general terms introduced 
in the first and in the second part respectively are just 
intensional variants of one and the same referent; and riddles 
cannot be mere analytical truths, i.e. intensionally identical 
terms used for extensionally different classes, something that 
happens when a child is learning a language, for it is unaccept-
able that, given a riddle about e.g. trees and men, which, say, 
defines a man as a kind of evergreen, anyone from among the 
community.where such a riddle appears, should perceptually 
take a tree for a man. This will be further emphasized when we 
speak about the didactic role of riddles among the primitive. 
- 119 -
It does not mean however that the role of naming does not have 
any part in riddle sessions. 
Objects do figure in riddle sessions in a sense, i.e. as proto-
types of classes. But they are recalled by means of explicating 
some of their properties. Naturally these properties do not 
remain the same; others can serve to convey reference to either 
the same or to a different class. These properties are used on-
ly to fix reference to one or another reference class. They do 
not have the role of proper names, nor that of general terms, 
for -they cover a wide range of possible usés. This is exactly 
how stereotypes are Used. To choose the right use of a stereo-
type in a given context would, amount to computing the right 
algorithm of a possible strategical move in the correlated lan-
guage-game of the utterance the stereotype occurs in. What we 
can say already at this point of the analysis is that riddles 
are somehow the prototypes of such computational processes. But 
it cannot be wholly segregated to a field of some literary genre, 
for it can become indispensable at any point of an ordinary 
communication, if the Hearer wants to have a thorough under-
standing of what has been said by the Speaker. For instance, 
9 
saying that 'The Daily News did not come to the press conference" 
the Speaker intends the Hearer to recur to some algorithm about 
publication of newspapers in order to select the correct use of 
"Daily News" as a stereotype. But what would this mean? Do we 
refer all the time to such an algorithmic function when uttering 
a sentence? Are there hidden riddles in everyday speach? We 
could save something from the original idea on the difference 
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between ordinary and literary communication by saying that 
riddles should contain composite functions; but a quick survey 
of data soon refutes such a claim. The only thing we can do is 
give some criteria of linguistic identification of riddles as 
stereotypes necessitating certain computational procedures to 
get the correct referent. It would first of all call for some 
syntactical rules to be correlated with our forthcoming game-
-theoretical model. But what syntax can be defined along the 
lines of strategical matrixes? This syntactical problem has 
been already dealt with by Hintikka; he affirmed that in laying 
down the syntactical rules for a game-theoretical semantic 
model one will always include some, elements which are in 
reality the formulations of some semantic conditions. 
Moreover, syntactical transformation will be never meaning-
-preserving. Bearing this in mind we would like to extend 
Hintikka's insight over one important field: stereotypal 
reference. We would like to argue that this is the only type 
of reference that can be relied on in speaking, although there 
are different modes of carrying it out; refering to what 
Wittgeinstein called the entanglement of language with action 
we should emphasize that game-theoretical semantics has been 
conceived just in order to reveal this fact, namely that the 
mode of realizing a strategical move can be either an utterance 
or an act; reference, then, should be viewed as the possibility 
of correlating such an act with a linguistic mode of carrying 
out a move, i.e. an utterance. And it should be added again 
that there is no causal relationship between the two different 
modes of manifesting a strategical move: it is just the possi-
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bility of correlation that is required for the Hearer to 
understand the Speaker's utterance; namely, the Hearer should 
at any time be ready to look for such a correlation. The act 
of refering need not then be deictic, but rather any act 
whatsoever which carries out a certain order conveyed by the 
utterance. However, reference itself is not needed for the 
construction of the possible strategies as a matrix. It is just 
the special content of what we called (PCR), i.e. its possi-
bility is incumbent on what the Speaker intends in a particular 
game. And this is what substitutes preference in language games. 
This is natural, for preference in case of human beings as 
players can be nothing else but intentional. An intention, 
which corresponds to preference relations between surface forms, 
and which is defined by (PCR), is an intention to correlate two 
model of carrying out a move in a game. From this argument 
results the possibility we have already hinted at that the two 
modes of carrying out a move in a game are, in reality, parts 
of two entirely different games. We will develop this idea 
further on when we have accomplished the construction of our 
game-theoretical model. 
To sum up: stereotypal reference is intentional in that it is 
involved in computing a certain algorithm for a correct move 
in a game; it is linguistic in that it is carried out by 
uttering a stereotype with the possibility of correlating an • 
act with it. The semantics of an utterance containing several 
similar stereotypes can be given with a matrix of a language 
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similar stereotypes can be given with a matrix of a language 
game. So far as the linguistic formulation of such an utterance 
is concerned, it depends on the identification of a stereotype 
by a move. This is done by applying an algorithm to it. But a 
stereotype need not be uttered in order to necessitate the use 
of an algorithm. For instance, if I go to see the pictures in 
an art exhibition with a friend of mine, and looking at one of 
them I exclaim: "I like him", my utterance will carry different 
meanings according to how the stereotype "picture" is intended 
to be used without being uttered: whether (i) I mean to refer 
to the painter, or (ii) to the possessor; in the first case I 
should make use of a- function like "x painted y" , whereas in 
the second something like "x is possessed by y". But at the same 
time I can use the stereotype "picture" in a sentence with the 
intention of necessitating a function for understanding it 
correctly; e.g. saying "The picture you liked best won the two-
-thousand dollar prize in the end" I may convey reference not 
to the picture itself but rather to its painter in the sense 
that it must have been him - and not the picture - who got the 
prize. What makes this sentence more interesting is that to 
understand it one has not only to compute a function for the 
painter but to consider the very same stereotype once again as 
calling for a normal interpretation with respect to the clause 
"you liked"; in this latter case we simply use the identity 
function. What we have to underline is that not only the func-
tions, which are used as algorithms to compute the correct 
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referents, may not be uttered, but even the stereotypes them-
selves may not enter into the sentences to be uttered. This 
again raises the problem of identifying a stereotype. Although 
it may prove to be an insurmountable problem, we will never be 
able to make do with stereotypes and the functions they neces-
sitate, for otherwise we cannot single out the correct referent 
in some ordinary examples like the one above; for, consider the 
same sentence "I like him" and suppose there are other visitors 
in the gallery, and one of them, a man, is even standing near 
the picture I happen to be looking at when uttering the 
sentence. How then could the correct reférent be singled out 
as the painter of the picture against the spatio-temporally 
given without recurring to the stereotype "picture"? In the 
next part we investigate the problem of identifying riddles as 
stereotypes, how they can be singled out by some syntactic 
rules, and how these syntactic rules can correspond to the 
semantic moves of the players. 
3. Some Games for Riddles 
In the foregoing passage we tried to argue that riddles contain 
some means of conveying references the modes of whicli can be 
either linguistic or not. As to what these means can be, we 
have said that they are certain computational algorithms selected 
by the use of different stereotypes. The idea of riddles as a 
means of reference may seem at first sight a bit outlandish; 
however many scholars observing the role played by riddles in 
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primitive society do state something similar when they take 
the criterion (i) about how many objects can figure in a given 
riddle seriously. How should we'understand 'objects' in (i) if 
not as something being referred to? How can we compare different 
objects without referring to them? We have seen that it is no 
way-out to say that riddles are about classes. On the other hand 
it seems natural that riddles are not references in the same 
way as for instance a proper name is in ordinary communication. 
This might result in a futile effort to prove in a straight-
forward sense of the word that riddles "refer" in some detectable 
way; we have seen that reference is not causally linked to 
speaking, which means that we cannot use any kind of proof 
procedure in going from an utterance to the objects referred to 
by it. But we can have empirical evidence for the role reference 
of riddles; we expect to find thus in the didactic role they 
play in the life of the members taking part in the sessions. 
Among many observers it is Permyakov"'"^ who discusses at some 
length the didactic' role of riddles. In general it can be re-
-assumed in that they serve as means of storing up and trans-
mitting the knowledge of the aged toward the new generation. 
Riddles had to convey adequately-founded information to provide 
some practical clues to nature for the young. Sessions were not 
simply for the ¿sake of fun but served a very practical aim: they 
were a kind of school for the illiterate. Although this fact is 
not thought to be crucial by Permyakov as far as logical form 
is concerned, we believe that it has to be formulated as an 
important pre-condition of riddles; we may say something like 
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(PCI) The riddle-poser's intention must not aim at something 
far-fetched or even abnormal in the given folklore but 
at something available to the riddle-solver. 
From (PCI) it follows that 
(PC2) The riddle-poser must not aim at winning the game in 
the sense that the correct solution be never found. 
Of course, what counts as 'far-fetched', 'abnormal* or 
'available' in a given folklore is to be properly defined. Though 
(PCI) and (PC2) belong to thé field of pragmatics, they heavily 
bear on how a winning strategy can be given as they govern the 
Speaker's intention, which according to (PCR) basically 
characterizes what can count as correct in a game. Considering 
the_ following examples we will see that as far as variants 
taken from the folklore are concerned the more possible ways 
there are to compute a solution the more indispensable the role 
of (PCI)- and (PC2) gets. This means that the Didactic Argument 
focusses on the restriction of (SSP) and on reducing the possi-
bilities of winning for the riddle-poser while it ensures a 
victory for the riddle solver. This would amount to saying that 
riddle games are unjust forward the riddle-poser. But they have 
to be if they are to guarantee that all profitable information 
should pass over-to.the young. The Didactic Argument then is 
evidence for the historical relationship between everyday life 
and a present literary genre. When we pass from literary 
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utterances closely connected with practical life to more 
sophisticated forms of the same genre, what needs modifying 
is the definition of what counts as a winning strategy in the 
game. The first type of riddles that we are going to examine 
blocks totally the winning possibilities of the riddle-poser. 
They belong to what scholars have described as meta-linguistic 
12 riddles. Consider the.following examples: 
(1) Woman has got one, (2) In ball there is, 
Rock has got two, In earth there is not, 
Worm has got one. In baby there are two, 
- While leech none. Letter 'O' In children there is none. 
The logics of these and similar riddles is obvious: one has just 
to count the letters according to the list of numbers presented 
in the first part of the riddle to find the solution. Indeed, 
after the second word in (1) one is ready with the answer as in 
'rock' there cannot be any other letter twice, which is also 
found in 'woman', than '0'. Redundancy although should not be 
a common feature, for in (2) it is only after the third word 
that we can count for sure the correct answer, and it is only 
a change in the order of the words that is required to, exclude 
redundancy at all. The logics of this kind of riddles is then a 
procedure of a virtually infinite well-ordering in which to 
each of the words an integral is assigned; so, we have an 
infinite set of well-ordered pairs, the first element of which 
is a lexical item, while the second an integral. If we would 
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like to generalize this procedure to any possible ordering of 
words and numbers so that each ordering would map words into 
those integrals which indicate how many times each word contains 
an arbitral letter, we can draw the following matrix; let each 
horizontal line correspond to a series of numbers consisting of 
as many places as the number of the letters in a given alphabet; 
let each number in the series correspond to the times a certain 
letter is contained in the word written at the beginning of the 
line. As the number of the words that can be formed with the 
letters of a given alphabet is infinitely countable, the vertical 
lines will have infinitely many elements. Below we try to 
represent a small fragment of what such a matrix can be; 
FIGURE I 
A B C' D E 
W1 a . . г b . 3 °k dl m n 
»2 a . 3 bk 
d m n o 
W3 ak h a m d n 0 . p 
W n a n b o a V 
d <7 V s 
In FIGURE I each word is coded uniquely according to how many 
times it contains a given letter of the alphabet provided that 
there is no letter which is contained more than nine times in 
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any of the words. This seems however, a very reasonable restric-
tion. Each horizontal line runs through the whole alphabet, and 
the index of each letter in each line indicates how many times 
the given letter is contained in the word written at the 
beginning of the corresponding horizontal line. If we now 
correlate with each such line a possible strategy of the riddle-
-poser (call him Player I) and with each vertical line a 
strategy of the riddle-solver (call him> Player II), then it 
will result that the utterance of a W. is a move made by the . i 
riddle-poser (and the utterances of different W..W......W are 
a joint move of his respectively), whereas the utterance of any 
of the letters of the alphabet is a move made by the riddle-
-solver. Then the matrix of (i) appears as the following: 
FIGURE II 
A C E H K L M N Q R W 
Woman 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Rook 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 o 
Worm 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Leech 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
By a closer scrutiny it becomes clear that each letter i in 
each line can be assigned a probability value with respect to 
a w. and depending on how many letters W. consists of'and on how v t 
many times each letter is contained in it. We can easily formulate 
this condition: 
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(3) P = — , 11 = k = = i v ' k (ak+$l+...\r)~(&l+ym+..,+ir) ak a 
where any 1 5 u > 9 corresponds to how many times a given letter 
is contained in W., which consists of s = {ak+8l+...+ir} different i 
letters, where k, I, m,...r one by one stands for a number 
indicating how many times each letter is contained in W^, while 
the Greek signs one by one stand for a number indicating how 
many letters are contained in 1/. on a par. Usually P, does not 2- K 
amount to 1, which means that if the riddle-poser wants the 
solver to be capable of computing a-solution for sure, he has 
to play with a joint strategy with respect to the sum total t 
of each Pj, for each strategical word. Naturally, if P^ = 1, then 
i . 
no possible inclusion of n+£ strategies into his original one 
would increase the probability of a possible correct answer; 
otherwise riddles become redundant. The riddle-poser's intention 
- if we accept (PCI) and (PC2) - is to maximalize P^, so he 
chooses ^.[^.j...,^ accordingly. Whereas the riddle-solver's 
task is to find an algorithm to W . . . , W , which could = ^ j n 
select a vertical line as his correct strategy such that 5) be 
as near as possible to 1. In other cases there will be more 
than one vertical line for him to choose as a possible strategy. 
To compute £ amounts to a selection of those letters in each 
. W. for which each P, has been counted; then a new computation 
of probability is required with respect to them. It is clear 
that the new probability, i.e. the sum total £ of all independent 
probabilities of the words uttered by Player I as his joint 
strategies will equal 1 only if there is one single letter for 
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which each P^ has been counted. Formulating it we have 
i 
(3) £ = P7 +P, +. . ,+P, = -k . k . k m t- J n 
where P indicates an independent probability and m stands for 
the number of the letters which satisfy the above criterion. A 
final mention must be made concerning words which contain none 
of the letters satisfying that criterion. We write then a zero-
-sign in the place of the corresponding letter in the matrix. 
These words can for all purposes be neglected when one draws 
up an algorithm, for they add no new information to the 
previous words of the joint move, which contain such a letter. 
The riddle game described above has clearly brought home what 
we first stated about algorithms; they are applied to compute 
what strategy a player has to choose if he wants to maximalize 
his probability of finding a correct answer. So an algorithm 
does not coincide with a strategy; for, to define what should 
properly count as a strategy we ought to fill an infinite 
vertical line; the algorithm only selects some value-assignments 
of such a strategy. This game is naturally information-dependent: 
to count the probability value of a given series of words and to 
select an algorithm therewith, requires a knowledge of what 
moves the first player has made when uttering the words in 
question; the winning strategy of Player IX can be defined as 
the correct computation of an algorithm, i.e. the selection of 
that strategy from among the vertical lines expressing a given 
letter of the alphabet which uniquely contains the value as-
signments indicated by the move of Player I (in case of- (1) this 
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is (1,2,1,0) which is the code of the letter '0'); what we 
have is that each riddle contains only one such strategy, 
which means that the solution to it can be counted for sure; 
but theoretically it need not be the case, i.e. the game need 
not be unjust for Player I; so the winning strategy of Player I 
should be one that does not allow a unique computation of an 
algorithm for any of the letters of the alphabet for Player II.' 
But it is easily seen that even in this case Player II might 
turn to the correct computation, and if so, he might turn a 
winning strategy of Player I into a losing one for him. This 
means that the concept of winning strategy can only be defined 
for Player II along the lines of ordinary game-theory: to select 
a strategy that secures winning; while Player I can only make 
ambiguous the selection of such a strategy, in which no strategy 
of Player II can be considered winning unless by (PCR) Player I 
is ready to decide which should be taken to be correct. If we 
turn to other games for riddles we note that it is this latter 
feature which has to be undelined: the importance of (PCR) 
increases as there is no easy way of computing the correct 
algorithm. It is obvious for we no longer have exact value as-
signment but reference to objects; in (1) and (2) we did not 
have to consider reference unless we wanted to take numbers or. 
letters as something being referred to. But most of the riddles 
one encounters deal with objects and their properties. We have 
argued that reference has to enter into the way we understand 
sentences; but how can it be conveyed? This question has been 
so variously answered in the literature that it may seem 
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tiresome even to list them: from causal chain theory to that 
of disguised descriptions, from notional to referential speci-
fication, from individual concepts to world-lines, from commonly 
believed bundles of descriptions to kinds of individuals. What 
our analysis is meant to illuminate is that the two aspects 
couched in the definitions are two sides of the same coin: the 
act of referring is then analogous to an act of ordering and 
re-ordering procedure accomplished by means of language, i.e. 
it is a linguistic function by which a re-ordering of objects 
can be achieved. We have seen that this function need not be 
uttered but is presupposed by the intention of the Speaker. 
Mutual recognition of it then runs on a Gricean line; but to 
construe such a function the moves of both players are needed. 
This is why we have to define whole matrixes to get the right 
re-ordering of objects, or at least that which the Speaker 
intends to be correct. These functions enter into the algorithms 
with which the correct reference is being computed. This brings 
home the fact that reference is accomplished by using a 
stereotype necessitating a given function. This is one side of 
the coin; the other is the possibility of correlating an act 
with each possible strategy; we can even say - further extending 
the idea of winning strategy - that a strategy is winning if 
such a correlation is actually carried out. A winning strategy 
then splits into two parts: first it selects the right func-
tions to the stereotype uttered and establishes what the correct 
use of it can be, and second, it expresses an extra-linguistic 
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act to find out the referents in reality. To explain away this 
two-faced character and their non-causal relationship, we have 
introduced the idea of two different games played independently. 
From now on this idea should be kept in mind. Consider then the 
following example: 
(4) Red mastiff in red courtyard - Tongue. 
Let us give a matrix to (4) first. Modify our original in 
FIGURE I in the following respects; still define the horizontal 
lines as the possible strategies of Player J, and suppose that 
the first part of a riddle like (4) contains a . selection from 
among these strategies, i.e. it expresses a joint move of his; 
the number of these lines then still remains to be infinite; 
correlate now with each vertical line a function (or a composite) 
that is needed for the correct re-ordering of objects (4) 
prescribes for the riddle-solver in order to give the correct 
solution. Allow that in some cases these functions are the 
identity itself, and indicate it by choosing a vertical line 
whose head-word corresponds exactly to that of a given horizontal 
line which is thought to require the application of the identity 
function. Now, we should naturally modify the value-assignments 
of possible moves (the cross-points of each horizontal and 
vertical line); as letters of the alphabet have given place here 
to what.we can call reference to objects, the values should 
reflect somehow the possible referents of a given stereotype. 
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We aré here in favour of a so-called Fregein alternative to 
accept objects as values of functions; we could assign a value 
according to whether a given move has achieved a successful 
re-ordering, i.e. it aims at existing objects. Then we can 
either define this value so that it corresponds to the number 
of these existing individuals, or consider only two cases: 
whether there is at least one such existing individual or there 
is none, and define the first case as a positive value 1, whereas 
the second as a zero value o. We prefer the latter choice just 
to escape futile complications; but it is important to note 
that a value 1 for a move does not decide between an existential 
or a universal quantification, but rather indicates existing 
individuals there. Absurd properties can easily be evaluated in 
this way; a stereotype like 'angel' or 'unicorn' indicates a 
zero-value if any player happens to choose it for a move; they 
necessitate an identity function which results in a zero-value. 
While an expression like 'winged horse' necessitates a function 
other than the identity but results in a zero-value as well. Of 
course, there will be possible moves to which no value can be 
assigned at a certain stage of the play; but this is no 
surprise if we think of language as means of expressing, 
transmitting and preserving knowledge about objects: for it is 
shown by our construction of a matrix that the divulgation of 
a move is only possible with the help of one or the other 
head-expression, i.e. it can be a move made either by the 
Speaker or by the Hearer, or both. If it is the first case, the 
stereotype has been communicated, if it is the second, it has 
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been left to be a presupposition of what was uttered, and if 
it is the third, no re-ordering is required by the Speaker for 
it necessitates the use of the identity function while in the 
first case it is some other function that he gives which is. 
intended. From this it is clear that one and the same property 
can convey reference to distinct classes of objects depending 
on what strategy Player II selects. A sequence of riddle games 
or of any other form of communication can be viewed as a 
gradual filling up of a potentially infinite matrix, i.e. newer 
and newer combinations of properties are achieved through the 
help of different functions other than the identity; every new 
correct move indicates an extension of the set of objects 
players have already encountered during the play. A play is 
then a potentially infinite series of games that aims at 
transmitting as much information about the world as possible. 
The domain of all existing individuals will not be defined in 
advance just because it is a domain that can only be described 
• by the actual stage of the play, i.e. how many games have been 
already played off. The realm of known objects is always 
extending, its boundaries always questioned with a new 
assignment. We think it is a very reasonable account of what 
an epistemological process can be. Of course, the process can 
have started at a certain time, but why should we have noted it; 
we can start playing again, and need or need not take into 
consideration what the previous games resulted in. It may very 
easily happen that a game played long ago is restarted again for 
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the players simply do not remember what the original moves 
were. This equally bears out the fact that the actual seeking 
and finding of the individuals referred to with the selection 
of functions are inevitably removed from the moves made in the 
course of an algorithmic game; so much so that it must count 
as a new game. The relationship of the two types of games is 
postponed to a later stage of our analysis. 
We can now represent the matrix according to which players play 









in the mouth in a closed space Red 
In FIGURE III we proceeded as it was prescribed; the strategies 
of Player I are indicated horizontally and those of Player II 
vertically; we designated the words appearing in the first part 
of the riddle of (4) as moves of Player I and selected some 
functions as moves of Player II and indicated them by their 
natural ranges: so, 'in the mouth1 stands for "x is in the 
mouth of ytt or equally for "y has in his mouth x", and 'in a 
closed space' stands for is in the closed space of y", while 
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'Red' indicates an identity function. Finally we filled ,.in a 
possible solution (indeed the solution (4) presents) and 
defined it as what has a positive value for each assignment 
with respect to the functions indicated vertically. We indicated 
it in as a possible strategy of Player I just to show that it 
is his intention that decides whether a solution can be correct 
and that uttering a corresponding term like this he may have 
necessitated only the identity. All possible solutions should 
satisfy this criterion, but it is not necessary that there 
should be only one such term. For the ominious point in computing 
an algorithm for (4) with the matrix of FIGURE III is how we 
name our move as Player II. This we have to do because the 
selection of an algorithm is heavily influenced by what we deem 
to be the intention of Player I. In FIGURE II each different 
veritically running algorithm gives us the very same result, 
i.e. the same letter can be coded in different games but 
requires the same algorithm; this goes for our vertical head-
-expressions here as well; but the algorithms which these 
expressions determine are no longer the same just because the 
value-assignments they run through indicate different configura-
tions of objects, which may even overlap, and not simple inte-
grals. With other words we can say that their intégrais stand 
in a sense for 'themselves' or are unanimous, while here 
integrals or the zéro-sign stand for objects. But as we have 
said we cannot extend our knowledge of these individuals without 
recurring to a commonly accepted term. We can wholly formulate 
how to count value-assignments by using algorithms: we consider 
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one or many assignments already counted in a vertical line 
and try to find or select an algorithm with the properties 
belonging to those assignments and/or to another property with 
still a zero-assignment by using a function defined by a veri-
tical property. A joint move by Player I may necessitate a joint 
move by Player II, i.e. a selection of a composite function or 
diverse independent functions; and the more strategies a joint 
move of Player I goes back to, the easiest it is for Player II 
to compute a correct algorithm. We then formulate a route to 
fill in a matrix for (4) in the following manner: 
(a) Define class A as the class of mastiffs and as an already 
computed move from a previous stage of the play, and enter 
it as a strategy of Player I (naturally A would contain 
all possible value-assi 
gnments along its horizontal line); 
call A as the Designatum Class; 
(b) Define class B as the range of reference so that it contain 
red things, and enter it both as a strategy of Player I 
and Player II (note: it necessitates the identity function) 
(c) Select a function /' from a set of reference functions RF 
such that "x has in his mouth y"; 
(d) Define V as the natural range of f, i.e. things in one's 
mouth, and enter it as a strategy of Player II; 
(e) Allowing that no A is B 
(f) Select a class B' such that it be the intersection of B 
and )'; 
(g) Define fl' as a possible move of Player II, and term it 
(if it has not been termed yet) like 'tongue'. 
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The same computation can be given for each expression of (4) .. 
We indicated it on our matrix. If we computed a function for 
each expression (note: identity functions have to be computed 
first) we may be able to formulate them in a composite like 
"x has in his mouth j in a closed space of 2". This is then 
the correct algorithm for (4). It is a composite function 
extending from a Designation Class A to a reference class 1 
which are W. Naturally, computing•such an algorithm depends on 
the selection of the range of reference to which an identity 
function is available; here it amounted to the choice of red 
things as such; this may seem arbitrary, but it is many times 
indicated by the fact that a riddle contains incompatible 
properties; namely that mastiffs and courtyards cannot be red. 
This is in accord with saying that a game at a certain stage 
of play presupposes some already counted assignments from 
previous stages. Mention must.be made.about the kind of func-
tions that can enter into an algorithm; there are two possibi-
lities: it either extends from a zero-assignment to any other 
one, or considers an already counted positive value and looks 
for any other such that it be equally true of the corresponding 
individuals. The first we call a normal reference function, 
while the second can be called an Equal Distribution Function 
as it maps the sub-classes of a class into sub-classes of 
another. Selecting a correct algorithm then depends on uttering 
more and more properties to which an identity function can be 
applied and/or M-intending functions which can make up an 
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algorithm as a whole. All this seems right except for one 
point: nothing can guarantee that an identity function has 
to be computed in each case where it is possible. There are 
riddles which are based on exactly this feature, i.e. they 
necessitate a new function to be applied although they can 
necessitate an identity. But consider a more difficult example, 
namely 
(5) Blind cock jumping crows - Axe. 
In constructing a matrix for (5) no function / seems to be 
available for the term 'hen'. We may choose something like "x 
is cut down by w" but it would not press our computation 
further, for a range of reference defined as things that 
jump will not select out a significant sub-class of the natural 
range i of f like things used for cutting, while the fact 
whether it can be true of the class of cooks adds nothing 
to our computational algorithm. Then we can proceed as follows: 
start with a range of reference for example jumping things; 
(a) Define a function "x is cut down by u" such that W be a 
class of men; 
(b) Define a function "w uses in cutting y" such that Y 
intersects with B,; 
(c) Define an Equal Distribution Function g such that it 
equally maps X into Z or into A^ where g is "¡/ makes 
a sound of z", A^ is the class of hens and A2 a class of 
things that crow; 
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(d) Define the new composite function as "w uses in cutting 
y making a sound of 2"; 
(e) Define a function h as "i directs v." such that it 
intersects with a range of reference B^ like the things 
that are blind; 
(f) Allowing that W and T, V, and X have common sub-classes 
(g) We arrive at a final composite like "w directs in cutting 
y making a sound of s" that should have overlapping sub-
-classes with both ranges of reference B^ and B2-
The single moves through which the above algorithm runs along 
may or may not be given a name in the course of the game; cf. 
the definition of tongue in FIGURE III. If we do not name each ' 
range our functions map out we can have in the end something 
like "a means used for cutting that is jumping while being 
directed by somebody". This has to serve for as adequate 
information to provide the term 'axe'. Representing (5) in a 
matrix we can have the following figure; this time we indicate 
only those assignments that are required during the computation 
of the algorithm; 
In FIGURE IV we wrote with capital letters the moves of 
Player II when he rearranged the matrix by corresponding a 
natural range of a function with a new range of reference. 
Our new game then again turns out to be information-dependent, 
for it is based on the selection of a correct range of reference. 
This modifies a bit what we have said about a possible winning 
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FIGURE IV 
jumping cut dcwn used for cutting making a sound directed blind 
Cock 1 0 0 1 0 
Jumping 1 1 




1 1 1 0 






1 1 1 1 0 
strategy of Player I; to minimalize the possibility of Player II 
winning he should select his joint move either so that it 
contains very few - probably no - moves that express a zero-
assignment, or so that it contains almost only - probably all -
moves that express zero-assignments. From FIGURE IV it is clear 
that (5) belongs rather to the first than to the second case. 
If it did not contain the expression 'blind', (5) would very 
much resemble normal communication in that an identity function 
could be used for each element it contains. Whereas in the 
other case riddles would be similar to metaphores used in more 
sophisticated litarary forms. Another important thing that 
FIGURE IV illuminates is that although value-assignments 
depend on. what common knowledge about previous stages of the 
play is presupposed and there can" be no restriction to what 
function Player I intends Player II to select - be it the 
identity or not, the most what we can say about ̂ the winning 
strategy of Player I is that his only choice is to minimalize 
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his opponent's possibility of winning by carefully selecting 
his joint move from among his possible strategies expressed 
by the expressions that can be formulated within a given 
language. From this it follows that what the pre-conditions 
of a game do is that they clearly prescribe in what sense 
Player I can minimalize the possibility of Player II winning. 
In other words they tell us what his possible intentions could 
be during a series of games; and moreover, by defining such 
notions as 'available', 'absurd' etc. we can significantly 
restrict the chances of Player I cheating: what may be resonably 
expected in a game must be intended by Player I. Of course 
this cannot go as far as a "reductio ad absurdum", for then 
playing will have no sense and the game will be wholly unjust 
for Player I and very partial to Player II. And this is the 
point where normal communication may start; although even in 
the latter there remains a slight impartial feature from which 
new games might have a start. And this possibility of new games, 
we urge, is an inherent character of language; it can be 
suppressed or it can be set free but it can never be totally 
eliminated. 
4. Some Syntactic Considerations: A Semantic Dependence 
In drawing some»conclusions about our matrixes from their 
syntactic, characteristics we should instead turn to the results 
of game-theoretical semantics. However there are two important 
points in which our games differ from those described by Hintikka 
and his followers; namely that (i) the roles of the two players 
are assigned to the Speaker and the Hearer respectively, and 
(ii) they often introduce individuals, the seeking and finding 
process of which has been interrupted or deadlocked or simply 
13 
has not already been accomplished. What our matrixes have 
taught us is that we can very easily use a zero—assignment in 
computing a correct move, i.e. a move which expresses a positive 
value; nothing impedes me saying: "Going to sweep the house?" 
- "There are some very nice witches in the bathroom." - giving 
that there is a function "a: is used to fly with by y" intended 
with which a correct computation of the stereotype 'brooms.' can 
be carried out. From this it results that a verification process 
relies.heavily on what we called the computation of an algorithm. 
This dependence we believe is already in Hintikka's works when 
he speaks about partial functions as being substituted into 
propositions. Such a function is a further specification of 
some individual (s), and a forthcoming seeking process should 14 
be pursued on the basis of such a specification. G. Nunberg 
procided some very explicit cases when a seeking process 
cannot even have a beginning unless such specifications are 
computed. Sentences like "The soprano played wrong" "I like 
chicken", "I have not read Dickens", etc. can only be understood 
if we are aware of such functions as "x play y", "x is the meat 
of y", "x-wrote y", etc. In riddles we do nothing but ask for 
such functions, or rather for those further specifications that 
such functions can map. In riddles however we are not for 
concrete referents as in ordinary communication when we consider 
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to the use of such a function; we rather map out whole classes, 
which we may or may not redub when making a move. This very 
naturally parallels what Hintikka called the naming of an 
individual to be substituted into a given variable. What needs 
further emphasizing is that it is not the communication of such 
given functions that is required but the moves themselves, which 
becomes possible by re-dubbing them. But how can this be done? 
The most simple answer is that we as Player II have to make a 
quick survey of assignments of the properties enlisted as the 
possible strategies of Player I along the line of a given 
function and select the greatest of them, and define the 
horizontal property as a new specification required by Player I 
in the game. This amounts to saying that he could have used 
this new specification as a definition of his move, but then 
he would have intended the identity function, which in turn 
reduces the possibility of playing. This throws open our matrix 
to infinite possiblities. 
In laying down our rules for syntactic formulations we have 
to answer some very important questions; first, how can rules 
of introducing these specification functions be incorporated 
into a general syntactic framework? Second, at what stage will 
our rules introduce these functions into propositions or other 
types of utterance in order to leave variables unbound, and 
when should games for quantifiers start? Third, how can we 
account for the fact that our matrixes do not differentiate 
between general terms and predicates? How can functions for 
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verbs be introduced? And forth, how can the difference between 
propositions and such specification functions be explained 
away? 
Syntactically riddles are like.propositions or can be transformed 
into constructions similar to propositions; however what refutes 
such a claim is that in applying some rules from game-theoretical 
semantics to arrive at atomic sentences, one will find them 
unverifiable or irremediably false. As the latter cannot be 
accepted empirically (if they are false how could they serve 
as means of transmitting important information?), we have to 
account for their different character. Take e.g. the following 
construction after Hintikka as explicating a riddle: 
(6) X - every 7 who Z ~ W 
If we apply Game (every) to (6) we undoubtedly get a false 
proposition: 
(7) b is a Y and b Z 
just because Y and Z may very well contain incompatible 
properties as in (5) "blind cock" or in (4) "red mastiff", 
etc. This comes down to the fact that (6) requires some specifica-
• ion functions. However, as we have seen, many riddles contain 
. property for the range of reference so that the solution 
could be computed. If so, consider Z such a range and take T as 
a computable property for Yj then our verifying rule has to give 
us something like 
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(8) b is a T and b Z 
(8) can now be put to a verification test of individual seeking 
and may still prove either true or false; if it is the former, 
then we have solved the riddle correctly; if it is the latter, 
then we have committed some mistake and a corresponding game 
should start again. This approach naturally would raise the 
problem of false constructions; for, it follows from what we 
have already said, that a false truth-value can at any time 
make us re-consider our original sentence and may suggest the 
need of applying a new specification function to it, i.e. it 
may necessitate a new game. If so, then a false proposition 
cannot be false in reality but rather it calls for the game to 
be played anew. The straight-forwardness of this claim appears 
to be grounded if we differentiate once again between the two 
kinds of game: to play a verificational game is based on the 
seeking and finding processes of individuals, i.e. it is a game 
played in and with Nature, and it seems right that games for 
quantifiers should be given in this way; if a sentence results 
in being verified by such a process, then we are get confirmed 
by having uttered it; whereas if it proves to be false, then 
there can very easily be some problem with any of the expressions 
occurring in it, and we may feel an urgent need to eliminate 
and substitute it. But this latter process is no longer a 
process in and with Nature; it is a process within the 
boundaries of language and theory: they simply have to be 
re-written, and our n'ew game rules should provide us with 
instructions about the way they can be reformulated. Call this 
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game a sort of transcriptional game; its role will be to re-
write a sentence so that it could prove to be true 'with the 
greatest probability, i.e. it maximalizes our winning proba-
bility in the second, verificational game. And this is the 
most we can make out of their relationship: each successful 
verificational game presupposes a successful transcriptional 
game, whereas a lost verificational game will prove a sentence 
false only if it does so with each outcome of a different 
transcriptional game that can be played over the given sentence. 
This latter claim may not seem normal, but this is what makes 
riddles possible to be posed: a necessarily false truthvalue 
calling for a transcriptional game; and this is what our (SSP) 
has already indicated. Riddles then can be considered as a 
special call for such games; although they are not proposit-ons, 
they can be correlated with an act, be it an act of referring 
or not, i.e. the possibility of a verificational game cannot 
be excluded, but their semantic structure is based on the rules 
one can associate with transcriptional games in order to provide 
new surface forms. Their semantic structure should contain in 
some sense those specification functions that are required for 
arriving at the new surface forms. We distinguish two such 
functions, namely one that takes any of the expressions of the 
original sentence as an argument or a correct substitution 
instance and specifies a new one as a corresponding value, and 
we call it a Reference Function, and another that we have called 
an Equal Distribution Function; we can correlate two different 
transcriptional rules with our matrix: 
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G(RF) I f a s e n t e n c e h a s the.form X - every Y who Z - W, 
play should not proceed unless a new function F has 
specified one or other of its constitutents; if Y is 
such a constituent, the Hearer may choose F with T 
as a corresponding value, and the game can start 
with respect to X - every Y who F T who Z - W. 
G(RF) c-Lear-'-y does not depend on every, i.e. on what quantifiers 
a given sentence may contain. So Gfjy?) can really be generalized 
to any kind of sentence. . 
G (EDF) a s e n t e n c e h a s t h e f° r m X - every Y who Z - (/, 
play should not proceed unless a new function G has 
equally specified one or other of its constituents 
and any new constituent too; if W is is auch a 
constituent to be equally specified as V, the 
Hearer may choose G and V respectively and the game 
can have a start with respect to 
X - every Y who Z and G V - G W. 
The same goes for G ( E D F j a s f°r G( r f)- t w o r u l e s naturally 
can be applied together, the Hearer then is making a joint move. 
If we apply them to (4) we can say something like: applying 
C(RF): 
(9) Every mastiff who has in his mouth a tongue which is 
red is in a red courtyard. 
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applying G ( e d f ) 
(10) Every mastiff who has in his mouth a tongue which is 
red and is in the closed space of a cavity which is 
red is in the closed space of a courtyard. 
In getting the surface form (10) we should further segment W 
into U who Z and apply G to V or to U who Z depending on what 
constituents we consider can be eliminated. This need not be 
any restriction on our rules but amounts to predicting that 
by the help of a function a syntactically dependent constituent 
may or may not be eliminated together with its head-phrase. 
But to bring the idea home we should pair our game-rules for 
the introduction of certain functions with game-rules for real 
elimination. As we never answer with (10) to a riddle, we have 
to get rid of all those constituents for which the new functions 
have been introduced. To generalize it we can formulate all our 
conditions in one rule as the Hearer may have applied G(ppj and/or 
C(EDF) m a n y t i m e s ' 
If a game has resulted in a sentence of the form (Elv) 3 
X - every Y who F T who Z and G V - G W 
all constituents for which new functions have been 
introduced, all functions F and all functions G 
with eliminable constituents can be left out, and 
the Hearer may define his (joint) move with respect 
to 
T who Z and G V. 
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Applying to (10) we get the acceptable form of (11): 
(11) A tongue which is red and is in the closed space of 
a cavity which is red. 
In some cases a modified version o f - G ^ ^ j is applied when all 
functions G can be eliminated except the new constituents each 
G^ has introduced. To make a move in a transcriptional game 
amounts to applying G and/or together the corres-
pondent G^.J. j. Having played off this game the players can 
start a new verificational game as soon as they agree on a 
surface form like (11). To start a verificational game appears 
to be dependent on the players' recognition that no transcrip-
tional semantic game could be played. This adds to the inter-
dependence of the two games; for, it is not only thai a verifica-
tional^ game actually verifies a surface structure sentence but 
the possibility of such verification must be presupposed before 
any new game can start. This we called the maximalization of 
winning probabilities in the new verificational game. This 
amounts to defining a given sentence as containing expressions 
whose categories are licensed by what G. Nunberg calls 'normal 
beliefs'. This would mean that the final output of a transcrip-
tional game has always to be governed by normal beliefs. This 
condition can also be imposed as a pre-condition of games for 
a certain sub-domain of linguistic data. The use of transcrip-
tional games always shows the level of conventionalized beliefs 
correlated with a specific utterance. From this it follows that 
maximalization relies on what has been accepted as normal in a 
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given context. This accords very nicely with our (PCI) and 
(PC2). The.end of transcriptional games is tested by such 
beliefs of the players. And as long as no such surface structure 
is arrived at, a sentence cannot be deemed true or false. But if 
riddles are considered to be special calls for such transcip-
tional games, they cannot again be either true or false. They 
are just 'waiting' to be verified. But if so, riddles cannot be 
taken to be normal questions, either. For, questions are 
correctly viewed as what can be truely answered by responding 
with a given proposition. How else can we account for the fact 
that almost any riddle can be made to be part of a syntactic 
question? If question-words do give an interrogative character 
to riddles, then to keep up with an erotetic logic we could 
say that our rules map the input forms against the output so 
that they preserve meaning; but it should be clear already 
that no two surface forms can be considered perfectly the same 
for different strategy applications would have resulted in 
different output sentences; this means that each output sen-
tence has a quasi-uncountable output structure set into which 
it can be mapped provided there are certain functions contextually 
available for the players. Then the relationship specified by 
riddles is quite different from the question-answer relationship. 
Another piece of evidence for this is that questions are usually 
i 
thought to be functions over individuals, whereas riddles 
contain functions over expressions that we called stereotypes, 
and so question-words here can only be taken to be functions 
over functions. So while there is syntactic evidence for riddles 
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being considered as questions, there is a strong semantic 
argument against'this. For we can by all means transform (4) 
into a syntactically interrogative structure and say 
(12) What dog is red and is in a red courtyard? 
But we can by no means reply to (12) with something like (13) 
trying to meet the demands of erotetic logic: 
(13) The tongue is a red dog and is in a red courtyard. 
That (13) is highly flawed can be seen from there being 
eliminable expressions in it, which would mean in turn that, 
if put to a verificational game, (13) is going to be found 
hopelessly false. And this should amount to telling us that in 
making a move like (13) in our transcriptional game we became 
irremediably lost. To clarify what we have said about the 
interrogative character of riddles, we can try to re-formulate 
(12) in order to show correc.tly what the role of a question-
-word can be; 
(14) What function(s) can be applied to a red dog in a 
red courtyard? 
or (14') What function is such that a red dog is in a red 
courtyard? 
Question-words in riddles cannot be applied directly to the 
referents of the expressions therein, but to the expressions 
themselves. Each interrogative form like (12) if found in the 
- 154 -
data should be transformed into something like (14) or (14'). 
It would prompt a meta-llnguistic reading; however it is imme-
diately seen that it is meta-linguistic only in the sense that 
an answer informs as about what moves have or will have been 
made in the course of a given game; i.e. question-words specify 
our G a n d G rules, but do not tell us anything about 
the actual input structures and their possible verification. 
But without the latter, as we have seen, riddles cannot have 
a full sway in the life of a given community. Question-words 
in riddles belie then an ambiguous character: they do not belong 
to the same linguistic level as the remaining elements do, but 
they express the need for playing a transcriptional game before 
playing any other. 
5. Actions and Riddles: A Problem of Narrativity 
That verificational games are functions of transcriptional ones 
is borne out by the general relationship of language and action 
as such; we have seen that a language game consists of two 
separate games: a 'pure' semantical game in which the correct 
reference expressions are sorted out and a 'referential* in 
which the right individuals are singled out. Their interdepend-
ence was straightforward: every referential game presupposes a 
correct surface"atructure with which its moves can be correlated, 
but any surface structure results from a previous game played 
over the expressions themselves. In case no such game seems to 
be apparent, the function of identity is presupposed, and it 
then means that the beliefs licensing it are readily available. 
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On the other hand a transcriptional game is always dependent 
on previously played-off referential games when strategical 
functions are being selected from among (SSP); for these 
functions should always select a natural range of individuals 
so that it overlaps with what has been defined as the range 
of reference for the utterance. Their interdependence clearly 
illuminates the entanglement of language with notions; but it 
also illuminates the lack of any causal relationship; for their 
functional interdependence relies on which algorithm has been 
selected in the first transcriptional game; but it is always 
contingent on the strategical move of Player II, even if he 
does his best to make up with his opponent's intention. Whereas 
even Player I, the Hearer himself may intend the most far-
fetched functions when uttering a sentence. And in some cases, 
such as in fiction, it can result that the intersection of the 
range of reference and of any natural range is empty; this 
amounts to acquiring new information; then we can either set 
out on our search, which may turn to be infinite, or else . 
interrupt the second game as deadlocked. But there are no such 
ways out if the correlated action is not an act of reference 
but something different; we have already hinted at the possi-
bility of a special riddle session when each answer should be 
accompanied by a deictic gesture with respect to the object 
meant. But the riddle-solver may be requested to' carry out some 
action as well; he may be expected to do something with the 
correct referents; then the actions themselves have to be 
deciphered by the. use of some transcriptional game-rule. And a 
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correct deciphering is indicated by carrying out the action 
in question and not just by uttering it: e.g. in a legendary 
folktale King Matthias asks a young maiden - among many other 
things - both to bring and not to bring him a present; this is 
all the more interesting because it is the last game in a riddle 
session in'which she always has to reply in a cunning way but 
never to do anything. And in the last she answers by bringing 
a dove as a present which flies away at the moment of its 
deliverance. To draw up an algorithm for it may appear a bit 
complicated, but it should precede the accomplishment of any 
kind of action; first, a choice has to be made on the correct 
range of reference: select 'present' as such for 'bringing-and-
-not-bringing' is contradictory, so unrealizable; now, a 
function must be counted for the latter: it can either give 
another action like 'sending', or be further segmented into a 
correct range and an aliminable part: then it can be either 
'bringing' or 'not-bringing'; in either cases the contradictory 
character is dispensed with by finding another predicate like 
'flying away' for 'not-bringing'; as 'not-bringing' is to be 
specified as a three-placed predicate 'x not-bringing y to z ' 
and 'flying away' is only two-placed 'y flying away from w', 
during the transcriptional game different pairings of the 
corresponding variables are possible; from them y=v and ¡0=2 
are selected on the basis of a function like "t does not 
have/possess/get/etc. u" which is ah EDF for y and v, and w 
and z respectively; then we should select a sub-domain of the 
intersection of the natural range of 'flying away' with the 
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range of reference of 'present' so that we negate something 
that is a present but cannot fly away. This with 'bringing' 
as also a range specifies birds as such presents. In computing 
the final 'x bringing to z y flying away from 2' composite 
function we have alternative choices; they would specify 
other results like the previously mentioned 'x sending y to a', 
or '̂c not-bringing to 3 y flying to 3'; computing them would 
necessitate the accomplishment of other actions. 
In the above case we substituted another action into the second, 
verificational game usually taken up by an act of reference. 
The range of actions is naturally as wide as the range of 
objects that can be referred to; what makes possible the 
introduction of actions into riddles is that to understand 
what one should do requires the use of certain functions as 
well as to understand what some stereotypes or predicates mean. 
This accounts for the universal character of riddles. To put 
it more exactly, if transcriptional games are played over some 
range into which the Hearer of the utterance containing it can 
be substituted, then to play off a game might involve the 
Hearer as a sample of the correct individuals. This is a 
syntactic device to show it can be the imperative; then the 
whole sequence of transcriptional and verificational games have 
to be played off; but this need not bear on the general 
character of riddles; a riddle game can stop at any point. 
Of course, we can introduce new terms for riddles when the 
second, verificational game is played off differently. But if 
sequences can be interrupted, how can we define winning 
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strategies? Naturally a winning strategy in a sequence must 
be a composite of each; but whether there is a winning strategy 
in the first, transcriptional game strongly depends-on whether 
it is also winning in the second, verificational game, which 
in turn can never be considered as winning unless it is a 
function of some transcriptional game from which a correct 
surface structure has resulted. This leads to a vicious circle; 
a winning strategy in a transcriptional game depends on whether 
three is a winning strategy in a correlated verificational game, 
while one in the latter depends on there being a transcriptional 
winning strategy of which it can be the function. However this 
is as it should be; for to escape from such a vicious circle 
language can do nothing else but resort to conventionalized 
uses, i.e. it accepts certain surface structures as a priori 
correct, although this 'a priori' has nothing to do with ana-
liticity. It means that convention licenses certain correlations 
as accepted to be correct; but there are ho once-and-for-all 
winning strategies in transcriptional games that uniquely 
define winning strategies in the second, and there are no 
once-for-all winning strategies in verificational games that 
uniquely define winning strategies in the first; neither 
analiticity nor inductivity works perfectly. Speaking is not 
only an act of referring but an act of selecting linguistic 
expressions by which an act of referring can be most easily 
and most probably carried out. But nothing prescribes that 
any particular correlation should be fixed for ever. And if 
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it can vary once, then it has to be allowed that it might vary 
at other times. This way we naturally lose the possibility of 
determining meaning uniquely if meaning has anything to do with 
reference. But this is what game-theoretical semantics seems 
to prompt us to do all the more. If we dispense with all fixed 
correlations, then any surface structure may convey the 
possibility of correlation. This was what helped in creating 
fictional discourses, although there may be some ultimate 
barrier to our (SSP) that something like "Finnegans1 Wake" 
indicates. 
Our game-sematnical approach shows then some very important 
ways of disambiguations: terms, predicates, imperatives and 
stereotypes are all treated on a par; so far so good; but how 
can we explain away the ambiguity in a riddle about samples 
of objects and actions which are particular in the sense that 
persons like the Hearer can carry them out? How can we explain 
away the difference between the universal character of riddles 
and the existential character of an action? As far as transcrip-
tional games are concerned we have observed many times that 
there is no uniqueness of individuals being required but rather 
a sample of them (Cf. the abbreviated form of value-assignments 
of our matrixes). And this goes for our game-rules, too: there 
is no specially quantified character involved; variables are 
still open. This accords with the fact that games for quantifiers 
are verificational games; a player chooses an individual which 
is no longer a sample but concrete in the sense that even he 
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should be named If he has not been already. If we speak about 
riddles with a universal character, it is Player II who, 
playing the part of Nature, should select an individual in the 
second, verificational game of the sequence, and prove the 
resulted surface structure against his choice; whereas if we 
speek about existentially quantified sentences, particular 
actions or narrative texts, it should be Player I to choose an 
individual but it is still Player II to prove the resulted 
surface structure against his opponent's choice. But this 
considerably adds to the difficulty of Player II to prove a 
certain surface structure; for any instance would not do; so 
much so that in most cases Player II gives up, and Player I 
should verify his own riddle. Communication breaks down: the 
winning strategy of Player II is always the condition of 
successful communication. 
6. Some Conclusive Remarks; A Parable of Fiction 
To end our investigations we should revive some of the previous 
assumptions and state them in a more concise form. First, 
riddles are played, and can be either a sequence of sequences 
of two tjames, a transcriptional and a verificational game, or 
a sequence of transcriptional games. Of course, a given se-
quence need not«be the same all through the play for it may 
incorporate different actions or different transcriptional games 
as well: Player II has always to decide what game the moves of 
his opponent define before he can correctly react. We presented 
two kinds of transcriptional games, a meta-linguistic and one 
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for property-selection; there are certainly others, but they 
are analyzable along the lines described here. Second, riddles 
reveal a very important character of language in that the 
reference classes of the expressions can further be removed 
from the utterances the expressions appearing or-not; so much 
so that the Hearer first should compute possible reference 
functions to get to the correct referents. If so, then third, 
cur transcriptional rules are part and parcel of what an 
utterance may mean, and as such it should contain the Hearer 
without which it will be simply meaningless or ununderstandable. 
In this and only in this sense can riddles enter a text whether 
narrative or not. For narrativity depends just on which player 
chooses an individual in the verificational game with respect 
to which a given sequence should be played off over a surface 
structure that resulted from the first, transcriptional game. 
This means that there is no constraint on forthcoming role 
selection, i.e. the games for quantifiers or for other 
verifying processes must be independent in type from what 
functions have been chosen to compute a correct surface 
structure before. It can be either verified universally by 
Player II or existentially by Player I choosing an individual. 
This seems right; for our transcriptional rules cannot have 
any direct bearing on Hintikka's rules for quantifiers. 
Variables are still unbound for no moves have been made to 
bind them; The use of 'any' comes in handy here to show the 
openness of transcriptional games; for, in "I like anything 
there is to eat" there can be nothing against a possible 
verification of it by the Hearer's saying "There is only 
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spinach". If you say "I will have any horse you give" I can 
make you agree with saying "I've got only Blackie left". In 
both cases a single instance verifies a sentence containing 
'any' with the only difference to an existential quantifier 
that it is always the Hearer!that can come up with it; for it 
would sound strange if the Speaker put in something like "Okay, 
please, bring beefsteak with roast potatoes" and "Right, I 
will have any horse you own, so please give me Brownie". 
Although in the above examples there was one arid only one 
instance that could verify what the Speaker said. If 'any' 
were ab ovo universal, the Hearer could not verify the 
Speaker's utterance containing 'any' in case of there being a 
single existing individual that can count as an instance. 
Naturally it is possible to answer that there is nothing to 
ea;t, or that there are no more horses left. Then nobody could 
choose an individual with respect to which a given surface 
structure can be verified or not. Then a sequence of games 
gets deadlocked. This can equally happen when, we speak about 
dragons that do not exist or of horses that are winged. The 
corresponding moves in the game scan zero-assignments; but one 
can never know that it is zero because no strategy can lead 
to a correct substitution instance, that the predicates are 
true of no possible object, or because there are no objects 
such that the given predicates could be true of; in the first 
case a sequence of games are thought to have been played off 
and proved to have been played with losing strategies; in the 
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second no such play has been conducted yet, or if it has it 
has been deadlocked. But how can we prove that a strategy is 
losing by finding none? What difference can there be between 
a game that is deadlocked and another that cannot have come 
up with a true instance? Fictional discourse indicates this 
kind of ambiguity: there can at any time start a new seeking 
process which becomes deadlocked without being able to prove 
that strategies in the transcriptional games are losing. There 
is a last corollary of this argument; namely that if a value-
-assignment belonging to a move in a transcriptional game is 
zero, then Player II has got nothing to choose as his 
forthcoming move in the second, verificational game, which 
turns out to mean that with fictional surface forms, i.e. with 
structures of deadlocked games, no universal conclusions are 
possible. If a move-assignment is already positive, then a 
new instance can add to its universal character. So, about 
fictional beings - if there are any! - we cannot coherently 
assert universal propositions like "All dragons are seven-
-headed" just because we have no single true instance with 
respect to them. So, in fiction we are forever doomed to be 
narrative; for, we can always claim that a new verificational 
game might start although later becoming deadlocked, while we 
can never say that there are fictional objects because then 
we should have other than zero-assignments belonging to the 
moves we make in asserting something about them. Naturally in 
many cases values are assigned by different belief contexts, 
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in epistemic logics or in fiction within fiction. The problem 
of beliefs looms large, for false or misfired beliefs can 
threaten our conception of winning strategy since within a 
certain text there is no explicit criterion about what can 
count as a possible endpoint of search. A normally deadlocked 
strategy can then turn out to be winning as well. Universal 
statements can also appear to be verifiable, although we do 
not think that the can destroy all our whole argument; for any 
kind of play consisting of a transcriptional and a verifica-
tional game needs the incorporation of something which counts 
as ultimately verifying a sentence; why cannot we have e.g. a 
text in front of us as players in order to look for each 
correct surface structure in it? If we can find one, it is true, 
if not, then it is false. But we can even play with a sage of 
the tribe and ask him after each move whether there is anything 
on the plate of his memory to verify a given form. And we could 
go on. But whatever conventions we do have about truth, the lo-
gic of our games would not change: we are still computing 
algorithms with the help of which we want to keep up with the 
Speaker: understand him and follow him. Truth is always a 
sort of correlation, here a correlation of two games making up 
a sequence; but in many cases we as Speakers and much loss as 
Hearers know on.nothing about actual end-points of verifica-
tional games; we presuppose that some - if any - correlation 
obtains, and revert to (SSP). 
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Notes 
1 Cf. Abrahams (1969) . 
2 Cf. Eigen-Winkler (1975) . 
3 
The main lines of such an approach can be found in "Language-
-Games for Quantifiers" in Hintikka (1973), and in Hintikka 
(1979) . 
4 Cf. Flahault (1981) . 
5 Cf. Permyakov-Barabanova (1982). 
6 Cf. Faik-Nzuji (1973) . 
7 Cf. E. Köngas-Maranda (1972) . 
o 
L. Tarnay "Megjegyzések a találós egyszerű fórmájához", 
manuscript. 
9 Cf. Nunberg (1978) . 
1 0 Cf. Hintikka (1976) , especially Chapter 11. 
** See fn. 5. 
12 
These are taken from Barabanova's text, but naturally they 
cannot be word-for-word translations of the original. l 3 For the idea of interrupted games see Tennant (1979). 
14 x See fn. 9. 
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GRUNDLAGENPROBLEME EINER THEORIE DES WITZES 
(EIN WISSENSCHAFTSTHEORETISCHES EXPERIMENT) 
ANDRÄS KERTfiSZ 
L. Kossuth Universität Debrecen 
0. Problemstellung 
Die Fülle der existierenden Witztheorien, die Vielfäl-
tigkeit und Zersplittertheit der Aspekte, unter denen an 
diese Problematik herangegangen wird, sowie die angebliche 
Unlösbarkeit der Grundfragen dieses Gebietes scheinen den 
Entwurf einer neuen Theorie kaum zu rechtfertigen. Der Grund 
dafür, daß wir dieses vieldiskutierte Thema hier trotzdem 
wieder aufgreifen und das Entwickeln einer Witztheorie an-
streben, besteht in erster Linie darin, daß dadurch Anlaß 
gegeben wird zur Behandlung einiger methodologischer Grund-
fragen der Textwissenschaft. 
Das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, den Vorgang der 
Theorienbildung im Hinblick auf die Untersuchung des Witzes 
zu analysieren. Die Probleme ergeben sich dabei vor allem 
auf den folgenden Ebenen: . 
1. Ebene des untersuchten Gegenstandes: Welche immanenten 
Strüktureigenschaften besitzt der Witz? Wie kann seine Posi-
tion im Sprachsystem bestimmt werden? Welche Funktionen hat 
er in der menschlichen Kommunikation? 
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2. Ebene der Untersuchungsmethode: Die Witztheorien scheinen 
darin einig zu sein, daß der Witz eine die Regeln der Sprache, 
der Logik und des "normalen" menschlichen Denkens verneinende, 
sich von ihnen grundsätzlich abhebende und ihnen entgegen-
gesetzte sprachliche Erscheinung sei, wobei gerade deshalb 
die exakten, d.h.' mathematischen und logischen Methoden als 
machtlos erscheinen. Auf der anderen Seite ist aber nicht zu 
leugnen, daß der Witz eine durchaus verständliche, informa-
tionsreiche und interpretierbare sprachliche Struktur darstellt. 
Es erhebt sich also folgende Frage: ist es möglich, eine 
Methode zu finden, die imstande ist, sowohl die inkongruente, 
widersprüchliche oder paradoxe Grundstruktur des Witzes zu 
modellieren, als auch eine Erklärung für seine Systemhaftigkeit 
und kommunikative Funktion zu liefern? 
Die Tatsache, daß die uns zur Verfügung stehenden bishe-
rigen Untersuchungen zum Witz keine sprachwissenschaftlichen, 
sondern psychologische, ästhetische, soziologische, politische, 
geschichtliche, volkskundliche Analysen sind, weist eindeutig 
darauf hin, daß die wesentlichen Eigenschaften des Witzes auf 
der Überlagerung solcher komplexer und Vielfältiger pragma-
tischer Faktoren beruhen, die innerhalb eines Sprachmodells 
nicht zu behandeln sind, ohne daß die in der Wirklichkeit eine 
untrennbare Einheit bildende pragmatische Komponente in iso-
lierte Teilgebiete zerfallen würde. Demgemäß stellt sich die 
Frage, ob es möglich ist, eine solche methodische Grundlage 
zu entwickeln, die als Ausgangspunkt zur einheitlichen 
Behandlung der pragmatischen Teilkomponenten (so z.B. der 
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psychologischen, ästhetischen, soziologischen, volkskundlichen, 
kognitiven usw. Aspekte) dienen kann und aus der diese Kompo-
nenten abzuleiten sind? 
3. Die Ebene der epistemischen Systematisierunq. Unsere Unter-
suchungen zum Witz, wobei von einer bestimmten Untersuchungs-
methode Gebrauch gemacht wird, führen zu Schlußfolgerungen, 
die als Erkenntnisse zu bewerten sind und in der Form von 
Thesen oder Aussagen oder Gesetzen formuliert werden können. 
Diese Thesen stellen jedoch eine ungeordnete Menge dar: die 
Aufgabe besteht in der Systematisierung dieser Menge. Da es 
sich hier um Erkenntnisse handelt, vollzieht sich der Vor-
gang der Systematisierung auf einer allgemein epistemischen 
Stufe, die von der Stufe unterschieden werden muß, auf der die 
Ermittlung dieser Thesen geschieht (also von der Ebene der 
Untersuchungsmethode und der des Gegenstandes). Demgemäß 
lautet die Frage: Wie läßt sich die gewonnene Menge von 
Thesen adäquat systematisieren? Unter adäquater Systematisie-
rung verstehen wir, daß (i) das entstehende epistemische 
System den Eigentümlichkeiten des behandelten Wirklichkeits-
bereiches gerecht wird und (ii) das epistemische System exakt, 
d.h. mit logischen oder mathematischen Mitteln beschrieben 
werden kann..Diese zweite Forderung ist unbedingt nötig, um 
Widersprüche and Anomalien auszuschließsen und die Interpre-
tierbarkeit sowie die empirische Prüfbarkeit des Systems zu 
bewahren. Eine weitere Motivation für die epistemische Syste-
matisierung besteht darin, daß eine Theorie nur aufgrund von 
hinreichend systematisierten Thesen errichtet werden kann. 
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4. Die Ebene der Theorienstruktur. Die Aufgabe einer jeden 
Erfährungswissenschaft besteht darin, das Verhältnis zwischen 
der mathematisch-logischen Struktur einer Theorie und dem 
untersuchten Wirklichkeitsbereich aufzudecken. Dieses 
Verhältnis ist dann adäquat, wenn die Theorie einem empi-
rischen Signifikanzkriterium gehorcht. Das Problem lautet 
demgemäß: ist die Theorie des Witzes, die aus den Untersuchun-
gen auf den ersten drei Ebenen hervorgegangen ist, empirisch? 
Hier ergeben sich erhebliche Schwierigkeiten: denn nimmt man 
die Signifikanzkriterien der naturwissenschaftlich fundierten 
traditionellen Wissenschaftstheorie an, so wird sich eine 
Theorie des Witzes als nicht empirisch erweisen; verzichtet 
man auf sie. so muß man anerkennen, daß unsere Theorie 
wissenschaftstheoretisch nicht beschrieben werden kann. Des-
halb ergibt sich die Aufgabe, einen allgemeinen wissenschafts-
theoretischen Rahmen zu entwerfen, in dem (1) die Vorurteile, 
die die steife Gegenüberstellung "Gesellschaftswissenschaften 
vs. Naturwissenschaften" unterstützen, widerlegt werden können, 
(ii) ein allgemeines Kriterium zu finden, nach dem die Theorie 
des Witzes sich eindeutig als empirisch erweist und (iii) alle 
anderen, in der traditionellen Wissenschaftstheorie als regressiv 
bewerteten Eigentümlichkeiten dieser Theorie wissenschafts-
theoretisch adäquat beschrieben und erklärt werden können. 
Infolge dessen, daß die methodischen Voraussetzungen 
immer von den Eigentümlichkeiten des untersuchten Gegenstandes 
mit bestimmt werden, muß nachdrücklich hervorgehoben werden. 
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daß die, auf den aufgezählten Ebenen formulierten Problem-
stellungen und die zu ihrer Beantwortung führenden metho-
dischen Voraussetzungen voneinander streng abzugrenzen sind 
und aufeinander nicht bezogen werden dürfen. Demgemäß wird 
es im Laufe der Untersuchungen des öfteren vorkommen, daß 
eine Methode, die auf der einen Ebene sich als fruchtbar 
heraustellte auf einer anderen verworfen werden muß. Die 
Notwendigkeit einer solchen strengen Unterscheidung läßt sich 
leicht rechtfertigen, wenn man die untersuchten Objekte der 
einzelnen Ebenen miteinander vergleicht: im ersten Kapitel 
bilden Witze, d.h. Texte; im zweiten epistemische Systeme und 
im dritten Theorien den Gegenstand der Untersuchung, die 
natürlich ganz verschiedene Entitäten sind. 
Es soll weiterhin bemerkt werden, daß die nachfolgenden 
Untersuchungen sich in einem bedautenden Maße auf logische 
und mathematische Mittel stützen. Um die Lektüre zu erleich-
tern, wird jedoch relativ informell vorgegangen. Es ist aber 
zu betonen, daß die Definitionen und Theoreme auch formal 
exakt expliziert bzw. bewiesen werden können. Grundlegende 
Kenntnisse zur Logik und Mengenlehre werden jedoch trotz allem, 
vorausgesetzt. 
1. Untersuchungen zum Witz 
1.1. Arbeitshypothesen und Voraussetzungen 
Da eine eingehende Behandlung der existierenden Witztheo-
rien weitläufige Ausführungen fordern würde, wozu im gegebenen 
Umfang der vorliegenden Arbeit keine Möglichkeit besteht, wer-
den wir als Ergebnis der Auswertung dieser Ansätze eine 
e 
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Standardtheorie konstruieren, die die allgemein vertretenen 
Auffassungen der Theoretiker widerspeigelt.^ Sie enthält 
die folgenden Thesen: 
T1 Witze können nicht mithilfe der Logik modelliert werden, 
da sie auf Inkongruenz, Paradoxien, Widersprüchen gründen. 
T2 Das Wesen des Witzes bilden seine pragmatischen Eigen-
schaften. 
T3 Die zentrale Funktion des Witzes ist seine Metafunktion, 
d.h. seine metakognitive, metasprachliche, metamora-
lische usw. Funktion. 
T4 Der Witz .führt seine Metafunktion dadurch aus, daß er 
durcl' die Verletzung der Regeln der Logik und des 
"normalen" menschlichen Denkens die Mitglieder einer 
Sprachgemeinschaft zur Neubewertung und Neuinterpreta-
tion ihrer als geltend vorausgesetzten Systeme von 
sprachlichen, gesellschaftlichen, kognitiven Normen, 
2 
ihrer Denkweise und Weltbetrachtung zwingt. 
Dieser Standardtheorie setzen wir unsere Arbeitshypothese 
gegenüber, die ähnlicherweise als eine Menge von Thesen an-
geführt. wird. Diese untershceidet sich von der Standardtheorie 
dadurch, daß T1 und T4 durch die folgenden Thesen WT1 und WT4 
ersetzt werden, unter Übernahme von T2 und T3 als WT2 und WT3: 
WT1 Der Witz kann mithilfe der Logik modelliert werden, 
trotz der Tatsache, daß er auf Inkongruenz, Paradoxien, 
Widersprüchen gründet. 
WT4 Der Witz führt seine Metafunktion nicht durch die Ver-
letzung der Regeln der Logik und des "normalen" mensch-
lichen Denkens aus, sondern dadurch, daß er unter ihrer 
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Beibehaltung diese "aufhebt" und auf einer anderen Stufe 
neubewertet und neuinterpretiert. 
Da die folgenden Untersuchungen lediglich als eine erste 
Annäherung zur Unterstützung dieser Thesen zu gelten haben, .. 
wird kein Anspruch auf einen vollständigen Beweis erhoben. Es 
wird ausschließlich ein Entwurf der Möglichkeit eines solchen 
Beweises angestrebt. Im Zusammenhang damit erfolgt keine ein-
gehende Analyse des ausgewerteten Korpus, sondern unsere Er-
wägungen werden einfach mit Hilfe einiger paradigmatischer 
3 
Beispiele erläutert. 
Mit Hinweis auf eine Rechtfertigung, die aber erst im 
Kapitel 3, ausgeführt wird, geben wir keine Arbeitsdefini-
tion der Textsorte Witz an - bei der Identifikation gewisser 
Texte als Witze bedienen wir uns lediglich des Begriffs der 
Familienähnlichkeit, im Sinne Wittgensteins. Es soll jedoch 
soviel vorausgesetzt werden, um den Bereich der in Frage 
kommenden Erscheinungen einigermaßen zu beschränken, daß wir 4 
Witze als Texte betrachten, die sich in einer Witzsituation 
als Sprechakte manifestieren. 
1.2. Präsuppositionen 
Fast alle Theoretiker weisen in irgendeiner Form darauf 
hin - und das ist natürlich auch intuitiv einzusehen -, daß 
eines der wesentlichsten Momente des Witzes in der Überraschung 
wurzelt, die die im Abschnitt 2.1. dargelegten metareflektori-
schen Reaktionen des Rezipienten auslöst. Diese These kann auch 
- um uns einer anderen Terminologie zu bedienen - so formuliert 
werden, daß die Witzstruktur auf das Präsuppositionssystem des 
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Zuhörers störend wirkt und zu seiner Umwertung führt. Eine 
erste intuitive Ausführung dieser Behauptung lautet folgender-
maßen. Der Witzerzähler äußert einen Satz, der eindeutig von 
einer bestimmten Menge von Präsuppositionen begleitet wird: 
es besteht kein Zweifel, daß der Rezipient diese Präsupposi-
tionen auf Grund seiner sprachlichen und außersprachlichen 
Kenntnisse mit der genannten Äußerung in Zusammenhang bringt. 
Von diesen Prämissen ausgehend versucht der Rezipient den 
Inhalt der erwarteten nächsten Äußerung zu erschließen, deren 
Präsuppositionen ebenfalls bekannt sind. Demgegenüber aber 
wird er mit einer solchen Äußerung konfrontiert, die zwar 
zweifellos in irgendeiner Weise auf die ihr vorangehende 
Äußerung zurückzuführen ist, aber deren Präsuppositionen keines-
falls aus den Präsuppositionen dieser Äußerung hervorgehen. 
Bevor wir auf die Analyse der Präsuppositionsstruktur 
einiger Witze eingehen, scheint es angebracht, den von uns 
angewandten Begriff der Präsupposition zu klären. Es sei vor 
allen Dingen betont, daß es sich in unserem Falle um pragma-
tische Präsuppositionen handelt, deren Definition sich von 
der geläufigen logisch-semantischen Festlegung der Präsuppo-
sitionen in einem beträchtlichen Maße unterscheidet: es geht 
nicht darum, daß man aus der Wahrheit eines Satzes auf die 
Wahrheit eines anderen Satzes schließen kann, sondern, daß 
der Sprecher gewisse Gegenstände und Sachverhalte als unbe-
streitbar gegeben und dem Hörer bekannt voraussetzt, was so-
wohl für die Formulierung der Aussage als auch für ihre Inter-
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pretation nicht ohne Folgen bleibt. Stalnaker charakterisiert 
den Begriff der pragmatischen Präsupposition wie folgt: "To 
presuppose a proposition in the pragmatic sense is to take 
its truth for granted, and to assume that others involved in 
the context do the same ... Presuppositions are propositions 
implicitly supposed before the relevant linguistic business 
is transacted ... It is important that the"participants in a 
single context have the same set of presuppositions if mis-
understanding is to be avoided. This is why presuppositions 
involve not only taking the truth of something for granted, 
but also assuming that others do the same...".^ 
Mit Anlehnung an Karen H. Ebert unterscheiden wir drei 
Typen der pragmatischen Präsuppositionen.^ Die Annahme der 
Bekanntheit und Identifizierbarkeit von Referenten wird star-
ke pragmatische Präsupposition genannt. Aber es ist oft der 
Fall, daß der Hörer eine Äußerung auch dann versteht, wenn 
er keine festen Vorstellungen in bezug auf die erwähnten Sach 
verhalte besitzt, z.B. wenn er nicht weiß, was das Wort "auch 
in dem folgenden Satz andeutet: 
"Auch Peter war in Berlin." 
Die Präsupposition kann folgendermaßen formuliert werden 
"Außer Peter war noch jemand in Berlin, den ich entweder ken-
ne, oder nicht kenne." Aber der Sinn des Satzes ist ohnehin 
klar, unabhängig davon, ob ich diese Person kenne, oder nicht 
Das läßt darauf schließen, daß bei der vollständigen Interpre 
tation des Satzes der Hörer sich neben der Kenntnis der Refe-
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renten auch auf die Bekanntheit anderer Sachverhalte stützen 
muß, um die Äußerung sinngemäß dekodieren zu können (z.B. 
wer, wann, warum war noch in Berlin, außer Peter), aber die 
Kenntnis dieser Tatbestände ist keine notwendige Voraussetzung 
für das Verstehen und für die Ermittlung des Wahrheitswertes. 
Anhand dieser Erwägungen wird die Kenntnis solcher Sachver-
halte, die sich aus dem Text ergeben, die aber, was das Wesen 
der Äußerung anbelangt, keinen Einfluß auf das Verständnis 
i'er Äußerung ausüben, schwache pragmatische Präsupposition 
genannt. 
Die Bestimmung des dritten Typs soll mit'den Worten K.H. 
Eberts wiedergegeben werden: "Notwendige Voraussetzungen für 
das Verstehen und die Beurteilung eines Sprechaktes, die sich 
aus der Formulierung ergeben, nenne ich logische Präsuppositio-
nen. Logisch präsupponiert sein, bedeutet für Referenten, daß 
sie identifiziert werden müssen, für Sachverhalte, daß sie für 
wahr (existent) gehalten werden müssen, bevor die Assertion 
abgelehnt oder akzeptiert werden kann... Die hier gegebene 
Bestimmung der logischen Präsupposition weicht von der üb-
lichen logischen Definition (Implikat von S und -S) insofern 
ab, als sie nicht Bedingungen für die Wahrheit von Sätzen, 
sondern Bedingungen für die Interpretation und Beurteilung 
kommunikativ intendiertet Äußerungen angibt."7 
Die folgende Analyse dient zur Rechtfertigung der Hypo-
these, daß die den Witzen zugrundeliegende Polarität oft auf 
der Inkongruenz der Präsuppositionssysteme beruht. 
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(1) Richter (streng): "Die nächste Person, die die Ver-
handlung unterbricht, wird nach Hause geschickt." 
Angeklagter: "Hurraaa!" 
Die Präsuppositionen der Äußerung des Richters: 
1. Im Saal sind solche Personen anwesend, die in der Lage 
sind, die Verhandlung zu unterbrechen. 
(Starke pragmatische Präsupposition) 
2.a. Diese Personen gehören zum Publikum 
oder 
2.b. Der Angeklagte ist nicht unter ihnen. 
(Logische Präsupposition) 
Die Präsuppositionen der Äußerung des Angeklagten: 
1. Im Saal sind Personen anwesend, die in der Lage sind, die 
Verhandlung zu unterbrechen. 
(Starke pragmatische Präsupposition) 
2. Auch der Angeklagte gehört zu ihnen. 
(Logische Präsupposition) 
Es besteht kein Zweifel, daß die Reaktion des Angeklagten 
auf Grund des Unterschiedes zwischen den logischen Präsupposi-
tionen der beiden Personen zu erklären ist. 
Die Entscheidung des Problems, inwieweit die Qualität des 
Witzes vom jeweiligen Typ der miteinander in Diskrepanz stehenden 
Präsuppositionen abhängt, würde eingehendere Untersuchungen 
erfordern und sei deshalb dahingestellt. 
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1.3. Mitverständniesse 
Bei den Witzen, deren Kern als eine sprachliche Ambigui-
tät zu erfassen ist, sind auch metasprachliche Präsuppositionen 
aufzuweisen. 
(2) "Wurden in dieser Gegend irgendwelche großen Männer 
geboren?" - fragt ein Tourist im abwertenden Ton. 
"Nein", antwortet der Ortseinwohner, "Das Höchste, 
wozu wir fähig sind, sind Babys. Anders in der Stadt, 
nicht wahr?" 
Die Präsuppositionen der Frage des Touristen: 
1. In der Sprache gibt es den Ausdruck "großer Mann". 
(Metasprachliche, starke pragmatische Präsupposition) 
2. Dieser Ausdruck bezieht sich nicht auf die körperliche 
Beschaffenheit eines Menschen, sondern auf die Bedeutung 
seiner Persönlichkeit. (Metasprachliche, logische Präsuppo-
sition) 
3. Es ist durchaus möglich, daß in diesem Dorf (dieser Gegend) 
solche Menschen geboren wurden, die die Eigenschaften 
eines "großen Mannes" besitzen. (Starke pragmatische 
Präsupposition) 
Der Ortseinwohner gibt jedoch eine Antwort, als ob man die 
Frage im Einklang mit dem, aus den folgenden Präsuppositionen 
bestehenden Hintergrund geäußert hätte: 
1. In der Sprache gibt es den Ausdruck "großer Mann". 
(Metasprachliche, starke pragmatische Präsupposition) 
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2. Dieser Ausdruck bezieht sich auf die körperliche Beschaf-
fenheit eines Menschen. (Metasprachliche, logische Präsup-
position) 
3. Die Menschen werden als Säuglinge geboren. (Starke pragma-
tische Präsupposition) 
Die Struktur des Witzes kann durch die Analyse zweier 
Ebenen nachgewiesen werden: einerseits wird die komische Wir-
kung durch eine sprachliche Zweideutigkeit, das heißt, die wort-
wörtliche Interpretation eines im übertragenen Sinne verwende-
ten Ausdrucks ausgelöst - das läßt sich zweifellos auf die 
Diskrepanz zwischen den Präsuppositonssystemen zurückführen, 
andererseits aber ragt die Tendenz des Witzes darüber weit 
hinaus und gipfelt in der Tatsache, daß dieses Mißverständnis 
nicht einem Zufall zu verdanken ist, sondern die Überheb-
lichkeit des Touristen bewußt an den Pranger stellt. Diese 
zweite Ebene kann durch die Analyse der Präsuppositionen nicht 
aufgedeckt werden, denn die Annahme, die die Antwort des Orts-
bewohners anfechtet, ergibt sich zwar aus der Frage des Touris-
ten, kann aber auf keinen Fall mit einer.Präsupposition identi-
fiziert werden: 
(A) "Dieses Dorf ist so klein und unbedeutend, daß nicht 
einmal eine berühmte Persönlichkeit hier geboren wurde." 
Satz (A) kann deshalb nicht als Präsupposition klassifiziert 
werden, weil dem Touristen durchaus zugestanden wird, diese 
Behauptung zu leugnen, und zwar mit Recht, angenommen, der 
Ortsbewohner stellt die Frage 
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(B) "Wollen Sie damit sagen, daß mein Dorf so klein und 
unbedeutend sei, daß es nicht einmal der Geburtsort 
einer bekannten Persönlichkeit sein könne?" 
steht dem Touristen nichts im Wege, diese Zumutung mit gutem 
Gewissen zurückzuweisen: 
(c) "So etwas habe ich überhaupt nicht gesagt: ich habe 
bloß gefragt, ob in dieser Gegend große Männer geboren 
wurden?" 
Dagegen aber besteht das Wesen der Präsupposition gerade darin, 
daß sie die notwendige Bedingung einer Äußerung darstellt., 
an deren Wahrheit nicht gezweifelt werden kann und die sowohl 
vom Sprecher als auch vom Hörer bedingungslos akzeptiert wer-
den muß. 
Um eine angebrachte Lösung des Problems zu finden, scheint 
es deshalb vorteilhaft, mit Anlehnung an Ducrot den Begriff 
o 
des "Mitverständnisses" einzuführen. Aus dem analysierten 
Beispiel ergibt sich, daß Mitverständnissen nur in dem Fall 
ein tatsächlicher kommunikativer Wert zugewiesen werden kann, 
wenn - im Gegensatz zu den Präsuppositionen - eine Oppositions-
relation zwischen dem Mitverständnis und dem wortwörtlichen 
Sinn des Satzes vorhanden ist, trotz der Tatsache, daß es aus 
der Äußerung erschlossen werden kann. Wir berufen uns auf 
Ducrots Ausführung: "Wenn X und X' zwei Äußerungen sind, die 
auf ein und derselben Bedeutungsskala liegen, und wenn die 
zweite sich von der ersten nur darin unterscheidet, daß sie 
eine höhere Stufe dieser Skala innehat, wenn weiterhin eine 
Schicklichkeitsregel der Verwendung von X' entgegensteht oder 
- 183 -
entgegenzustehen scheint, dann neigt der Hörer, der X hört, 
9 
dazu, sie als X' zu interpretieren." Diese Definition soll 
insofern präzisiert werden, als die, der Interpretation der 
Äußerung.zugrundeliegende Regel als eine soziale Regel hingenom 
men wird, die das kommunikative Verhalten der Teilnehmer einer 
Sprechaktsituation steuert. Demnach bestimmen solche Regeln 
die Interpretation von Äußerungen. In unserem Fall soll das 
soviel bedeuten, daß die Äußerung (A) vom Hörer als eine 
Beleidigung hingenommen werden könnte: deshalb stellt der 
Tourist die am Anfang des Witzes stehende Frage. Der Orts-
bewohner aber, da er die Äußerung versteht und sich im Klaren 
über die der Beleidigung entgegenstehende Regel, ist, interpre-
tiert die Frage als (A'), und zwar folgendermaßen: der Tourist 
ist nicht berechtigt, (A) mitzuteilen: als er also die Frage 
gestellt hat, die semantisch sich am nächsten zu (A) befindet, 
dann besteht eine recht große Wahrscheinlichkeit dessen, daß er 
(A') gemeint hat. 
Bei diesem Witz soll ein weiteres Moment von grundlegen-
der Wichtigkeit hervorgehoben werden. Ducrot weist überzeu-
gend nach, daß in bezug auf eine Äußerung das Mitverständnis 
den Präsuppositionen zeitlich nachgeordnet ist, oder genauer 
gesagt, daß, während die Präsuppositionen Elemente der 
linguistisch-semantischen Komponente bilden, sind die Mitver-
ständnisse in der rhetorischen Komponente enthalten, die sich 
als das Output der linguistisch-semantischen Komponente mani-
festieren. Aber eine wesentliche Struktureigenschaft des 
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behandelten Witzes besteht darin, daß zwischen der zu der 
linguistich-semantischen Komponente gehörenden Präsupposi-
tion und dem in der rhetorischen Komporiente enthaltenen 
Mitverständnis eine Art Rückkopplung hervorgerufen wird: 
das heißt, die linguistisch-semantische Komponente'kommt -
mag es als noch so paradox erscheinen - als das Output der 
rhetorischen Komponente zustande. Als nämlich der Ortsbewohner 
die Frage des Touristen als (A') deutet, gestaltet er seine 
Antwort diesem Mitverständnis entsprechend: eine Antwort, die 
sich auf die der Frage widersprechende Präsuppositionsstruktur 
gründet - das führt dann zu der sprachlichen Zweideutigkeit, 
der die Pointe des Witzes zu verdanken ist. Aus diesen Präsuppo-
sitionen ergibt sich wiederum ein Mitverständnis, das sich 
annähernd in der folgenden Form darstellen läßt: 
(D) "Wollen Sie darauf anspielen, daß jeder Mensch, der 
in einer Großstadt geboren wurde, ein großer Mann sei?" 
Und dieses Mitverständnis ist eine Antwort auf das aus der 
Frage erschlossene Mitverständnis. Der hier skizzierte Mecha-
nismus läßt sich mit dem folgenden Schema verdeutlichen: 
Präsuppositionen. Präsuppositionen-
V f ^ ^ iy 
'Äußerung.. ^ z ^ Äußerung., 
Mitverständnis., -e Mitverständnis., 
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1.4. Assoziationen 
(3) Wenn ein Diplomat "ja" sagt, dann meint er "viel-
leicht". Wenn ein Diplomat "vielleicht" sagt, dann 
meint er "nein"; und wenn ein Diplomat "nein" sagt, 
dann ist er kein Diplomat. 
Wenn eine Frau "nein" sagt, dann meint sie "vielleicht". 
Wenn sie "vielleicht" sagt, dann meint sie "ja". 
Und wenn sie "ja" sagt, dann hat sie kein Feingefühl. 
Die Struktur des Witzes findet ihren Niederschlag in den 
folgenden Struktureigenschaften: 
1. in der Textstruktur: zwischen den beiden Texteinheiten 
herrscht nicht nur eine Art Parallelität, sondern die 
zweite Einheit bildet gerade das Spiegelbild der ersten. 
Daraus enfaltet sich der Prozeß, der Anlaß gibt zur 
Betrachtung einer spezifischen gemeinsamen Eigenschaft 
von Diplomaten und Frauen unter einem bestimmten Gesichts-
punkt, und zwar so, daß der zwischen ihnen bestehende 
Unterschied durch ihre análogen Züge hervorgehoben wird. 
Mit anderen Worten: die Struktur des Textes veranschaulicht 
die "Identität der Nicht-Identität". 
2. in den metasprachlichen Reflexionen: der Erscheinung, die 
Ducrot "Mitverständnis" nennt, kommt hier eine explizite 
sprachliche Form zu; 
3. dadurch, daß der Witz so offen auf die Entfernung zwischen 
dem Gedanken und dem ausgesprochenen Wort hinweist, lenkt 
er die Aufmerksamkeit des Rezipienten auf eine bekannte 
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Eigenschaft der Denotate, die ungefähr die folgende sprach 
liehe Form erhalten kann: 
(E) "Diplomaten und Frauen sagen nie, was sie meinen." 
Wenn wir diese Aussage unter die Lupe nehmen, kann uns 
die Folgerung nicht entgehen, daß sie weder als Präsupposition 
noch als Mitverständnis zu qualifizieren ist. 
Beachtenswert ist die Tatsache, daß Satz (E), bzw. die 
Eigenschaft der Diplomaten und der Frauen, daß sie nie das 
sagen, was sie denken, nicht in der primären Bedeutungsebene 
der beiden Begriffe enhalten ist. Dieser Tatbestand ist mit 
der Annahme gleichzusetzen, daß diese Eigenschaft nichts 
anderes als eine, sich an die Begriffe knüpfende Assoziation 
ist, die - obwohl sie natürlich keinesfalls mit der Bedeutung 
der Wörter "Frau" und "Diplomat" identifiziert werden kann -
im gesellschaftlichen Bewußtsein eng mit den Begriffen des 
Diplomaten und der Frau verbunden ist. Während also im Fal-
le der Präsuppositionen gewisse Eigentümlichkeiten der Witze 
auf die Denotationsebene der semantischen Struktur von Äuße-
rungen und bei den Mitverständnissen auf die, außerhalb der 
linguistisch-semantischen Sphäre fallende rhetorische Kompo-
nente zurückgeführt worden sind, scheint die Struktur von 
Witz (3) auf der zweiten Ebene der semantischen Komponente, 
der der Konnotation zu beruhen. Die Bedeutungsstruktur des 
Witzes wird also von der Ebene der Denotation in die Richtung 
der der Konnotation verschoben und das läßt darauf schließen, 
daß die Struktur des Witzes gesellschaftlich akzeptierte Asso-
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ziation als unbestreitbar gegeben voraussetzt, die die Inter-
pretation der Äußerungen bestimmen. 
Dieser Bedeutungsstruktur kommt deshalb Relevanz zu, weil 
sie zur Erklärung einer grundlegenden Eigentümlichkeit des 
Witzes.beiträgt: seiner manipulativen Kraft. Es war notwendig, 
zu dem Erkennen der manipulativen Kraft des Witzes zu gelangen, 
denn es versteht sich von selbst, daß der Witz die Denkweise, 
das Sprach- und Weltbild des Rezipienten außerordentlich 
stark modifiziert, indem er die, über ein breites Bedeutungs-
feld verfügende aktuelle Bedeutung eines Begriffs durch ein 
konnotatives Element, das ursprünglich nicht in der lexika-
lischen Bedeutung des Begriffs enthalten war, modifiziert. 
(Dazu sei noch die Bemerkung hinzugefügt, daß das Wort "mani-
pulativ" in einem neutralen Sinn, ohne seine negativen und 
pejorativen Konnotationen zu der Bezeichung der auf den Emp-
fänger ausgeübten Wirkung einer sprachlichen Konstruktion ver-
wendet wird, die seine Denkweise beeinflußt, ohne daß er sich 
im Klaren über diese Einwirkung wäre.) 
Um jetzt zu den Präsuppositionen zurückzukehren, wird 
es zweifellos ersichtlich, daß auch sie eine starke manipula-
tive Wirkung ausüben - jedoch aus einem anderen Grund. Schon 
Frege weist darauf hin, daß die Präsuppositionen, da sie als 
selbstverständlich einer Äußerung vorauszusetzen sind, wodurch 
der Hörer gezwungen ist, sie ohne jegliche Begründung anzu-
nehmen, ihre manipulative Verwendung zu fördern scheinen.10 
Ihr Akzeptieren läßt sich schon deshalb nicht bestreiten, 
weil sie nie in expliziter Form zur Geltung gebracht werden. 
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Das hat zur Folge, daß der Hörer seine Aufmerksamkeit viel-
mehr der Kritik des Aussageinhaltes zuwendet als dem Aufdecken 
und Dekodieren der Präsuppositionen. Da der Rezipient keines-
falls dem Annehmen der Präsuppositionen entgehen kann, es sei 
denn, daß er die Kommunikationssituation im Grunde zurück-
weisen will, kann er viel leichter zur Übernahme der Präsuppo-
sitionen bewegt werden, als zum Anerkennen der Wahrheit einer 
Aussage. 
Ähnliche Schlußfolgerungen können auch im Fall der den 
Mitverständnissen zugrundeliegenden sozialen Ragelri gezogen 
werden. Aus unseren Überlegungen läßt sich die manipulative 
Struktureigenschaft eindeutig ableiten, denn diese Regeln 
treten in einer kommunikativen Situation nicht explizit zum 
Vorschein, sondern funktionieren als implizit gegebene Be-
stimmungsfaktoren der Interpretation von Äußerungen. 
Um das bisher Gesagte zusammenzufassen, läßt sich 
feststellen, daß die drei untersuchten Erscheinungen über 
folgende gemeinsame Eigenschaften verfügen: erstens, werden 
sie nicht explizit sprachlich realisiert: zweitens üben sie 
eine manipulative Funktion aus und drittens, im Zusammenhang 
damit, bestimmen sie eindeutig die Interpretation einer Äuße-
rung, oder anders formuliert, geben sie Anweisungen zur Inter-
pretation der Äußerung an, wodurch sie gewisse explizit nicht 
gegebene Obligationen in Gang setzen und dadurch zur normativen 
Bestimmtheit des Witz-Sprechaktes beitragen. 
Aufgrund dieser gemeinsamen Eigenschaften fassen wir sie 
zu einer Einheit zusammen. Im weiteren werden wir eine Konjunk-
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tion von Präsuppositionen, Assoziationen und Regeln der er-
wähnten Art, wobei diese natürlich als Propositionen zu re-
konstruieren sind, eine konditionale Basis nennen. Das Vor-
handensein wenigstens eines Elements ist notwendig und hin-
reichend für eine konditionale Basis. Das soll bedeuten, daß 
sie einerseits nicht leer sein darf, andererseits genügt aber 
eine einzige Präsupposition oder eine einzige Assoziation zum 
Zustandekommen einer konditionalen Basis. Falls mehrere solche 
vorhanden sind, so werden sie miteinander konjunktiv verknüpft. 
1.5. Die Ermittlung der Grundstruktur 
(4) X: "Hast du Streichhölzer, Karl?" 
Y: "Nein, aber ich habe ein Feuerzeug." 
X: "Wie soll ich mir denn die Zähne mit einem Feuer-
zeug stochern?" 
Im gegebenen Fall sind zwei konditionale Basen vorzu-
finden: die eine aktualisiert sich, wenn man die Streichhölzer 
zum Feuerzünden, die andere, wenn man sie zum Zahnstochern 
verwenden will. In einer Mehrdeutigkeit ausschließenden Si-
tuation realisiert sich nur die eine Basis; im Witz (4) treten 
jedoch beide zum Vorschein, und zwar folgendermaßen: 
1. X stellt eine Frage, die sich auf Streichhölzer bezieht. 
Die im Kontext gültige aktuelle Interpretation dieser Äußerung 
ist aber mit der folgenden Aussage gleichzusetzten: "ich 
brauche. Streichhölzer". 
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2. Y, um der Frage Rechnung tragen zu könnai, wendet sich an 
seine konditionale Basis. Von den ihm zur Verfügung stehenden 
Systemen - sich auf die jeweilige Situation und seine außer-
sprachlichen Kenntnisse stützend - wählt er eine konditionale 
Basis aus und versucht,, auf Grund ihrer die Frage zu beantwor-
ten: die Streichhölzer werden zum Feuerzünden benötigt. 
3. Die Antwort von X ermöglicht die eindeutige Eingrenzung der 
konditionalen Basis, die der Frage zugrunde lag. Es stellt sich 
heraus, daß diese nicht mit der von Y vorausgesetzten Basis 
übereinstimmt. 
4. Also: eine Äußerung, die sich ursprünglich auf zwei, von-
einander getrennt erscheinende konditionale Basen bezieht, ak-
tualisiert sich mit Bezug auf beide Basen. 
Mit Anlehnung an Stalnaker betrachten wir eine interpre-
tierte Äußerung als eine Funktion, die Kontexte auf Proposi-
tionen abbildet.11 Demgemäß läßt sich die in einem gegebenen 
Kontext geltende aktuelle Interpretation einer Äußerung als 
Pr.oposltion darstellen. Führen wir nun das Zeichen "(" und 
die propositionalen Variablen p, q, r ... ein. Es bezeichne 
die vom Zeichen'")" rechtsstehende Variable die Proposition, 
die die aktuelle Interpretation einer Äußerung repräsentiert, 
die von dem Zeichen ")" rechts stehende Variable die konditio-
nale Basis, die unbedingt im Vordergrund stehen muß, damit 
innerhalb des Rahmens eines Sprechaktes der Sprecher die Äu-
ßerung wenigstens einem Rezipienten mitteilen kann, so, daß 
der Hörer den intendierten Inhalt zu entnehmen imstande ist. 
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Führen wir weiterhin die logischen Konstanten "&", "v", 
"-•", "=" zur Bezeichnung jeweils der Negation, der Konjunk-
tion, der Disjunktion, der Implikation und der Äquivalenz, so-
wie die Klammer "(", ")" ein. Dann erhält die im Punkt 4. dar-
gelegte Beobachtung die folgende Form: 
(p/q) & (p/r) 5 (p/q&r) 
wobei 
p = "Ich brauche Streichhölzer" 
q = die konditionale Basis, die mindestens die folgende 
Proposition enthält: "Streichhölzer werden zum Feuer-
zünden gebraucht". 
r = die konditionale Basis, die mindestens die folgende 
Proposition enthält: "Streichhölzer werden zum Zahnsto-
chern gebraucht". 
Das Problem läßt sich aber auch in einer anderen Weise 
erfassen. Man betrachte die Menge r aller zu einer bestimmten 
Äusserung gehörenden konditionalen Basen. Nun stellt sich die 
Frage, ob sich die Äußerung "Hast du Streichhölzer, Karl", 
mitteilen läßt, wenn r gegeben ist. Eine bejahende Antwort 
O. 
kann nur'in dem Fall gegeben werden, wenn man diese Äußerungen 
als zwei, sich voneinander semantisch unterscheidende Inter-
pretationen der Äußerung ansieht, die, falls sie sich einzeln 
aktualisieren, aus dem potentiell beide umfassenden System r 
die der interdierten Mitteilung entsprechende Basis auswählen? 
die andere Basis, obwohl sie potentiell vorhanden ist, übt 
keinen Einfluß auf das Dekodieren der Äußerung aus. Somit er-
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halten wir die folgenden zwei Interpretationen der eingangs 
erwähnten Äußerung: 
p = Ich brauche Streichhölzer zum Zahnstochern 
q = Ich brauche Streichhölzer zum Feuerzünden, 
r = die Konjunktion mindestens der Propositionen "Streichhöl-
zer werden zum Feuerzünden gebraucht" und "Streichhölzer 
werden zum Zahnstochern gebraucht". 
In dem Witz treten jedoch beide Interpretationen der Äu-
ßerung gleichzeitig auf, also es gilt die Äquivalenz: 
{p/r) & (q/r) = {p & q/r) 
Es besteht keine Möglichkeit, die hier abgeleiteten Grund-
gesetze anhand einer großen Anzahl von Witzen zu explizieren. 
Deshalb wird die These, daß diese zwei Gesetzmäßigkeiten 
wenigstens einen Grundtyp des Witzes hinreichend charakterisie-
ren, nur als eine Hypothese formuliert. 
1.6. Ein System der deontischen Logik 
12 
Den Gegenstand der deontischen Logik bilden Handlungen, 
zu deren Beschreibung sie normative Operatoren verwendet, 
wie z.B. "ist geboten" ("0"), ist .erlaubt" ^ "P") und "ist. 
verboten" ("F"). 
Eine Motivation für die Anwendung der deontischen Logik 
haben wir schon erwähnt, indem darauf hingewiesen wurde, daß 
die konditionalen Basen eng mit Obligationen normativer Natur 
zusammenhängen, wodurch gewisse Interpretationen der Äußerungen 
geboten werden. 
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Eine zweite Motivation ergibt sich aus der Analyse von 
Sprechakten bzw. Sprechaktsituationen - dabei sollten die 
13 folgenden kurzen Bemerkungen genügen. 
Erstens: Seärle unterscheidet zwischen konstitutiven und 
14 
regulativen Regeln. Die letzteren sind jedoch eindeutig, 
dem logischen Status nach, auf normative Grundlagen zurückzu-
führen. 
Zweitens: Grice identifiziert die Mechanismen, die die 
Interpretation einer Äußerung in einem Sprechakt bestimmen, 
mit allgemeingültigen Maximen.^ Da diese Maximen Aufforderun-
gen sind, ist ihre logische Beschaffenheit normativ und sie 
können dementsprechend leicht mit Hi°lfe der deontischen Logik 
formalisiert werden. 
Drittens: Wunderlich betont ausdrücklich, daß jede 
Sprechhandlung gewisse Obligationen für Sprecher und Hörer 
erzeugt und/oder erfüllt.16 Mit den Obligationen sind soziale 
Regeln verbunden: "Jede mit einer Obligation verbundene sozia-
le Regel läßt sich in der folgenden Form beschreiben: Man 
sollte, wenn die Bedingungen G bestehen, eine Handlung vom 
Typ A tun (bzw. unterlassen), andernfalls könnte man eine Sank-
tion aus dem Bereich T erwarten."17 
Mögen diese Hinweise noch so oberflächlich sein, scheinen 
sie jedoch die Anwendung der deontischen Logik zur logischen 
Beschreibung von Sprechakten eindeutig zu rechtfertigen. 
Dies soll also soviel besagen, daß im Zusammenhang mit 
einer jeden Äußerung gewisse Obligationen auftreten, die 
eine gewisse Interpretation dieser Äußerung gebieten. Die 
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oben von Wunderlich erwähnte soziale Regel, die den Äußerungen 
zuzuordnen ist, macht die Aktualisation einer der Interpreta-
tionen der Äußerung für die Teilnehmer der kommunikativen 
Situation obligatorisch. Diese Regel kann demnach als eine 
deontische Formel dargestellt werden, deren erstes Element ein 
deontischer Operator, also z.B. "obligatorisch" (0) und dessen 
zweites Glied diejenige Proposition ist, die die aktualle In-
terpretation der Äußerung repräsentiert. Wir ergänzen somit 
die im vorangegangenen Kapitel angeführten Ausdrücke mit dem 
Operator "0". Ausdrücke der Form "0(p/q)" werden wie folgt ge-
lesen: "Wenn die konditionale Basis (d.h.,-wenn die Bedingung) 
q gegeben iist, ist die Interpretation der Äußerung als die 
Proposition p geboten". Solche Formeln können, falls nötig, 
auf die Person des Sprechers oder des Hörers relativiert wer-
s h 
den: 0 (p/q) oder 0 (p/q), wobei die obige Lesart mit den Aus-
drücken "für den Sprecher" oder "für den Hörer" ergänzt wird. 
In der deontischen Logik wird zwischen monadischen und 
dyadischen Systemen unterschieden. Während die ersteren sich 
mit absoluten, d.h. bedingungslos geltenden Normen beschäfti-
gen, behandeln die dyadischen Systeme sog, hypothetische Normen, 
die immer nur aufgrund bestimmter Bedingungen auftreten. Die 
im vorangehenden Kapitel durchgeführte Analyse zeigt, daß 
im Witz die Interpretation einer Äußerung durch die konditio-
nalen Basen bestimmt wurde, wodurch die Anwendung eines dya-
dischen Systans hinreichend motiviert zu sein scheint. 
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Das hier vorzuschlagende Modell gründet sich auf ein 
System der dyadischen deontischen Logik, das von G.H. von' 
1 8 
Wright entworfen wurde. Dieses System wird jedoch'sowohl 
modifiziert, als auch uminterpretiert. Dies wird einerseits 
dadurch gerechtfertigt, daß das ursprüngliche Anwendungsge-
biet der deontischen Logik die Ethik und die Rechtsphilosophie 
bilden, wir aber hier sprachliche Erscheinungen untersuchen, 
und zweitens dadurch, daß ein deontisch logisches System immer 
auf einen bestimmten normativen Kodex bezogen werden muß. Die 
Logik selbst bietet lediglich einen formalen Rahmen dar, der 
immer dem gegebenen normativen Kodex gemäß spezifiziert werden 
muß. Aber die Gültigkeit der Formeln, ist nicht nur auf den 
Kodex zu relativieren, sondern auch auf eine pragmatische In-
terpretation. Es dürfte klar sein, daß die deontische Logik 
grundsätzlich pragmatisch ausgeprägt ist, denn sie setzt die 
Existenz derjenigen, Personen voraus, die die Normen befolgen -
semiotisch betrachtet hat man hier also mit den Interpretätoren 
im Sinne von Morris zu tun. Das System wird demgemäß den Witzen 
entsprechend interpretiert. 
Der wichtigste formale Unterschied zwischen unserem und 
von Wrights System betrifft sein Axiom B3, das folgendermaßen 
lautet: 0(p/qvr) = 0 (p/q) & 0{p/r). Dieses Axiom wird durch 
unser A1 ersetzt. Zwar ist die Plausibilität von B3 in einem 
ethischen Kontext nicht zu leugnen, doch erweist es sich in 
unserem Kodex als unbrauchbar.\ Der Grund dafür liegt darin, 
daß B3 infolge des Wahrheitsmatrixes der Disjunktion auch 
dann wahr wäre, wenn auf der linken Seite der Äquivalenz nur 
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eine Basis sich realisieren würde: dagegen aber war es eine 
wichtige Struktureigenschaft der Witze, daß eine Äußerung auf 
beide Basen gleichzeitig bezogen werden mußte. 
Wenn wir die im Kapitel 1.5. ermittelten Formeln, die 
die grundlegendsten Strukture'igenschaften des Witzes darstel-
len, mit dem deontischen Operator "O" ergänzen und sie im oben 
ausgeführten Sinne deuten, 'erhalten wir die ersten zwei Axiome 
des Systems. Es soll aber auch das folgende dritte Axiom A3 
eingeführt werden: -(0{p/q) & 0(-p/q)) . In dem (monadischen) 
Standardsystem der deontischen Logik ist das folgende Axiom 
gültig: -(Op & 0-p); das erwähnte A3 scheint also eine ein-
fache dyadische Adaptation dieses Axioms zu sein. Die Funktion 
dieser beiden Axiome besteht darin, daß sie die Konsistenz des 
Systems garantieren sollen, indem sie die Ableitung einander 
widersprechenden Obligationen von vornherein ausschließen. 
Es ergibt sich also das folgende System: 
Axiome 
A1 0(p/q) & 0 (p/r) = 0(p/q & r) 
A2 0(p/r) & 0(q/r) = 0(p & q/r) 
A3 -(0(p/q) & 0(~p/q)) 
Ableitungsregeln 
R1 Eine jede Variable oder jeder molekuläre Ausdruck in 
einem jeden Axiom oder Theorem kann durch andere Variable 
oder molekuläre Ausdrücke ersetzt werden. 
R2 modus ponens 
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R3 Eine jede Variable oder jeder molekulare Ausdruck in 
eineirt jeden Axiom oder Theorem kann durch eine tau-
tologisch äquivalente Zusammensetztung von Variablen 
ersetzt werden. 
R4 Ein jeder .O-Ausdruck,.der aus einer Tautologie der 
Aussagenlogik abgeleitet wurde, indem die Aussagen-
Variablen durch O-Ausdrücke ersetzt wurden, ist ein 
Theorem. 
Die ersten drei Ableitungsregeln sind mit den üblichen 
Regeln des Aussagenkalküls identisch: die vierte ist die so-
genannte Extensionalitätsregel, die die Gültigkeit der aus-
sagenlogischen Formeln in der deontischen Logik sichert. 
Das System ist entscheidbar. Bei der Entscheidung, ob • 
eine Formel ein Theorem des Systems ist, d.h. ob es eine de-
ontische Tautologie darstellt, oder nicht, bedienen wir uns 
19 
des folgenden Verfahrens. In jedem atomaren O-Ausdruck der 
Formel ersetzte man die von dem Zeichen" /" links stehenden 
Variablen oder molekulären Ausdrücke durch ihre kanonische 
konduktive Normalform: die von dem Zeichen" /" rechts stehen-
den Variablen oder molekulären Ausdrücke durch ihre disjunktive 
Normälform. Nun wende man die in A1 und A2 dargelegten Distri-
butionsregeln an. Die so entstehenden atomaren O-Ausdrücke 
werden die O-Konstitutenten der Formel genannt. In jeder 0-
-Konstituente ist auf der linken Seite des Zeichens" /" die 
Disjunktion aller Variablen oder molekulären Ausdrücke, auf 
der rechten Seite des Zeichens" /" die Konjunktion aller 
Variablen oder molekulären Ausdräcke zu finden. Zu der, in 
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dieser Weise umgestalteten Formel kann eine Wahrheitsmatrix 
konstruiert werden, mit Rücksicht auf die folgende Beschränkung,, 
die durch A3 auferlegt wird. Man betrachte all die O-Konsti-
tuenten, in denen eine gegebene Konjunktion rechts vom 
Zeichen" /" steht. Man bilde die Konjunktion der links von" /" 
stehenden Disjunktionen in allen O-Konstituenteri. Ist diese 
Konjunktion kontradiktorisch, so kann nicht jeder O-Konsti-
tuente der Wert "wahr" zugeordnet werden. Wenn der untersuchte 
Ausdruck sich als Tautologie erweist/ ist er ein Theorem des 
Systems. 
Im folgenden werden einige interessante Theoreme ange-
führt. 
(T1) 0 (p/q ) •*• 0 (pv-p/q) 
Das Theorem ergibt sich unmittelbar aus A2 und der aussagen-
logischen Tautologie p = (pv-p) & p, mit Hilfe von R3 und R4. 
Es wird wie folgt interpretiert: "Wenn eine Interpretation 
einer Äußerung auf einer bestimmten Basis obligatorisch ist, 
dann ist jede beliebige Interpretation der Äußerung obliga-
torisch auf derselben Basis." Somit schließt das Theorem die 
Aktualisation anderer, sich von p unterscheidender Interpre-
tationen nicht aus, wodurch es eine notwendige, aber nicht 
hinreichende Bedingung der Realisation von Witzen liefert. 
(T2) 0(p & q/r) + 0(p & q/p) 
(T3) 0 (p & q/r) 0(p S q/q) 
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Diese beiden Theoreme können unmittelbar aus A2 mit Hilfe 
von R1 und R4 abgeleitet werden. Die Interpretation lautet: 
"Wenn aufgrund zweier konditionaler Basen zwei Interpretationen 
obligatorisch sind, dann sind beide auf einer Basis obligato-
risch, die nur einer der beiden entspricht". Die Theoreme wer-
den sofort verständlich, wenn die Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks 
von der Form Q(p/p) geklärt wird. In diesem Zusammenhang betont 
von Wright: "Sometimes the world is as it ought to be. It is 
thoroughly meaningful to make it a duty that 0(p/p). The duty 
to see to it that p when it is the case that p requires us to 
take heed that the state of affairs in question does not 
disappear. Not always, howerver, is the world as it ought to 
be. Then the duty may be that 0(p/-p). The duty to see to it 
that p when this is not the case requieres us to take care 
that the state of affairs in question comes to be. It should 
be clear from these considerations that there is no objection, 
from the point of view of interpreting the formulae, to the 
possibility that the same variable appears both to the left 
and to the right of the "/" in the same atomic expression".20 
Demgemäß sagen die Theoreme soviel aus, daß zwei verschiedene 
Interpretationen einer Äußerung auf einer einzigen Basis geboten 
sind, wobei die Basis die perfekte Aktualisierung der einen 
ermöglicht - zwischen der Basis und der arideren obligatorischen 
Interpretation besteht eine Art Inkongruenz oder Diskrepanz, 
die in den bekannten Witztheorien immer wieder erwähnt wird. 
(T4) 0 (p & q/r>) = 0 (p & q/p) & 0(p & q/q) , wobei r = p & q 
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(T4) ergibt sich unmittelbar aus (T2) und (T3) mit Hilfe von 
R4, des Konjunktionsprinzips P, Q, |- P & Q (wobei P und Q 
gültige Formeln sind) und der Tautologie (p •+ q) & (p •* r) h 
= (p q & r). "Auf einer bestimmten konditionalen Basis sind 
zwei Interpretationen obligatorisch gdw. jede Interpretation 
sich auf der ihr entsprechenden Basis obligatorisch aktuali-
siert." Es ist leicht einzusehen, daß dieses Theorem eine 
wichtige Struktureigenschaft der Witze formuliert: ihre Po-
larität . 
Ähnlich wie (T2)-(T4) ergeben sich die folgenden Theoreme 
und werden analog intepretiert, deshalb wird darauf nicht 
eingegangen: 
(T5) 0 (p/q &r) 0(q/q & r) wobei p = q & r 
(T6) 0(p/q & r) -*• 0(r/q & r) wobei p = q & r 
(T7) 0 (p/q & r) = 0 (q/q & r) & 0(r/q & r) wobei p = q & r 
An dieser Stelle ist jedoch nicht mehr zu übersehen, daß, 
obwohl die Theoreme einige wichtige Struktureigenschaften des 
Witzes formulieren, sie einen grundlegenden Zusammenhang ver-
schleiern: wenn nämlich z.B. auf einer Basis zwei verschiedene 
Interpretationen obligatorisch sind, dann schließen sie einander 
aus, d.h. die gleichzeitige Aktualisierung der beiden Interpre-
tationen führt zu einem Widerspruch. Formal soll das bedeuten, 
daß, wenn 0(p/r) & 0(q/r), dann gilt in jedem Fall (p -»• -q) , 
was zur Gültigkeit der Formel 0{p/r) & 0(-p/r) führen würde. 
Und diese Formel ist es gerade, die durch Axiom A3 ausgeschlossen 
wird, denn sie würde zur Inkonsistenz des Systems führen. Daß 
aber diese Formel eine grundlegende Eigenschaft des Witzes 
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repreäsentiert, ist anhand von Beispiel (4) leicht zu zeigen. 
Falls der Sprecher mit seiner Äußerung die Interpretation 
intendiert hat: "Ich möchte meine Zähne stochern" (p), dann 
hat er offensichtlich nicht gemeint: "Ich möchte Feuer zünden" 
(q, dh. -p). Aber gerade in der konjunktiven Verknüpfung und 
in dem gleichzeitigen Gebotensein dieser beiden Propositionen 
besteht der Kern des Witzes. Damit bietet sich die Schlußfolge-
rung an, daß unser System den Witz nicht hinreichend modellie-
ren kann, denn es ist nicht imstande, seine wichtigste Struktur 
eigenschaft zu erfassen. Es stellt sich die Frage, ob es mög-
lich ist, die Unzulänglichkeit des Systems zu korrigieren? 
Wir gehen davon aus, daß das ominöse Axiom A3 aufgrund 
von Analogie aus dem monadischen Standardsystem übernommen 
wurde, ohne die Eigentümlichkeiten der dyadischen deontischen 
Logik zu berücksichtigen. Es bietet sich der folgende Gedan-
21 
kengang an. 
Ausdrücke, die den Operator "0" vor der Disjunktion von 
Variablen enthalten, werden monadische O-Konstituenten genannt. 
Im Fall von n Variablen ist die Zahl der monadischen O-Konsti-
tuenten 2 n. Diese nennen wir die O-Einheiten des von n-Variab-
len bestimmten deontischen Raumes. Eine Variable p bestimmt 
einen deontischen Raum, der zwei O-Einheiten enthält, nämlich 
Op und 0-p. Demnach sagt A3 soviel aus, daß diese zwei O-Einhei 
ten nicht zugleich gültig sein können, mindestens eine von 
ihnen muß ungültig sein. Zwei Variablen bestimmen einen 
deontischen Raum von vier O-Einheiten: Olpvq), O(-pvq), O(pv-q) 
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O(-pv-q). Es ergibt sich unmittelbar, daß nicht alle vier 
O-Einheiten gültig sein können. Dieses Prinzip wird auch im 
dyadischen System beibehalten. 
Es sei nun eine Menge von n Variablen gegeben. Man wähle 
m Elemente dieser Menge aus, verknüpfe sie disjunktiv miteinan-
der und bilde die Negation der übrig gebliebenen. Man wähle 
weiterhin k Elemente der Menge aus, verknüpfe sie konjunktiv 
miteinander und bilde die Negation der übrig gebliebenen. 
Eine Formel, die aus dem Operator "O" und der erwähnten Dis-
junktion und Konjunktion besteht, wobei die letzteren voneinan-
der durch "/" getrennt werden, nennen wir eine dyadische 
O-Konstituente. 
Die Zahl der von n-Variablen determinierten dyadischen 
_n 
O-Konstituenten beträgt 2n "2n, d. h. 2 . Für n = 1 ist 
diese Zahl vier, also 0(p/p), 0(-p/p), 0{p/-p), 0l-p/-p). 
Dementsprechend läßt sich die Einführung eines Axioms A3' 
anstelle von A3 rechtfertigen. Dieses Axiom sagt aus, daß von 
den O-Konstituenten, die von einer Variablen bestimmt worden 
sind, nicht alle gleichzeitig wahr sein können: 
A3' - (0(p/p) S O(-p/p) & 0 (p/-p) & 0(-p/-p)) 
Die Gültigkeit des Axioms für den allgemeinen Fall von 
n Variablen ist leicht zu beweisen mit Hilfe von A1, A2, R4 
und der zweimaligen Anwendung von A3' . Damit erhalten wir das 
folgende endgültige Axiom: 
A3" -(0 (p/q) & 0(-p/q) & 0(p/-q) & 0{-p/-q) ) 
Das Axiom sagt also aus, daß von den vier dyadischen 
O-Konstituenten nicht alle gleichzeitig wahr sein können, d.h. 
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das Axiom ist schon dann erfüllt, wenn wenigstens eine Konsti-
tuente als falsch ausgeschlossen wird und demgemäß werden aile 
anderen als gültig angenommen,, unabhängig davon, ob sie unter 
anderem auch die Ausdrücke 0(p/q) und 0(-p/q) enthalten. 
Dieses Axiom ist von fundamentaler Wichtigkeit im Hinblick 
auf die logische Repräsentation der Strukturmerkmale des Wit-
zes, indem es die Identifikation seines Strukturkernes mit 
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einem Normenkonflikt ermöglicht. Wir sagen, daß Normen 
miteinander im Konflikt stehen, wenn die Gültigkeit zweier 
Obligationen auf derselben Basis gefordert wird. Einen solchen 
Normenkonflikt stellt z.B die Formel 0(p/r) & 0(-p/r), oder 
die Formel 0(p/r) & 0(q/r), wobei (p -q) . dar-, und diese sind 
ja mit denjenigen Formeln identisch, die den Strukturkern des 
Witzes formulieren, die aber unter Beibehaltung von A3 nicht 
abgeleitet werden konnten. Das Axiom A3" ermöglicht eindeutig 
sowohl die Ableitung dieser Normenkonflikte als auch das 
Zurückführen der Witzstruktur auf einen Normenkonflikt. 
•1.7. Schlußfolgerungen: die Thesen 
Bei der Untersuchung des Witzes wurde eine Methode ver-
wendet, die enerseits auf semantisch-pragmatischen Faktoren, 
andererseits auf einem deduktiv aufgebauten System der deonti-
schen Logik beruht. Diese Methode liefert uns neue Erkennt-
nisse über das Wesen des Witzes, die in der Form von Thesen 
oder gesetzartigen Aussagen zu formulieren sind. Aus der Be-
trachtung der Hauptcharakteristika der Methode ergibt sich 
der folgende Gedankengang. 
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Da die Gültigkeit aller drei Axiome exakt zu beweisen 
ist und da alle drei die Struktureigenschaften des Witzes 
darlegen, wodurch zur Ableitung weiterer Eigenschaften Anlaß 
gegeben wird, läßt sich eideutig die folgende These aufstellen: 
TT1 Der Witz kann mit der deontischen Logik modelliert 
werden. 
Uber die deontische Logik wissen wir, daß sie die klas-
sische zweiwertige Aussagenlogik nicht leugnet, sondern ihre 
Regeln und Tautologien beibehält. Also: 
TT2 Die deontische Logik enthält die Gesetze der klassischen 
Logik. 
Unsere Analysen haben weiterhin eindeutig bewiesen: 
TT3 Den Kern des Witzes bildet der Normenkonflikt. 
In der deontischen logik stellen Normenkonflikte keine 
Inkonsistenz dar im aristotelischen Sinne; Systeme, die diese 
dulden, sind nicht inkonsistent. Da nach TT2 die deontische 
Logik die Gesetze der klassischen Logik enthält, indem diese 
i 
durch die deontischen Gesetze ergänzt worden sind, und nach 
TT1 der Witz mit einem deontisch logischen System modelliert 
werden kann, ergibt sich unmittelbar die folgende Schlußfolge-
rung : 
TT4 Die Metafunktion des Witzes beruht nicht auf der Ver-
letzung der Regeln der Logik und des konsistenten 
menschlichen Denkens, sondern auf ihrer Beibehaltung 
und Neuinterpretierung auf einer qualitativ anderen 
Ebene. 
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Weiterhin folgt unmittelbar aus diesen Thesen: 
TT5 Die logische Struktur des Witzes ist konsistent. 
Anhand von TT3 kann nun die in der Einführung genannte 
scheinbar widersprüchliche Doppelseitigkeit des Witzes klar 
erklärt werden: 
TT6 Die inkongruente Natur des Witzes folgt daraus, daß er 
auf der Ebene der Normen Konflikte enthält. 
TT7 Für die Interpretierbarkeit des Witzes folgt daraus, 
daß er auf der Ebene der Logik konsistent ist. 
Normenkonflikte bilden die zentralen Elemente von Normen-
systemen und der deontischen Logik und spielen eine äußerst 
progressive Rolle in diesen. Sie sind verantwortlich für ihren 
Dynamismus, ihren Selbstorganisierungsmechanismus, ihre stän-
dige Umstrukturierungsfähigkeit und dialektische Natur. Daraus, 
daß Witze als Normenkonflikte dargestellt wurden, folgt also: 
TT8 Witze sind Elemente eines dynamischen, sich ständig 
neustrukturalisierenden Systems. 
TT9 Witze gehören zu den Herauslösern dieser Umstrukturie-
rungsprozesse . 
TTlO Witze spielen eine progressive Rolle in diesem System. 
TT31 Witze sind nicht statisch, sondern prozessual. 
Die deontische Logik ist grundsätzlich pragmatischer 
Natur, denn sie setzt die Existenz von Personen voraus, die 
an den normativen Vorgängen teilnehmen: 
TH2 Der Witz ist grundsätzlich pragmatisch. 
Auf den ersten Blick scheint die folgende These sich 
unmittelbar ableiten zu lassen: 
- 206 -
TT13 Aus der logischen Struktur des Witzes lassen sich 
seine pragmatischen Teilkomponenten ableiten, nämlich 
die psychologische, anthropologische, ästhetische, 
volkskundliche, soziologische, usw. 
Könnte man diese These bestätigen, so wäre bewiesen, daß 
das vorgeschlagene Modell tatsächlich die Grundlagen zur 
einheitlichen Behandlung der pragmatischen Teilaspekte des 
Witzes schuf, wodurch die konsistente Integration der auf 
diesen Gebieten vorliegenden Untersuchungen in eine kohärente 
Theorie geleistet wäre. Demgemäß könnte man u.a. auf die 
folgenden Zusammenhänge hinweisen: 
Es baut sich z.B. alles, was über die Präsuppositionen, 
M:tverständnisse, Assoziationen gesagt wurde, einschließlich 
der manipulativen Kraft dieser Erscheinungen, auf psycholo-
gische bzw. anthropologische Momente auf. Die Erforschung der 
erwähnten sozialen und Schicklichkeitsregeln würde das Gebiet 
der Soziologie eröffnen. Das Verhältnis des Modells zu den. 
einzelnen Bereichen der Logik, sowie zum menschlichen Denken 
im allgemeinen fordert kognitive und,epistemologische Unter-
suchungen. Auch die Frage, was für ästhetische Inhalte dieser 
Struktur zukommen können, erscheint auschlaggebend. Die Kon-
sequenz, daß aufgrund des Modells der Witz in einen speziellen 
Bereich gesellschaftlicher Handlungsschemata gehört, der unter 
anderem von Lügen, einander widersprechenden ethischen Anweisun-
gen und dem Versprechen verbotener Handlungen bestimmt ist, 
wirft schwerwiegende gesellschaftsphilosophische Probleme auf. 
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Von äußerst großer Wichtigkeit ist die Frage, was für eine 
Position der Witz, als ein über eine eigenartige logische 
Struktur verfügendes kommunikatives Mikrosystem, in den Vor-
gängen der gesellschaftlichen Kommunikation einnimmt. Wie ist 
die immanente Struktur seines Kodes zu beschreiben usw. These 
TT13, die Anlaß zu diesen äußerst wichtigen Erwägungen gibt, 
kann jedoch nicht bewiesen werden. 
Um das einzusehen, soll man die Tatsache in Betracht 
ziehen, daß all die Thesen aufgrund der Anwendung einer 
bestimmten Methode aufgestellt wurden - diese Methode war ein 
logisches System. Deshalb können wir nur auf die Thesen fol-
gern, die unmittelbar aus logischen Objekten zu erschließen 
sind. Demgegenüber sind die Begriffe, die in TT13 vorkommen, 
nichtlogische Begriffe - und uns stehen keine Schlußregeln 
zur Verfügung, aus logischen Prämissen auf nichtlogische Kon-
sequenzen zu schließen. Deshalb können wir TT13 aufgrund der 
angewendeten Methode nicht beweisen. 
Auf der anderen Seite ist es einleuchtend, daß TT13 
unbedingt Element der Theorie sein muß, um einerseits, die 
anfangs aufgestellte Arbeitshypothese WT2 nachweisen zu können, 
und andererseits, damit die angestrebte Theorie den Bereich 
des Witzes nicht auf eine leere logische Struktur beschränkt, 
die nichts mit den eigentlichen Wesensmerkmale des Witzes zu 
tun hat. Es folgt also, daß TT13 nicht nur ein Desideratum, 
sondern ein tatsächlicher Bestandteil der Theorie ist. Zusam-
menfassend läßt sich also feststellen, daß TT13 ein Element 
der Theorie darstellt, jedoch in der Theorie selbst nicht 
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bewiesen werden kann. Eine solche Theorie wird im deduktiv -
logischen Sinne unvollständig genannt. 
Diese Feststellungen führen zu einem nächsten Problem- ' 
kreis. Mit Hilfe unserer Untersuchungen gelangten wir zu Er-
kenntnissen, die in der Form von Thesen formuliert wurden: 
Auf dieser Stufe bilden aber diese Thesen lediglich eine 
unsystematisierte Menge, da es unklar ist, welche Beziehun-
gen unter ihnen herrschen. Eine ungeordnete Menge von Sätzen 
ist jedoch noch keine Theorie - deshalb besteht die nächste 
Aufgabe in der Systematisierung dieser Erkenntnisse, wobei 
unter anderem auch eine Lösung des aufgeworfenen Problems 
der Unvollständigkeit gesucht wird. 
2. Epistemische Systematisierung 
2.1. Die axiomatische Methode 
Die epistemische Systematisierung, deren Aufgabe in 
der Aufdeckung der, unter den einzelnen Thesen oder Gesetzen 
der hypothetisch angenommenen Kenntnisse herrschenden Beziehun-
gen besteht, soll zunächst ausschließlich auf einer allgemeinen 
erkenntnistheoretischen Stufe behandelt werden, die scharf von 
der wissenschaftstheoretischen Beschreibung der Theorienstruk-
tur abgegrenzt werden muß. Es soll dabei nachdrücklich hervor-
gehoben werden, daß es uns bei der Diskussion der Systemati-
sierungsmöglichkeiten der ermittelten Thesen weder um die 
Befolgung der von anderen Einzelwissenschaften gesetzten 
Normen, Desiderata und Ideale geht, wie das z.B. bei der 
- 209 -
Übernahme der naturwissenschaftlichen Denkweise der Fall wäre, 
um einen verhältnismäßig hohen Grad an Präzision und Exaktheit 
zu erreichen unter Vernachlässigung der Eigentümlichkeiten des 
Gegenstandes; noch handelt es sich um einen Anschluß an litera-
turwissenschaftliche Traditionen, wobei die Forderung der prä-
zisen Darstellbarkeit des epistemischen Systems preisgegeben 
wird, unter dem Vorwand, daß eine solche dem untersuchten 
Gegenstand nicht entspräche, denn dadurch würde eine mit 
Anomalien beladene, uninterpretierbare Theorie entstehen. Die 
Zielsetzung der folgenden Untersuchungen besteht darin, ein 
Verfahren zu finden, das zugleich präzise und gegenstands-
bezogen ist. 
Eine eingehende Analyse epistemischer Traditionen weist 
nach, daß uns grundsätzlich zwei Verfahren zur Verfügung 
stehen: das axiomatische und das kohärentistische. Etwas ver-
einfachend formuliert, läßt sich feststellen, daß der ersten 
Methode vorwiegend in der Mathematik und in den Naturwissen-
schaften, der zweiten dagegen in den Gesellschaftswissenschaf-
ten der Vorzug gegeben wird. Zunächst wird die Anwendbarkeit 
der axiomatischen Methode untersucht. Eine kurze schematische 
Zusammenfassung ihrer wesentlichsten Merkmale läßt sich wie 
folgt darstellen: 
(a) Grundsätzlich gibt es zwei Arten von Wahrheiten: grund-
legende (Axiome) und abgeleitete (Theoreme). 
(b) Die Erfahrung liefert die grundlegenden Kenntnisse. 
(c) Nur wohlbekannte Wahrheiten finden Eingang in die Menge 
der diskursiven Kenntnisse. 
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(d) Die in den späteren Phasen des Erkenntnisvorgangs ge-
wonnenen Kenntnisse können nicht auf die früher als 
wahr angenommenen Thesen zurückwirken. 
(e) Es wird zwischen Beobachtungssätzen und allgemeinen 
V 
Gesetzmäßigkeiten unterschieden. 
(f) Die Widerspruchsfreihet der beim Argumentieren verwen-
deten Evidenz wird vorausgesetzt. 
Zur Bewertung der axiomatischen Methode läßt sich fol-
gendes sagen. 
(1) Der wesentlichste Vorteil der Axiomatisierung besteht 
darin, daß, wenn schon einmal die Axiome ermittelt und ge-
prüft worden sind, man die aus ihnen abgeleiteten Thesen 
nicht mehr einzeln der Wirklichkeit gegenüberzustellen braucht, 
es genügt, lediglich nachzuprüfen, ob sie aus den Axiomen fol-
gen oder nicht. Die Vollständigkeit und Konsistenz des Axiomen-
systems garantiert also den höchsten Grad an wissenschaftlicher 
Zuverlässigkeit, Exaktheit und Präzision. Es ist sehr leicht 
einzusehen, daß in dem im Kapitel 1.7. angeführten Gedanken-
gang zur Argumentation die Schlüsse der klassischen Logik an-
gewendet wurden (diese Argumentation, Sowie die Thesen selbst 
lassen sich ohne weiteres formalisieren, das ist jedoch keine 
notwendige Voraussetzung). Es ergibt sich demnach, daß es 
genügt, nur die Thesen TT1, TT2, TT3 aufgrund des Modells 
aufzustellen, alle anderen Thesen (mit der Ausnahme von TT13) 
lassen sich aus ihnen unter Verwendung der Schlußregeln ab-
leiten. Dementsprechend wären also TT1, TT2, TT3 die Axiome, 
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die anderen Thesen die Theoreme des epistemischen Systems. Bei 
einer solchen Axiomatisierung ergeben sich jedoch folgende 
Probleme. 
(2) Der erste Einwand folgt aus dem analytischen Charakter 
eines jeden Axiomensystems. Das soll bedeuten, daß die 
Theoreme, die mit Hilfe wahrheitswertbewahrender logischer 
Regeln von den Axiomen abgeleitet werden, keine solchen Infor-
mationen tragen können, die in den Axiomen nicht enthalten 
wären. Das heißt, die Axiome tragen, wenn auch implizit* den 
ganzen Informationsgehalt des Systems; die Aufgabe der Theore-
me besteht lediglich darin, diese implizite Information expli- 1 
zit zu machen. Auf einer allgemeinen erkenntnistheoretischen 
Stufe kann diese Tatsache durch die folgende These der epis-
temischen Logik verdeutlicht werden: 
W(a,p) * W{a,W(a,p)) 
Lies: "Weiß die Person a, daß p gilt, so weiß sie auch, daß 
sie das weiß." (Wobei "W" für das Prädikat "wissen", "a" für 
eine Person und "p" für einen Sachverhalt steht.) In der vor-
liegenden Interpretation sagt die These soviel aus, daß aus 
impliziten Kenntnissen auf ihre Explizierung logisch zu folgern 
ist, wodurch das Implicandum keineswegs informationsreicher sein 
kann als das Implicans. Da das eine unvermeidbare Konsequenz 
eines jeden Axiomensystems ist, lassen sich schon an dieser 
Stelle Bedenken gegenüber der Axiomatisierung der Theorie des 
Witzes hervorbringen: es soll nämlich eine solche Systemati-
sierung ermöglicht werden, in der jede These Träger selbständi-
ger Informationen ist, um die durch neue Untersuchungen 
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gewonnenen Kenntnisse ständig in das epistemische System in-
tegrieren zu können, wobei auch die Ergebnisse der nichtlo-
gischen Untersuchungen mit berücksichtigt werden können. 
(3) Die Axiome, deren grundlegende Wahrheit hypothetisch 
angenommen wird, verfügen über die folgenden zwei Eigenschaf-
ten: erstens, müssen sie als maximal gesichert und begründet 
gelten, um die Wahrheit der aus ihnen abgeleiteten Thesen 
garantieren zu können, damit auf die Einführung eines Veri-
fikationsmechanismus in das System verzichtet werden kann. 
Zweitens müssen sie einen reichen Informationsgehalt besitzen, 
um, im Sinne der obigen Ausführungen, die im ganzen System 
enthaltene Information zu tragen. Es ist leicht einzusehen, 
daß diese beiden Voraussetzungen in einem unauflösbaren Konflikt 
miteinander stehen: denn (wie das die umfangreiche Diskussion 
zur analytisch-synthetischen Dichotomie, worauf hier nicht 
eingegangen werden kann, nachweist), je reicher der Informa-
tionsgehalt einer Aussage, desto kleiner die Wahrscheinlich-
keit ihrer Verifizierung; und umgekehrt, je sicherer die Wahr-
heit einer These begründet werden kann, desto weniger Informa-
tionen sind in ihr enthalten. Wenn man also möglichst sichere 
Kenntnisse speichern will, dann wird das System gehaltlos. 
Wenn man dagegen nach Informationsreichtum strebt und eine 
Bereicherung der Kenntnisse als Ziel setzt, dann hat man 
keinen Grund mehr, die Wahrheit und die Konsistenz der als 
Ausgangspunkt dienenden Thesen (Axiome) anzunehmen. Da die 
analytischen Sätze die informationsärmsten und die kontra-
diktorischen die informationsreichsten sind, soll ermöglicht 
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werden, aus einer widersprüchlichen Menge von Sätzen wahre 
Schlußfolgerungen zu ziehen. Innerhalb des Rahmens der axio-
matischen Methode ist jedoch die Entwicklung eines solchen 
Verfahrens nicht denkbar: 
Gegen diesen Gedankengang könnte folgendes eingewendet 
werden: zum Witz liegen bereits solche Ergebnisse vor, die 
mit Hilfe der korrekten Anwendung einer exakten, zuverlässigen 
und bewährten wissenschaftlichen Methode gewonnen wurden, 
nämlich durch das deontisch logische System, und die deshalb 
als maximal gesichert und wahr anzunehmen sind. Eine solche 
Argumentation wäre jedoch aufgrund der folgenden Überlegungen 
zurückzuweisen. 
Die Tatsache, daß die Axiome durch eine zuverlässige 
wissenschaftliche Methode aufgestellt wurden, liefert kein 
Argument für die Annahme ihrer Wahrheit und Konsistenz, denn 
die Anwendung einer noch so erfolgreichen wissenschaftlichen 
Methode kann in sich genommen noch keine Evidenz für die 
Wahrheit der mit ihrer Hilfe gewonnenen Thesen darstellen. 
Dieses Problem berührt eine der zentralen Fragen der 
epistemischen Logik, worauf im folgenden kurz eingegangen 
werden soll. Die Frage lautet folgendermaßen: Wie soll die 
Aussage "die Person a weiß, daß p" definiert werden? Eine 
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der Möglichkeiten wird von der folgenden Formel dargestellt : 
V(a,p) = dj.G(a,p) S B(a,p) & p 
wobei: U(a,p) = "die Person a weiß, daß p",: G(a,p) = "die 
Person a glaubt, daß p"; B(a,p) = "die Person a kann p begrün-
den". Die Formel wird also gelesen: "die Person a weiß, daß p 
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genau dann, wenn sie glaubt, daß p, und sie kann diesen Glauben 
bestätigen und p ist der Fall". Nun stellt sich die Frage, 
was man unter "begründet" versteht, d.h., wie läßt sich der 
Ausdruck B(a,p) definieren? Will man sich dabei auf die wissen-
schaftliche Erkenntnis beziehen, ergibt sich das Folgende: 
Sei m die auf den Witz angewendete wissenschaftliche 
Methode (d.h. das logische System), die über die folgenden 
Eigenschaften verfügt: (i) sie zeichnet gewisse Aussagen aus, 
\ 
(ii) sie zeichnet die Ergebnisse von gewissen Beobachtungen 
aus, und (iii) gibt gewisse Folgerungsschemata an, mit deren 
Hilfe aus den von m ausgezeichneten Aussagen auf andere 
Aussagen gefolgert werden kann, die von m ebenfalls ausgezeich-
net werden. In diesem Fall ergibt sich die folgende Definition: 
¿^(a.p) besagt, daß die Person a ihre Überzeugung, daß p gilt, 
durch die Anwendung der Methode m gewonnen hat. 
Es ist jedoch ziemlich leicht zu zeigen, daß die mit 
Hilfe von m gewonnenen Ergebnisse nicht notwendig wahr sind. 
Um das einzusehen, braucht man nur die Tatsache in Betracht 
zu ziehen, daß diese höchstens so gut begründet sein können, 
wie die Prinzipien von m und höchstens so zuverlässig sind, 
wie die Beobachtungs- und Folgerungsverfahren von m. Da aber 
m gerade durch diese Prinzipien und Verfahren definiert wird, 
können diese nicht allein durch m begründet werden, sonst 
gerät man in einen Zirkel. Es kann also keine ^-Kenntnis 
angegeben werden, wonach die Thesen von m wahr und die Ver-
fahren von m zuverlässig wären. Wenn wir diese begründen wollen. 
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dann brauchen wir eine zweite Methode m', die aber die genann-
ten Probleme erneut aufwirft. Also Kenntnisse können nicht 
einfach methodisch begründet werden, die Zuverlässigkeit 
wissenschaftlicher Methoden läßt sich wissenschaftlich nicht 
begründen. Aus diesen Überlegungen ergibt sich folgende 
Schlußfolgerung: 
Wir verfügen über keinerlei wissenschaftliche Evidenz 
darüber, daß die, mit Hilfe irgendeiner wissenschaftlichen 
Methode aufgestellten Thesen über den Witz wahr sind, oder eine 
Menge solcher Thesen konsistent ist. Deshalb können wir die 
aus ihnen abzuleitenden weiteren Thesen nicht auf ihre ange-
nommene Wahrheit gründen. Demgemäß soll, wie schon erwähnt, ein 
logisches Verfahren ermittelt werden, das die Konsistenz der 
als Ausgangspunkt dienenden Menge von Thesen nicht voraussetzt 
und trotzdem wahre Schlußfolgerungen ergibt. 
(4) Die metamathematischen Resultate von Gödel, Church, Rosser 
und Kleene weisen entscheidende Konsequenzen für ein jedes 
formales ̂ xiomatisches System auf. Gödels Theorem hat gezeigt, 
daß ein spezielles formales System, nämlich die Zahlentheorie, 
nicht vollständig axiomatisierbar ist. Kleene ging jedoch nicht 
von einem bestimmten System aus, sondern von einem intuitiven 
Prädikat, wodurch eindeutig nachgewiesen werden konnte, daß es 
überhaupt kein formales axiomatisches System gibt, das die 
24 
vollständige Förmalisierung des Prädikats enthalten würde. 
Zwar handelt es sich in dem Falle der Theorie des Witzes 
nicht um ein rein mathematisches, sondern um ein empirische 
Kenntnisse enthaltendes System, aber das Theorem von Kleene 
hat insofern eine Bedeutung, als bei einer strengen Formali-
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sierung der Theorie immer solche Thesen vorgegeben werden 
können, die den Theoremen und Axiomen des Systems nicht 
wiedersprechen, aber im System unbeweisbar sind, deren Wahr-
heitswert also nicht entschieden werden kann. Diese Tatsache 
findet in TT13 ihren Niederschlag. Man nehme an, durch die 
Anwendung unserer hinreichend exakten logischen Methode seien 
Thesen zu formulieren, wobei einige von ihnen als Axiome 
ausgezeichnet werden können, aus denen die anderen abzuleiten 
seien. Da es sich hier aber um die Untersuchung von Texten 
handelt, deren Wesenszüge keinesfalls auf die mit mathematischen 
oder logischen Mitteln beschreibbaren Eigenschaften beschränkt 
werden darf, ist es wünschenswert, auch solche Thesen in die 
Theorie zu integrieren, die mit Hilfe anderer nichtformaler 
Methoden gewonnen werden,- und die z.B. die pragmatischen 
Aspekte der Witze, d.h. ihre ästhetische, psychologische, sozio-
logische, kognitive Leistung erfassen. Es dürfte jedoch ein-
leuchtend sein, daß überhaupt keine Schlußregeln angegeben 
werden können, die es ermöglichen, von mathematischen oder 
logischen Prämissen auf nichtmathematische Konsequenzen zu 
schließen. Aus diesem Grunde müssen diese zuletzt genannten 
Thesen aus einer-streng formalen Theorie unbedingt ausgeschlossen 
werden, obwohl sie eng mit den formalisierbaren Aspekten 
zusammenhängen und wichtige Informationen enthalten. Versuchte 
man trotzdem, sie den Axiomen anzuschließen, würde die Theorie 
eindeutig inkohärent, da das in diesem System gültige Kohärenz-
kriterium, nämlich die Ableitbarkeit, nicht zu erfüllen wäre. 
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2.2. Die kohärentistische Methode 
Diese Mangelhaftigkeiten der Axiomatisierung führen zur 
Untersuchung der Leistungen der anderen Alternative, die in 
der kohärentistischen Systematisierung besteht. Diese Methode 
verfügt über folgende Grundeigenschaften: 
(a) Die Thesen sollen als wahr akzeptiert werden, die mit 
der Ganzheit unserer Kenntnisse kohärieren. 
(b) Die Erfahrung liefert lediglich rohe, undifferenzierte 
Kenntnisse. 
(c) Rückkopplungen ermöglichen die ständige Neubewertung der 
Thesen. 
(d) Es wird von einer inkonsistenten Menge von Thesen aus-
gegangen. 
(e) Es wird zwischen Beobachtungssätzen und allgemeinen 
Gesetzmäßigkeiten nicht, unterschieden. 
(f) Die Konsistenz der beim Argumentieren verwendeten Evidenz 
wird nicht vorausgesetzt. 
Da der Ansatz zur kohärentistischen Methode in seiner 
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ausgereiftesten Form in den Werken N. Reschers vorliegt 
wählen wir diese Konzeption als Ausgangspunkt für die nachfol-
genden Erwägungen. 
Reschers Ausführungen verfügen über die oben skizzenhaft 
aufgezählten allgemeinen Züge des Kohärentismus. Darüber hinaus 
bieten sich aber die folgenden Anmerkungen zu seiner Konzeption / an. . 
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(1) Rescher betont, daß ein epistemisches System erst im 
Laufe einer Kohärenzanalyse ermittelt werden kann, wobei das 
Hauptziel in der Aufdeckung der unter den einzelnen Thesen 
herrschenden Beziehungen besteht. Dabei spielt die Logik eine 
wesentliche Rolle; sie bildet jedoch, im Gegensatz zur axio-
matischen Methode, nicht das Endergebnis, sondern den Ausgangs-
2 6 
punkt der Kohärenzanalyse. Er geht aber inkonsequent vor, 
indem er das grundlegendste Problem außer Acht läßt, nämlich 
in welcher Weise die Berührungspunkte zwischen den logischen 
und nichtlogischen Elementen des kognitiven Systems hergestellt 
werden können. In dieser Hinsicht entbehrt also sein System 
eines wichtigen Kohärenzkriteriums. « 
(2) Sein System ist mangelhaft insofern, als der Schlüs-
selbegriff der Kohärenz im Rahmen der epistemischen Systema-27 
tisierung nicht eindeutig und exakt definiert wird. Dadurch 
wird seinen überzeugenden Ausführungen der Boden entzogen. 
(3) Die von Rescheroangebotene kohärentistische Methode 
kann der Forderung der formalen Strenge nicht genügen. Rescher 
betont zwar, daß die Mittel der klassischen Analysis nicht 
ausreichen, um ein solches System zu formalisieren, er gibt 2 8 
jedoch keine positive Lösung dieses Problems an. In dieser 
Hinsicht ist also die axiomatische Methode dem Kohärentismus 
weit überlegen. 
(4) Da die Wahrheitsbedingungen der in einer kohärenti-
stischen Weise systematisierten Aussagen nicht darin bestehen, 
daß diese den Sachverhalten der Wirklichkeit entsprechen, sondern 
in ihrer kohärenten Beziehung zu den anderen Elementen des 
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Systems stehen, scheint die empirische Signifikanz der koliä-
rentistischen Systematisierung anfechtbar zu sein. Rescher 
versucht das Problem dadurch zu lösen, daß er neben dem ko-
härentistischen Wahrheitsbegriff, dessen Funktionieren als ein 
zeitlich ausgedehnter Mechanismus mit ständigen, zyklisch ver-
laufenden Rückkopplungen dargestellt wird, einen zweiten 
pragmatischen Zyklus definiert. Die Aufgabe des.letzteren ist 
es, die Thesen, die von dem Kohärenzmechanismus als wahr 
qualifiziert wurden, an die Wirklichkeit zu knüpfen, indem sie 
auf ihre Verwendbarkeit, Brauchbarkeit und ihr Funktionieren 
in der Praxis untersucht werden. Aber obwohl Rescher seinen 
Pragmatismus als methodologischen Pragmatismus bezeichnet, 
wodurch er anscheinend einige offensichtliche negative Kon-
sequenzen der pragmatistischen Philosophie vermeiden will, 
scheint er doch die Tradition der amerikanischen Pragmatisten 
weiterzuführen, indem er als einziges und alleiniges Akzeptier-
barkeitskeriterium einer These sein Funktionieren in der Praxis 
29 
anerkennt. Da wir in der vorliegenden Arbeit den Standpunkt 
vertreten, daß eine adäquate epistemische Systematisierung als 
Ausgangspunkt für die wissenschaftstheoretische Darstellung 
der Theorienstrüktur dienen soll, dürfte es einleuchtend sein, 
daß ein solcher pragmatistischer Ansatz dieser Forderung nicht 
gerecht werden kann. 
(5) Eine nähere Betrachtung der Grundthese Reschers gibt 
zu ähnlichen Bedenken Anlaß. Rescher bezeichnet diese These 
als "Hegeische Inversion" und versteht darunter die Erscheinung, 
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daß in der nachhegelschen Periode der Erkenntnistheorie das 
bis dahin gültige Grundprinzip der Systematisierung umgekehrt 
wurde: anstelle der These "was wahr ist, ist systematisierbar", 
die das Grundprinzip der Axiomatisierung darstellt, ist deren 
Umkehrung: "was systematisierbar ist, ist wahr" als Leitwort 
angenommen worden. Diese "Inversion" hätte dann den Ausgangs-
punkt für den von Rescher vertretenen Kohärentismus geschaffen. 
Wie aber schon erwähnt, kann eine solche Auffasung den Wirklich 
keitsbezug des epistemischen Systems nicht herstellen. Da es 
sich also herausgestellt hat, daß weder die axiomatische, noch 
die kohärentistische Methode auf einer allgemeinen epistemolo-
gischen Stufe Anspruch auf die Ermittlung der Wahrheit der zu 
systematisierenden Thesen erheben kann, liegt die Schlußfol-
gerung nahe, daß die Lösung dieses Problems nicht Aufgabe der 
epistemischen Systematisierung sein kann, sondern von der 
wissenschaftstheoretisch angelegten Beschreibung der Theorien-
struktur übernommen werden muß. 
Im folgenden soll versucht werden, einen Ansatz zur 
Systematisierung der Thesen, die eine Theorie des Witzes for-
mulieren sollten, anzugeben, wobei die progressiven Ergebnisse 
der Rescherschen Konzeption beibehalten werden, unter Bezug-
nahme auf einige notwendige Verfeinerungen, die aus der obigen 
Kritik ersichtlich sind. Die Probleme, die bei der Behandlung 
der axiomatischen Methode aufgeworfen wurden, lassen sich in 
einem demgemäß modifizierten kohärentistischen System wie folgt 
vermeiden. 
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(1) Wie bereits nachgewiesen wurde, müssen wir von der 
Annahme ausgehen, daß die uns zur Verfügung stehende Menge 
der Ausgangsthesen inkonsistent ist. Daraus ergibt sich die 
Notwendigkeit der Erarbeitung einer Methode, wonach aus 
einer inkonsistenten Menge von Prämissen auf wahre Konsequen-
zen gefolgert werden kann. In Anlehnung an Rescher wird das 
folgende Verfahren angegeben. 
Sei S eine beliebige Menge von Aussagen, wobei S = 
{p,q ,r,s...} ungeachtet dessen, ob S konsistent ist oder 
nicht. Eine jede Untermenge S^ von S wird eine maximal konsi-
stente untermenge von S genannt, gdw. sie die folgenden Bedin-
gungen erfüllt: 
1. S^ ist eine nichtleere Untermenge von S. 
2. S. ist konsistent. 
3. Es gibt kein Element von S außerhalb von S^, daß in S_. 
aufgenommen werden könnte, ohne die Konsistenz von S an-
zufechten. Also für jedes p in S, das aber nicht in S^ 
enthalten ist, gilt, daß die Menge S^ u {p} inkonsistent 
ist: 
Die Aussage p wird eine unvermeidbare Konsequenz (I-
Konsequenz) einer Menge S von Aussagen genannt genau dann, 
wenn p deduktiv aus einer jeden maximal konsistenten Untermenge 
S^ von S folgt. 
Die Aussage p wird eine schuaehe Konsequenz ([-/-Konsequenz) 
einer Menge S von Aussagen genannt genau dann, wenn es eine 
maximal konsistente Untermenge S^ in S gibt, aus der p logisch 
folgt. 
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Die maximale Konsistenz einer jeden Untermenge von s 
ist entscheidbar, im Sinne der Aussagenlogik. Die Menge der 
J-Konsequenzen einer Aussage bildet die Untermenge der Menge 
der W-Konsequenzen derselben Aussage; während die erstgenannte 
Menge immer konsistent ist, kann die letztere auch inkonsistent 
sein. Ist S inkonsistent, dann ist auch die Menge ihrer (/-Konse-
quenzen inkonsistent. Es erhebt sich die Frage, wie die Konse-
quenzen von S ermittelt werden können? Wir führen die folgende 
Definition ein: 
Eine Aussage p wird die P-Konsequenz einer Menge genannt, 
genau dann, wenn p deduktiv aus einer prüferierten Untermenge 
S. von S folgt. Dann werden die folgenden zwei Bedingungen 
erfüllt: 
(i) Ist eine Proposition p die P-Konsequenz von S, dann ist 
sie zugleich ihre (/-Konsequenz. 
(ii) Ist eine Proposition p die I-Konsequenz von S, dann ist 
sie zugleich ihre P-Konsequenz. 
Diese Bedingungen weisen darauf hin, daß sich eine P-Konse-
quenz einer Menge S zwischen den I-Konsequenzen und den (/-Konse-
quenzen befindet. Das soll soviel bedeuten, daß die P-Konse-
quenzen sich aus bestimmten maximal konsistenten Untermengen von 
S ergeben, die als präferierte Mengen bezeichnet werden. 
Der hier eingeführte Begriff der Präferenz soll etwas 
näher erläutert werden. Mit Anlehnung an Rescher reden wir 
hier von einem alethischen Präferenzbegriff, wobei von der 
ursprünglichen Bedeutung des Wortes Gebrauch gemacht wird. 
Der Begriff der-Präferenz spielt also eine Rolle ausschließ-
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lieh in Bezug auf den angenommenen Wahrheitswert der Propo-
sitionen - das heißt, diejenigen Propositionen werden als 
alethisch präferiert ausgezeichnet, deren Wah.rheitspoten-.ial 
am höchsten ist. Demgemäß handelt es sich bei dieser Eigen-
tümlichkeit der Kohärenzanalyse keinesfalls darum, daß ge-
wissen Aussagen gemäß den subjektiven Wünschen und Einstel-
lungen des Forschers der Vorzug gegeben wird. Es muß jedoch 
zugegeben werden, daß keine allgemeingültige Methode der 
Ermittlung der Präferenzkriterien anzugeben ist - diese hän-
gen immer von den jeweiligen Daten und den.Möglichkeiten der 
jeweiligen Kohärenzanalyse ab. 
An dieser Stelle soll ein weiterer Gesichtspunkt ange-
fünrt werden, der ein solches Verfahren im Falle der ange-
sprochenen Theorie des Witzes rechtfertigen wird. Die Theorie 
des Witzes handelt von Texten. W. Stegmüller gelangte bei 
der Untersuchung des hermeneutischen Zirkels zu der Erkennt-
nis, daß dieser nicht nur in den Gesellschaftswissenschaften 
auftritt, sondern auch in den Naturwissenschaften, wodurch 
sich die Dichotomie zwischen den beiden Gruppen empirischer 
Wissenschaften aufgrund des hermeneutischen Zirkels als un-
begründet erwies. Ein wichtiges Zwischenergebnis dieser Unter-
suchung besteht darin, daß sich folgendes herausstellte: im 
Falle der Wissenschaften, die Texte untersuchen (d.h. inter-
pretieren, analysieren, beschreiben usw.) ist der hermeneutische 
Zirkel darauf zurückzuführen, daß die Grenzlinie zwischen den 
Ausgangsdaten und dem Hintergrundswissen des Forschers nicht 
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eindeutig gezogen werden kann. Dadurch kann z.B. die Tatsache 
erklärt werden, daß zwei verschiedene Forscher, die denselben 
Text untersuchen, über dasselbe Hintergrundwissen verfügen und 
denen dieselben Ausgangsdaten zur Verfügung stehen, zu einander 
grundsätzlich widersprechenden Endergebnissen gelangen. Der 
Grund für diese Erscheinung besteht darin, daß die Forscher 
nur aufgrund von Werturteilen zwischen dem Hintergrundwissen 
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und den Ausgangsdaten unterscheiden können. 
In unserem System entspricht die Stufe, auf der nach 
Stegmüller das Einbeziehen der Werturteile stattfindet, der 
vortheoretischen Ebene, wo also erst von der Systematisierung 
der ermittelten Thesen und nicht von der Theorienbildung 
selbst die Rede ist. In diesem Sinne hängen also diese unver-
meidbaren Werturteile mit dem Begriff des Präferenzkriteriums 
eindeutig eng zusammen. 
Nun kann das folgende Verfahren zur Ermittlung der Kon-
sequenzen einer inkorisistenten Menge S von Aussagen angegeben 
werden: 
(i) Man bestimmt die Familie der Menge S, deren Elemente 33 
ihre maximal konsistenten Untermengen Sj, S 2 > ... . ,S bilden. 
(ii) Es wird eine Teil-Familie dieser Familie bestimmt, die 
aus-den alethlsch präferierten maximal konsistenten Mengen 
besteht. 
(iii) Als P-Konsequenzen einer Menge S bezeichnet man also 
die Aussagen, die aus jeder P-präferierten maximal konsistenten 
Teil-Familie von S folgen. 
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Das Funktionieren dieses Verfahrens kann folgendermaßen 
illustriert werden. 
Es ist bereits nachgewiesen worden, daß wir nicht be-
rechtigt sind, die Wahrheit der durch unsere Methode ermit-
telten Thesen vorauszusetzen. Deshalb nehme man an, es sei 
die folgende inkonsiste Menge von Thesen (Aussagen) gegeben, 
wobei keines der Elemente dieser Menge sich eindeutig als wahr 
herausstellt: 
5 = {p,q,-p v -q] 
Die maximal konsistenten Untermengen von s sind folgende: 
S: = lp,q) 
5 2 = (p.-p V - q ) 
53 = lq,-p V -q} 
In der Aussagenlogik ist die folgende Ableitungsregel 
gültig: 
p,q p & q, 
d.h. aus der Wahrheit zweier Aussagen folgt die Wahrheit ihrer 
Konjunktion. Unter Anwendung dieses Prinzips erhalten wir: 
5? = p & q 
52 = p & -q 
53 = "P & q 
Also die Konsequenzen von s sind: 
(p & q) V (p S -q) v (-p & q) 
Jetzt können wir wahre Ausdrücke ermitteln, wie z.B. 
p v (-p & q) und q v (p & -q) und falsche, wie z.B. 
(-p 8 -q) , aber es dürfte klar .s-ein, daß kein Element der 
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ursprünglichen Menge S als eindeutig wahr qualifiziert werden 
kann. Diese Schlußfolgerung ist ziemlich bedeutend insofern, 
als dadurch in dem vorliegenden Zusammenhang eine strenge 
wissenschaftstheoretische Forderung entschärft wird: wenn 
nämlich in einem System ein einziger Widerspruch auftritt, 
dann kann aus diesem Widerspruch auf jede beliebige Aussage 
gefolgert werden, wodurch das ganze System uninterpretierbar 
wird und verworfen werden muß. Der hier angebotene Lösungs-
versuch erlaubt jedoch solche lokalen Widersprüche, die nicht 
die globale Inkonsistenz des ganzen epistemischen Systems 
nach sich ziehen, sondern klar isolierbar und durch die Anwen-
dung von Präferenzkriterien eliminierbar sind. Der hier dar-
gebotene Mechanismus erfaßt somit die üblichen Rekonstruktions-
verfahren von widersprüchlichen Theorien. 
(2) Nach Rescher läßt sich das Problem der Vollständig-
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keit wie folgt darstellen. 
(i) Sei K eine Menge von als wahr anerkannten, aber unsystema-
tisierten Thesen; die Aufgabe besteht in der Systematisierung 
dieser Menge. Bezeichne man weiterhin mit p,q,v,... usw. die 
Elemente dieser Menge. 
(ii) Sei L eine Menge von Argumenten, die die in K enthaltenen 
Thesen beweisen. Man bezeichne mit a,b,o,... usw. idie Elemente 
dieser Menge. 
(iii) Bedeute weiterhin der Ausdruck "alp" folgendes: "Das 
Argument a macht die These p gültig.." 
Anhand dieser Bestimmungen können wir das folgende Verhältnis 
beschreiben: 
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"L'.p", das folgendes aussagt: "Das System L macht die These p 
gültig". Die Formalisierung lautet: 
(1) L'.p £ (Ea) (a S L & a'.p) 
Man sagt, daß L vollständig in Bezug auf K ist, oder daß 
L ^-vollständig ist, falls gilt: 
(2) Vp (p e K + Llp) 
Man sagt, daß £ adäquat in Bezug auf K ist, oder daß -L in-
adäquat ist, falls gilt: 
(3) Vp (Llp -y p 6 K) 
Das deduktive System ist dann unvollständig, wenn 
(4) p e K & -£!p 
Das System ist dann inadäquat, wenn 
(5) p £ K & Llp 
In axiomatischen Systemen entspringt die Unvollständigkeit 
des Systems der Inkongruenz zwischen K und L. Das schlägt sich 
in denjenigen X-Thesen nieder, die nicht mit ¿-Argumenten 
gültig gemacht werden können. Also: 
(6) (£p) (p e K & (va) (a £ L -a'.p)) 
Diese Inkompatibilität zwischen den durch ¿-Argumente 
unterstüzten Thesen und der K-Gültigkeit ist im Grunde genommen 
darauf zurückzuführen, daß in deduktiven Systemen eine, von 
den ¿-Argumenten unabhängige X-Gültigkeit anerkannt wird; d.h. 
anhand eines nicht weiter bestimmten Kriteriums werden die 
Thesen in K für wahr erklärt. Die Inkompatibilität und demzu-
folge auch die Unvollständigkeit wurzelt somit in der potentiellen 
Irrelevanz der L-Unterstützbarkeit für die K-Gehörigkeit. 
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Geht man aber dagegen statt von einer deduktiven, d.h. 
axiomatischen, von einer kohärentistischen Systematisierung 
aus, deren Grundprinzip in der von Rescher verteidigten 
"Hegeischen Inversion" besteht, läßt sich das Problem der 
Vollständigkeit leicht vermeiden. Dieser Konzeption nach 
liefert die ¿-Gültigkeit das einzige Kriterium der K-Wahr-
heit, d.h. den einzigen Weg, der zur Akzeptierung der Wahr-
heit einer These führt, also 
35 
(7) p e K gdw Llp, für ein jedes p 
Demgemäß ist die Bedingung für die K-Vollständigkeit, die 
in Formel (2) dargelegt wurde, keine unmittelbare Konsequenz 
der Definition der X-Gehörigkeit. Mit anderen Worten, wenn 
man eine schwächere Bedingung annimmt, nämlich daß hinreichend 
systematisierte Thesen als wahr zu gelten haben, die durch die 
These 
(8) wenn Llp, dann p e K 
formuliert wird, dann tritt die Umkehrung dieser Formel, also 
das Prinzip der Vollständigkeit nicht notwendig auf. Durch die 
"Hegelesche Inversion" wird die Auffassung, daß die Systema-
tisierung erst bei einer Menge von vornherein angenommener 
Wahrheiten ansetzt, vollkommen gebannt, indem diese Menge als 
das Ergebnis der Systematisierung selbst bestimmt wird. 
Es ist jedoch einzusehen, daß dieses Vorgehen in unserem 
Falle als eine Pseudolösung- erscheint. Denn das hier angestrebte 
Ziel besteht nicht in der Eliminierung des Problems der Vollstän-
digkeit, sondern in der Erarbeitung einer Methode, die die exakte 
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Systematisierung einer unvollständigen Theorie ermöglicht. 
Und das soll soviel bedeuten, daß die UnVollständigkeit der 
Theorie des Witzes keine Mangelhaftigkeit der Theorie darstellt, 
sondern ganz im Gegenteil: die Theorie wird erst dann wissen-
schaftlich bewertbar, wenn ihre Unvollständigkeit im früher 
ausgeführten Sinne anerkannt und legitimiert wird, um dadurch, 
aufgrund unterschiedlicher Fragestellungen, Methoden, und 
Gesichtspunkte aufgestellte Thesen miteinander in Verbindung 
zu setzen und sie in ein einheitliches kohärentes epistemisches 
System integrieren zu können. Unter anderem soll damit auch 
eine grundsätzliche Schwäche von Theorien, die sprachliche 
Strukturen mit exakten Mitteln untersuchen, vermieden werden: 
denn diese bestehen aus solchen leeren formalen Strukturen, 
die - infolge der in deduktiven Systemen geforderten formalen 
Strenge - die nicht-formalisierbaren extra-logischen und 
extra-mathematischen Elemente, die aber wesentliche Bereiche von 
sprachlichen Konstruktionen bilden, ausschließen; oder sie ver-
suchen diese an die formalisierbare Struktur willkürlich anzu-
hängen, wodurch die Theorie, infolge des Mangels an immanenten 
Beziehungen zwischen den mathematisch-logischen und den extra-
mathematischen, bzw. extra-logischen Elementen, eine inkohärente 
Struktur aufweist und demzufolge ihrer epistemischen Funktion 
nicht Rechnung tragen kann. 
Sowohl dieser Gedankengang als auch die Tatsache, daß in 
einer kohärentistischen Epistemölogie das Aufnahmekriterium 
einer These in die Theorie nicht in dem eben geschilderten 
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Sinne exakt beschrieben werden kann, scheinen die Einführung 
eines neuen Verfahrens zu rechtfertigen. Wir schlagen den 
folgenden einfachen Lösungsversuch vor: 
Sei R die Kohärenz-Relation, wobei R als eine Menge von 
n+1-stelligen Relationen bestimmt wird: 
(9) R = {Rn1 + 1,Rn2+1,...,R^ + 1} wobei für jedes r"+1} 1 <, i < k 
gilt: vqr..qn £ X: pRV1qy..qn 
Aus dieser Bestimmung ergibt sich die folgende Wahrheitsde-
finition, d.h. die Bestimmung der K-Angehörigkeit: 
(TO) p e K e es gibt ein R/R = + J . . .R^ + J so daß für jedes 
R'l + 1 € B, 1 <5 i < k, gilt: Vqr..qneK: pftV-1 q y . .qn. 
An dieser Stelle bieten sich zwei Anmerkungen an: 
(i) Offensichtlich kann eine solche kohärentistische Wahr-
heitsbestimmung für eine empirische Theorie nicht angenommen 
werden, denn sie verzichtet auf jeden Wirklichkeitsbezug. Es 
wird jedoch in dem anschließenden Kapitel versucht, nachzu-
weisen, daß eine solche Bestimmung zusammen mit der empirischen 
Behauptung einer Theorie, die jedoch erst auf dér wissenschafts-
theoretischen Stufe behandelt werden kann, ihre Funktion 
hinreichend erfüllt. In diesem Sinn ist es einzusehen, daß die 
Bestimmung des Wirklichkeitsgehaltes einer wissenschaftlichen 
These nicht Aufgabe der epistemischen Systematisierung sein 
kann, sondern von den wissenschaftstheoretischen Untersuchungen 
erzielt werden soll, denn sie setzt die Beschreibung der 
Theorienstruktur voraus. 
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(ix) In den angeführten Definitionen wurde über Relationen 
quantifiziert und das könnte den schwerwiegenden Einwand 
eines Nominalisten hervorrufen, daß wir einem extremen 
Piatonismus zum Opfer gefallen sind. Denn Quines wohlbe-
kannte These lautet: "To be assumed as an entity is, purely 
ariu simply, to be reckonned as the value of a variable.""^ 
In diesem Sinne würden wir hier also Relationen als plato-
nistische Wesenheiten anerkennen. Es stellt sich jedoch die 
Frage, inwieweit ontologische Grundprinzipen be^ solchen 
Untersuchungen gerechtfertigt sind, deren Hauptziel in der 
sachgerechten Beschreibung einer wissenschaftlichen Theorie 
bestellt, wobei also nicht normativ, d.h. gewissen allgemei-
nen Prinzipien und Normen gehorchend vorgegangen wird, son-
dern die deskriptive Rekonstruktion des Mechanismus einer 
Theorie angestrebt wird. Zwar befinden sich die Überlegun-
gen zur epistemisehen Systematisierung auf einer allgemeinen 
erkenntnistheoretischen Stufe, d.h. sie sind ziemlich stark 
philosophisch ausgeirichtet, scheinen jedoch ontologische 
Hinwendungen in diesem Sinne verfehlt zu sein. Dieser Stand-
punkt soll aber keinesfalls bedeuten, daß der Piatonismus 
anerkannt werde - es wird lediglich soviel behauptet, daß 
die Lösung von ontologischen Grundlagenproblemen der Logik 
ni'.i-hl, die Aufgabe der Systematisierung der Thesen einer 
Theorie sein kann: hier wird einfach das Vorgehen der Wis-
senschaftler beschrieben. Es sei jedoch bemerkt, daß dieses 
Problem selbst in der Logik nicht so streng verabsolutiert 
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Betrachtet wird, wie das vielleicht das obige Quine-Zitat 
suggeriert. I. Ruzsa z.B., der in der Logik ein Verfechter 
der Quineschen These ist, betont, daß die ontologischen 
Voraussetzungen nicht wesentlich stärker werden, wenn man 
neben der Anerkennung zweier Quantifikationsbereiche auch 
die zwischen ihnen bestehenden Relationen oder Funktionen 
anerkennt, die die Objekte des einen Bereiches auf Objekte 
des anderen abbilden. In diesem Sinne werden in der extensiona-
len Logik neben den Bereichen der individuellen Objekte und 
der Wahrheitswerte auch die Bereiche anerkannt, die aus den 
anerkannten Bereichen mit Hilfe mengentheoretischer Operatio-
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nen entstehen. 
Diese Kohärenz-Relation trägt zur Explikation der fol-
genden intuitiven Grundprinzipien der kohärentistischen Syste-
matisierung bei: 
Ein jedes Element der epistemischen Struktur steht in 
einer Beziehung mit jedem anderen Element; 
Die epistemische Struktur kann auf einzelne, verhält-
nismäßig selbständige Teilsysteme aufgeteilt werden. 
Dies kann durch eine Angabe einer Untermenge von R oder 
durch die Angabe einer Teilrelation von 'R geschehen. 
Die Angabe einer einzigen solchen Relation bestimmt 
automatisch das ganze•System. 
Die Anordnung der Thesen ist nicht linear, wie bei 
axiomatischen Systemen. 
Infolge von (iii) und (iv) ist das System genau so 
handhabbar wie ein Axiomensystem. 
(i) 
(ii) 
U ü ) 
(iv) 
( v ) 
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(vi) Mit Hilfe der Spezifikation von Implikativ-Relationen 
des "wenn... dann" - Typs lassen sich innerhalb eines 
global kohärentistischen Systems lokal deduktive 
Teilsysteme bestimmen, wodurch einerseits die Axioma-
tisierung nicht steif und rücksichtslos auf ihre Vor-
teile aufgegeben werden muß und andererseits die ge-
gebenenfalls <..\-;duktiv formalisierbaren Teilsysteme 
kohärent an die nichtdeduktiv darstellbaren Teilsysteme 
angeschlossen werden können, 
(viij Uber die inferenziellen Verhältnisse hinaus lassen sich 
auch die viel feineren Beziehungen unter den Thesen 
beschreiben. 
(ixj Mit Hilfe der Relation R kann die kohärentistische Wahr-
heitsbestimmung leicht formálisért werden: wahr ist 
die These, die mit jeder anderen These des epistemischen 
Systems in kohärenter Beziehung steht. 
Anhand dieser Überlegungen kann (8) durch die folgende 
Formel ersetzt werden: 
(11) pRq}. . -nn/Vqr . .qn G K -»- p £ K 
R erfüllt somit all die Funktionen, die in axiomatischen 
Systemen die metamathematische Forderung der Vollständigkeit 
zu erfüllen hat, und darüber hinaus wird sie auch dem oben 
erwähnten Desiderat gerecht; und nicht zuletzt ermöglicht sie 
die Aufnahme von TT13 in das epistemische System. 
Es soll kurz auf ein weiteres Problem eingegangen werden. 
In axiomatischen Systemen, infolge der linearen Anordnung 
der Thesen, zieht eine einzige Veränderung die Veränderung des 
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ganzen Systems nach sich. Da aber das hier vorgeschlagene 
kohärentistische System mit Hilfe der Teilrelationen von 
R auf relativ selbständige Teilsysteme aufgeteilt werden 
kann, hat eine Veränderung oder sogar eine lokale Inkompa-
tibilität keine solchen schwerwiegenden Konsequenzen hin-
sichtlich des ganzen Systems. Beim Auftreten dieser Erscheinun-
gen braucht man nicht das ganze System zu verwerfen. Dieser 
Tatsache soll insofern Bedeutung zugeschrieben werden, als 
dadurch die Gefahr des Holismus von vornherein ausgeschlossen 
wird. In diesem System ist also Quines Behauptung nicht gül-
tig, nach der er über die mathematischen und logischen Gesetzte 
spricht und folgendes aussagt: "Because these laws are so 
central, any revision of them is feit to be the adoption of a 
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new conceptual scheme..." 
Das bisher Gesagte ermöglicht an dieser Stelle die An-
gabe einer Definition der kohärenten Systematisierung. 
(DF) Die Struktur S wird eine kohärente epistemische Struk-
tur genannt, wenn es K,H,F,R gibt, so daß folgendes gilt: 
1 . S = <K, n, F, R> 
2. K ist eine endliche, nichtleere Menge (die Menge der 
Thesen) 
3. H = Po(K) , wobei für jedes H^ e ü: H^ ist eine maximal 
konsistente Teilmenge von K 
4. F: K -> H 
5. R c K x K: R ist die offene Menge der n+i-stelligen Re-
lationen auf K, wobei R' c R. 
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Diese zuletzt genannte Forderung spiegelt die Bedingung 
der kohärentistischen Systematisierung wider, daß die, in 
einem solchen System unter den einzelnen Thesen bestehenden 
Beziehungen nicht von vornherein angeführt werden können, 
sondern sich erst im Laufe der Kohärenzanalyse ergeben. Des-
halb kann R nur durch eine ihrer Teilmengen bestimmt werden. 
Da es immer möglich ist, neue Beziehungen zu entdecken, nimmt 
die Zahl der Elemente von R ständig zu. 
Ferner gelten die Ausführungen über die Folgerung aus 
inkonsistenten Prämissen die alethische Präferenz, die K-
Angehörigkeit, die Wahrheit in K - diese werden hier nicht 
wiederholt. 
über die schon erwähnten Funktionen der kohärentistischen 
Systematisierurig hinaus erfüllt diese Definition des kohären-
tistischen Systems zwei weitere Desiderata: (i) sie ist formal 
exakt, um die minimalen Forderungen an Interpretierbarkeit zu 
erfüllen, und (ii) sie ist hinreichend allgemein formuliert 
und leer genug, um keine unerwünschten Beschränkungen und 
Normen vorzuschreiben, die der Natur des untersuchten Gegen-
standes nicht Rechnung tragen würden. 
Die Struktur S erfüllt somit die grundlegenden Bedin-
gungen der formalen Beschreibung von kohärentistischen Systemen, 
die A. Rapaport folgendermaßen bestimmt: "Classical mathema-
tics is not able to handle complex structural features. 
Organisation is best depicted as a network, and the mathematical 
theory of netwroks derives largely from certain branches of 
- 236 -
topology and abstract algebra rather than from classical 
analysis, which underlies classical mathematics. Thus the 
salient feature of a nervous system, of an institution, or 
of international systems may well reside in the vastly complex 
network of relations which constitute them: for example, 
neural pathways, lines of communication and authority, links 
of alliences or rivalries in international trade... The 
'nature' of the system is indeed embodied in the quality of 
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interrelation of these connections..." 
Zusammenfassend läßt sich feststellen, daß die durch die 
kohärente epistemische Struktur S systematisierte Menge von 
Thesen über die folgenden allgemeinen Eigenschaften verfügt: 
1. über jede epistemisch progressive Eigenart dér axiomatischen 
Systeme 
2. über keine epistemisch regressive Eigenart der axiomatischen 
Systeme 
3. über die progressiven Eigentümlichkeiten der axiomatischen 
Systeme hinaus weitere epistemisch progressive Eigenschaften. 
Somit ergibt sich die wichtige Schlußfolgerung, daß das 
System der Thesen über den Witz mathematisch beschreibbar ist. 
Die Vagheit, die aus dieser Formulierung ersichtlich ist, kann 
jedoch auf dieser Stufe nicht behoben werden: denn wie diese 
mathematische Struktur dargestellt werden und in welcher 
Beziehung sie zu den Texten stehen soll, kann erst auf der 
Stufe der wissenschaftstheoretischen Beschreibung der 
Theorienstruktur beantwortet werden. 
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3. Die wissenschaftstheoretische Ebene: die logische Struktur 
der Theorie 
3.1. Das Aussagenkonzept 
Die traditionelle Wissenschaftstheorie (das Aussagenkon-
zept) identifiziert eine Theorie mit einer hinreichend (axioma-
40 
tisch) systematisierten Menge von Thesen. In Bezug auf die 
Theorie des Witzes würden die Hauptcharakteristika dieser Auf-
fassung folgende Schwierigkeiten anbieten. 
(1) Eine Theorie ist eine Menge von Aussagen. 
Dagegen ist es aber klar, daß eine Theorie des Witzes viel mehr 
sein sollte, als eine Menge von mathematisch oder logisch zu 
beschreibenden Aussagen, indem sie auch das Stück der Wirk-
lichkeit mit einbeziehen sollte, das den Gegenstand der 
Theorie bildet. 
(2) Eine Theorie wird mit Hilfe von formalen Sprachen be-
schrieben. Dies ist jedoch menschlich unmöglich, wegen des 
äußerst komplizierten mathematischen Apparat, der hier erfor-
derlich wäre. Selbst die bisherige Geschichte der Wissen-
schaftstheorie. der Naturwissenschaften kennt nur eine einzige 41 
Arbeit, in der ein solcher Versuch erfolgreich ausgeführt war. 
Deshalb kann diese Methode, im Falle der unvollständigen Theorie 
des Witzes nicht in Frage kommen. 
(3) Die Unterscheidung zwischen Beob.achtungssprache und 
theoretischer Sprache. Da diese Unterscheidung nach Carnap 
lediglich anhand von Konventionen getroffen wird, erscheint 
es als fragwürdig, ob die Grenzlinie zwischen diesen auch bei 
der Theorie des Witzes adäquat gezogen werden kann. 
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(4) Das Problem eines empirischen Signifikanzkriteriums. 
Es gab zahlreiche Ansätze, ein empirisches Signifikanzkrite-
rium aufzustellen, jedoch all diese scheiterten in irgendeiner 
Hinsicht. Demnach wäre die empirische Signifikanz der Theorie 
des Witzes nicht zu beweisen. 
(5) Das Aussagenkonzept ist normativ, d.h. es schreibt die 
Gesetze der Theorienbildung vor. Da diese Gesetze dem Muster 
der Naturwissenschaften folgen, wäre es leicht zu beweisen, 
daß die Theorie des Witzes diesen nicht gerecht werden kann. 
(6) Es wird von der Beschreibung von Mikrostrukturen ausge-
gangen. Dies würde einen so feinen Apparat voraussetzen, der 
die sprachliche Struktur des Witzes präzise beschreiben kann. 
Darüber verfügen wir jedoch nicht: selbst die Anwendung der 
intensionalen Semantik, bzw. der Typenlogik höherer Ordnung, 
wie es in der Montague-Grammatik vorgelegt ist, würde nicht 
ausreichen, die Mikrostruktur der Witztextes zu beschreiben. 
Deshalb kann unsere Theorie nur etwas von seiner globalen 
Makrostruktur aussagen. 
(7) Die Theorienbeladenheit der Beobachtungen. Es ist einzu-
sehen, daß die empirischen Daten, d.h. die Auswahl des Unter-
suchurigsmaterials und ihre Bestimmung als Witze, sowie gewisse 
Voraussetzungen hinsichtlich ihrer Struktur von bereits existie-
renden Theorien des. Witzes bestimmt wurden. Unsere empirischen 
Untersuchungen sind also nicht unabhängig von Theorien (vgl. 
die konstruierte Standardtheorie und die Arbeitshypothese) . 
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(8) Die Notwendigkeit der Angabe eines allgemeingültigen und 
streng umgrenzten Anwendungsbereiches. Wir waren nicht imstande, 
einen solchen Anwendungsbereich unserer Theorie anzugeben, da 
wir die allgemeingültigen Gesetzmäßigkeiten des Witzes nicht 
ermitteln konnten. Wir stellten die Thesen lediglich aufgrund 
der Analyse von paradigmatischen Beispielen auf. Deshalb besteht 
kein Grund anzunehmen, daß die Theorie auf jeden Typ des Witzes 
zutrifft, obwohl dies ein wichtiges Desideratum wäre. 
(9) Die Objektivität der Untersuchungen. Dagegen ist jedoch 
ersichtlich, daß die vom Verfasser der vorliegenden Arbeit 
vollzogenen Analysen sehr stark von seinen Werturteilen, der 
wissenschaftlichen Tradition, der er angehört, seinem Glauben 
an gewisse Methoden, von dem historischen Zeitintervall, in 
dem er arbeitet, abhängen. Die Theorie des Witzes sollte 
demnach pragmatisch relativiert werden. 
Wie oberflächlich auch immer diese Bemerkungen sind, 
scheinen sie doch zu der Schlußfolgerung zu gelangen, daß 
die intendierte Theorie des Witzes in diesem Rahmen nicht 
adäquat beschrieben werden kann. Deshalb soll die Anwendbarkeit 
der anderen Alternative erwogen werden. 
'3.2. Das strukturalistische Theörienkonzept 
Dieses neue Theorienkonzept, das in der Wissenschafts-
theorie grundsätzlich Origenelles und Neuertiges schuf, wurde 
von J.D. Sneed im Jahre 1971 dargelegt, von W. Stegmüller, 
W. Balzer und C.U. Moulines aufgegriffen, weiterentwickelt 
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* und propagiert. Da die formale Darstellung der Theorie des 
Witzes die Anwendung des ausgedehnten und etwas komplizierten 
mengentheoretischen Apparats von Sneed erfordern würde, wird 
im folgenden relativ informell vorgegangen, wobei wir uns 
lediglich auf einige Kernprobleme konzentrieren, die im 
Hinblick auf die vorgelegte Theorie des Witzes entweder von 
großer Wichtigkeit, oder problematisch sind. Auf die Theorien-
dynamik, die einen ausschlaggebenden Bestandteil des struktu-
ralistischen Konzeptes darstellt, wird nicht eingegangen, denn 
ihre Behandlung würde die Analyse der existierenden Witztheorien 
nötig machen, was in dem vorliegenden Umfang nicht möglich ist.. 
Wir beschränken uns auf die folgenden Bemerkungen. 
(1) Der strukturalistische Theorienbegriff 
Den Ausgangspukt bildet ein Vorschlag von P. Suppes, 
wonach (physikalische) Theorien mit Hilfe eines mengentheo-
retischen Prädikats axiomatisiert werden sollten. Dies kann 
sich in zwei Schritten vollziehen. In einem ersten Schritt, 
wobei eine übliche Axiomatisierung der betreffenden Theorie' 
vorausgesetzt wird, führt man ein Prädikat von der Form "ist 
ein P" ein, dessen Definiens die Axiome bilden. Handelt es 
sich z.B. um die klassische Partikelmechanik, so führt man 
das Prädikat "ist eine klassische Partikelmechanik" ein, das 
durch die von Newton bestimmten Axiome definiert wird. In 
einem zweiten Schritt wird ein Name, sagen wir "a" angegeben, 
um diejenige Erscheinung zu benennen, die Gegenstand der 
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Theorie ist. Im Beispielfall könnte das z.B. das Sonnensystem 
sein. Und nun kann man die empirische Hypothese formulieren: 
"a ist eine klassische Partikelmechanik". 
In der Mathematik ist dieses Verfahren weit verbreitet 
i und gilt als eine besonders elegante' Methode zur Axiomatisie-
rung einer Theorie; ihr grundliegender Vorteil, mit der üb-
lichen Axiomatisierung verglichen, liegt daran, daß in diesem 
Fall die Gültigkeit der Axiome nicht Schritt für Schritt 
geprüft zu werden braucht, sondern einfach durch die mit Hilfe 
der Definition festgelegten Bedeutung des Prädikats entschie-
den werden kann. Im Prinzip ist diese Methode auf eine jede 
Theorie anwendbar, angenommen sie liegt in einer axiomatischen 
Formalisierung vor, wodurch der gewünschte Grad an Präzision 
gesichert wird. Die vorangehenden Erwägungen zur Systema-
tisierbarkeit der Theorie des Witzes haben jedoch gezeigt, 
daß einerseits die von uns vorgeschlagene kohärentistische 
Systematisierung zu einem geringeren Maße* mit Nachteilen 
beladen ist als die axiomatische Methode, und andererseits, 
was die formale Strenge betrifft, sie nicht hinter der Axioma-
tisierung zurückbleibt, wodurch sich die Anwendung der kohä-
rent! sti sehen Methode als adäquater örwies. Die wichtige 
Schlußfolgerung besteht also darin, daß die Theorie des Witzes 
erst dann durch ein mengentheoretisches Prädikat angegeben 
werden, kann, wenn das Prädikat "ist ein Witz" nicht mit Hilfe 
von Axiomen, sondern unter Verwendung der vorgeschlagenen 
kohärenten epistemischen Struktur S definiert wird. Die Defi-
* 
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nition soll natürlich auch einen Gegenstandsbereich angeben, 
worüber die Theorie etwas aussagt, sowie diejenigen Begriffe, 
die in der Theorie vorkommen. Da diese Begriffe eine äußerst 
wichtige Rolle spielen, soll kurz auf ihre Beschaffenheit 
eingegangen werden. 
"Im allgemeinen gibt es grundsätzlich drei Arten von wis-
senschaftlichen Begriffen: die klassifikatorischen, die durch 
Mengen, die komparativen, die durch zweistellige Relationen, 
und die quantitativen, die durch Funktionen dargestellt Wer-
den. Die letzteren sind den anderen beiden Begriffsarten weit 
überlegen, indem sie einem jeden Objekt "des Gegenstandsbe-
reiches eine Zahl zuordnen, wodurch die Bestimmung dieser 
Objekte durch präzise Messungen ermöglicht wird: ein solcher 
Begriff in der Physik ist z.B. "Masse". Die nachteiligsten 
Begriffe sind die klassifikatorischen - unglücklicherweise 
werden gerade diese in der Literaturtheorie angewendet. Sie 
ordnen jedes Objekt einfach einer Klasse zu, die durch ein 
Prädikat intensional angegeben werden kann; ein Text ist z.B. 
genau dann "komisch", wenn dieses Prädikat auf ihn zutrifft. 
Der größte Nachteil klassifikatorischer Begriffe besteht 
darin, daß sie sehr arm an Information sind: sie ermöglichen 
keine.Aufdeckung der Beziehungen zwischen den einzelnen 
Klassen oder Prädikaten - all diese müssen disjunkt definiert 
werden. Die komparativen Begriffe nehmen eine Zwischenstellung 
ein: sie liefern viel mehr Informationen, als die klassifika-
torischen, indem sie durch eine Ordnungsrelation charakterisiert 
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werden, wie z.B. "ist größer als" "ist früher als"... Um 
aber auch die von den klassifikatorischen Begriffen gespeicher-
ten Informationen zu enthalten, können sie als Quasiordnungen 
definiert werden, z.B. "ist größer als oder genau so groß wie". 
Auf der anderen Seite dienen sie als Ausgangspunkt zur Metrisie-
rung, wodurch im Prinzip die Möglichkeit ihrer Uberführung in 
einen quantitativen Begriff besteht. 
Es wäre angebracht, die in der Theorie des Witzes vor-
kommenden Begriffe als komparative zu rekonstruieren. Da eine 
solche Rekonstruktion jedoch die Analyse gewisser Vergleichs-
kriterien erforden würde, z.B. in welchem Sinne, sagen wir, 
ein Witz "logischer" ist oder über eine stärkere Metafunktion 
verfügt, als der andere usw., auf die hier nicht eingegangen 
werden kann, sollen sie zunächst als Mengen betrachtet werden. 
Es sei aber sowohl die Möglichkeit als auch die Notwendigkeit 
einer solchen Behandlung betont. 
Schon J. Bar-Hillel hat darauf hingewiesen, daß die, in 
der traditionellen Wissenschaftstheorie geläufige Unterschei-
dung zwischen den theoretischen und den Beobachtungsbegriffen 
auf der Verknüpfung zweier, von einander unabhängiger Dicho-
tomien beruhe: die eine ist die "beobachtbar - nicht-beobacht-
bare", die andere die "theoretisch - nicht theoretische" 
Dichotomie. Auch H. Putnam trug zur Klärung des Problems der 
theoretischen Begriffe entscheidend bei, indem er die Frage 
zugespitzt aufgeworfen hat, in welchem Sinne man sagen könne, 
43 daß ein theoretischer Begriff von der Theorie herkommt? 
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Aufgrund von Bar-Hillels Analyse kann eine der beiden 
Dichotomien außer Acht gelassen werden - die "beobachtbar -
nicht-beobachtbar" - und man kann ausschließlich das Problem 
der Theoretizität untersuchen. Gegenüber Carnaps Behauptung, 
wonach die Bestimmung der theoretischen Begriffe ein konven-
tioneller Akt sei, wobei es sich einfach um einen Schnitt in 
einem Kontinuum handle, betont Sneed nachdrücklich, daß die 
Theoretizität eines Begriffs von keinerlei willkürlichen 
Konventionen abhänge, sondern durch ein solches Kriterium 
festgelegt werde, das sich auf die ganze Theorie ausbreitet. 
Eine sinngemäße Adaptation dieses intuitiven Kriteriums für 
die Theorie des Witzes läßt sich so formulieren: Ein Begriff 
ist genau dann !/T-theoretisch, wenn sie in '/'^'-abhängiger Weise 
bestimmt wird. (TT-die vorliegende Theorie des Witzes) 
Als f'/'-theoretisch erweisen sich demnach die folgenden 
Begriffe, deren Ermittlung und Bestimmung eindeutig von der 
Theorie abhängt: t = Normenkonflikt (denn was darunter verstan-
den wird, kann nur aufgrund des deontisch logischen Systems 
bestimmt werden) 
£ ,, - Logik (wobei dieser Begriff auch die deontische Logik 
enthält, die viel mehr und auch anders ist als die klassische 
Logik) 
/. = Metafunktion (denn dieser Begriff ist z.B. nicht identisch 
mit dem in der Standardtheorie vorkommenden Begriff) 
Für diese drei Begriffe ist es also charakteristisch, daß 
sie nicht zu der empirischen Beschreibung des Witzes gehören. 
All die anderen Begriffe, die in den Thesen TT1-TT13 vorkommen, 
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gelten als nichttheoretisch, da ihre Deutung nicht von der 
Theorie selbst abhängt, (so z.B. "inkongruent", "verständlich", 
"pragmatisch", "dynamisch", "neustrukturalisierend" usw.). Der 
Einfachheit halber werden sie nicht weiter spezifiziert, sondern 
als eine Menge n = {n^, n^,n^, ...} zusammengefaßt. 
Jetzt wird die folgende Definition verständlich: 
D1 .V ist eine m + k -Matrix gdw 
( 1 ) x'e.M; 
(2) m und k sind positive ganze Zahlen: 0 < m, 0 < k) 
(3) für alle x 6 X: es gibt n^, . . . ',n , e M 
so daß x = <>i,,....n . t t, >: 1' ' m 1 ' k ' 
Nach (1) ist x' eine nichtleere Menge. (3) besagt, daß 
x ein ro+&-Tupel von Mengen, Relationen und Funktionen ist. 
Wichtig ist die schon erwähnte Unterscheidung zwischen den 
theoretischen und den nichtteoretischen Entitäten von x. 
Nun sind wir in der Lage, das angekündigte mengentheore-
tische Prädikat, das die Grundstruktur der Theorie angeben 
soll, zu definieren: 
D2 X ist ein Witz gdw 
(1) es B3 D, t?, t2> t3, n gibt, so daß 
(a) B = <D, tv t2, ts,n>s 
(b) D ist eine endliche, nichtleere Menge (Menge von 
Texten) ; 
(c) tn, t„j t, sind Untermengen von D; l a d 
(d) n ist eine Menge von Untermengen von Dm, 
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(2) es K, H, F, R, S gibt, so daß 
(a) S = <K, H, F, R>; 
(b) K = {TT1, TT2,..., TT13}; 
(c) H = Po(K) = {{TT1,. . . , TT12 ),{TT13 } } ; 
(d) F = K H; 
(e) R c K x K: R ist eine Menge von fc-stelligen Relationen, 
1 < k < 13, wobei R* c Rund 
R> = {R\Z ,R\,R\,R\,R\,R\,R27>R28,2Zr2 B]Q) 
13 
Rj (TT1,...,TT13) transitive, symmetrische, ref-
lexive Konjunktiv-Relation;. 2 
ff, (TT2,TT4) irreflexive, transitive, antisymmet-
rische Implikativ-relation; o 
R3 (TT1,TT S) irreflexive, transitive, antisymmet-
rische Implikativ-Relation; P 
R4 (TT3,TT6) irreflexive, transitive, antisymmet-
rische Implikativ-Relation; 
R2. (TT3, TT?) irreflexive, transitive, antisymmet-O rische Implikativ-Relation; 
2 
Rß (TT1,TT8) irreflexive, transitive, antisymmet-
rische Implikativ-Relation; ? 
j (TT3,T.T9) irreflexive, ti 
rische Implikativ-Relation; 
j (TT3,TT10) irreflexive, t] 
rische Implikativ-Relation; 
Rp (TT3,T.T9) irreflexive, transitive, antisymmet-
R\ (TT3,TT10) irreflexive, transitive, antisymmet-




R'jq {TT1,TT12) irreflexive, transitive, antisymmet-
rische Implikativ-Relation;: . 
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Die Elemente von R wurden durch die Anwendung der Kohä-
renzanalyse ermittelt. Die Vervollständigung dieser Analyse 
würde weitere Relationen ergeben. 
Bei der Beschreibung der mathematischen Struktur einer 
Theorie hält Sneed eine rein extensionale Behandlung für hin-
reichend. Demgemäß kann in einer ersten Annäherung eine 
mathematische Struktur durch die Gesamtheit derjenigen Objek-
te angegeben werden, die sie erfüllen, d.h. durch die Menge 
der Modelle M der mit Hilfe des mengentheoretischen Prädikats 
axiomatisierten Theorie. M ist also die Extension des Prädikats. 
Wir erhalten somit: "die Witze und nur die Witze sind die Mo-
delle der mathematischen Struktur der Theorie." Diese Defini-
tion ist überhaupt nicht zirkulär, sondern stellt eine ein-
wandfreie, präzise Bestimmung der Modelle der Theorie des Wit-
44 
zes dar. Verzichten wir nun auf die eigentlichen Gesetze 
oder Thesen, die die Theorie ausmachen, also auf D2(2), dann 
erhalten wir die Menge der potentiellen Modelle M^. Die poten-
tiellen Modelle sind solche Entitäten (Texte), die nicht un-
bedingt die Gesetze der Theorie erfüllen, aber diesen auch 
nicht widersprechen, die also die Potenzialität besitzen, sich 
zu Modellen der Theorie zu entwickeln, falls die Gültigkeit 
der Gesetze bewiesen werden könnte. Die Zahl der M ist na-P türlich viel größer als die der Modelle. Es bietet sich die 
45 folgende Definition an: 
D3 X ist ein Mw, gdw. es B, D, 
p 
t2, t'2, t3, n gibt, so daß 
(1) B = <D,t 1,t2,t3,n>; 
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(2) D ist eine endliche, nichtleere Menge (Menge von 
Texten); 
(3) t t t 3 sind Untermengen von 0; 
(4) n ist eine Menge von Untermengen von D; 
Läßt man weiterhin auch alle theoretischen Begriffe, 
weg, so ergibt sich die Menge der partiellen potentiellen Mo-
delle M . Diese Menge besteht ausschließlich aus solchen En-
PP 
titäten, die mit Hilfe rein nichttheoretischer, d.h. empirischer 
Begriffe beschrieben werden können und die von der Theorie er-
klärt werden sollen. 
D4 X ist ein Mw der Theorie des Witzes gdw. es B, D, n pp 
gibt, so daß 
(1) B = <D,n>; 
(2) D ist eine nichtleere, endliche Menge (Menge von 
Texten); 
(3) n ist eine Menge von Untermengen von 0; 
Es ist nun leicht enzusehen, daß die im Kapitel 1. behandel-
ten Witze (1),...,(4) als M aufzufassen sind. Sie bilden 
nämlich solche Elemente des Objektbereiches D, die allein mit 
Hilfe von den nichttheoretischen Begriffen so wie z.B. "Inkon-
gruenz", "Verständlichkeit", "Pointe" usw, zu beschreiben sind. 
Der nächste Begriff, der der Erklärung bedarf, ist der 
Begriff der Nebenbedingung C. Nebenbedingungen müssen streng 
von Gesetzen unterschieden werden. Während die ersteren die 
Möglichkeit dessen ausschließen, daß gewisse potentielle 
Modelle zu Modellen werden, stellen die Nebenbedingungen 
/ 
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Querverbindungen zwischen den einzelnen Anwendungen,der Theo-
rie her, indem sie den potentiellen Modellen Beschränkungen 
auferlegen. Diese Beschränkungen können z.B. darin bestehen, 
daß die Werte eines theoretischen oder nicht-theoretischen 
Begriffs in einer Anwendung mit den Werten desselben Begriffs 
in einer anderen Anwendung übereinstimmen. Es lassen sich 
leicht Beispiele finden. Die Theorie des Witzes soll auf einen 
Witz angewendet werden, der sowohl schriftlich, als auch münd-
lich in der Erzählung mehrerer Personen vorliegt - unsere 
Gesetze sollen jedoch auf all diese Aktualisierungen zutreffen. 
Das ist erst dann der Fall, wenn diese Aktualisierungen im 
Hinblick auf die, zu ihrer Beschreibung verwendeten Begriffe 
dieselben Bedingungen erfüllen. Falls diese Werte in den 
einzelnen Aktualisationen nicht, übereinstimmen, so handelt 
es sich um verschiedene Witze. Es läßt sich einsehen, daß für 
die Aktualisationen eines jeden Witzes Identitätsbedingungen 
dieser Art erfüllt werden müssen. Beispiele für Nebenbedingun-
gen wären u.a., "der Schotte ist geizig", "der 
ist unauflösbar" usw. 
D5 Wenn M^ ein potentielles Modell ist, dann 
Nebenbedingung für M^ gdw. 
(1) Cw c Po(Mp); 
(2) Ex 6 MWp({x} e Cw) ; , 
Es soll die folgende Definition angeführt 
Normenkonflikt 
ist Cw eine 
werden. 
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D6 X ist ein Kern gdw es gibt MU, m" , Mu. CW, m und k. so 3 pS pp, , , , 
daß 
(1) A' = A f p , M W , C W > ; 
(2) Mw ist eine m+fc-Matrix; P 
(3) MUpp = { < V . . . J % > | Etv...,tk«n1,...,nm,t1,...,t 
6 *J>}, 
(4) MW C Mp," 
(5) Cw ist eine Nebenbedingung für M^; 
Der Kern soll die mathematische Struktur der Theorie 
darstellen. Die Theorie selbst ist aber mit dieser mathema-
tischen Struktur nicht identisch: sie enthält daneben auch 
eine andere Komponente, nämlich die Menge der intendierten 
Atiwendungen I. An dieser Stelle ist bereits einzusehen, daß 
die Theorie keine Menge von Aussagen mehr darstellt, sondern 
auch eine nichtmathematische oder nichtlogische Komponente 
enthält, also "ein Stück der Wirklichkeit". Um weitere Dif-
ferenzierungen treffen zu können,. werden wir nicht von der 
Theorie des Witzes reden, sondern von einem Theorieelement 
des Witzes. Die Definition lautet: 
D7 ,Y ist ein Theorielement gdw es gibt ein VW, und ein IW, 
so daß 
(1) X = <UW, Iu>; 
(2) uw = m" , m V u > ; 
P PP' 
(3) Iw C Po(Mw )/ - pp 
Die Elemente von I werden also als Mengen von partiellen 
potentiellen Modellen behandelt. Das spiegelt die Idee wider, 
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daß für ein jedes x ein jedes y desselben Typs auch eine 
intendierte Anwendung ist. So gehören nicht nur die im Laufe 
der vorliegenden Arbeit bisher beschriebenen Witze in den 
Bereich der intendierten Anwendungen unserer Theorie, sondern 
46 
alle, die dieselben Eigenschaften besitzen. Der gesamte 
Bereich kann jedoch nicht genau angegeben werden. Die Menge 
I läßt sich nur durch ihre Teilmenge umreißen, die die 
Menge der paradigmatischen Beispiele angibt - hier besteht 
also keine Notwendigkeit mehr, wie im Aussagenkonzept, das 
gesamte Feld der Anwendungen anzugeben. In unserem Falle ist 
diese Menge identisch mit der Menge der Witze (1),..., (4), 
die im Kapitel 1. analysiert wurden. Bei der Ermittlung von 
I spielen offenbar pragmatische Faktoren eine bedeutende 
Rolle, genauer gesagt haben wir es hier eindeutig mit dem 
Wittgensteinschen Begriff der Familienähnlichkeit zu tun. Es 
läßt sich also nun unser Vorgehen rechtfertigen, daß wir 
keine allgemeingültige Strukturbeschreibung der Witze angaben, 
sondern, genau wie es Wittgenstein im Falle des "Spiels" tat, 
sie aufgrund gewisser, vage umrissener Eigenschaften identi-
fizierten. 
(2) Die empirische Behauptung der Theorie 
An dieser Stelle greifen wir das einmal schon ange-
deutete Problem der theoretischen Begriffe wieder auf und 
wenden uns dem von Sn^ed dargelegten Lösungsversuch zu. Die 
Frage stellt sich folgendermaßen: Läßt sich der mathematische 
Apparat einer Theorie mit seinen theoretischen Begriffen zur 
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Formulierung empirischer Behauptungen verwenden? Die Antwort 
ist: Nein. Denn bezeichne "P" die Grundstruktur und "a" eine 
der Anwendungen der Theorie, dann erhält die empirische 
Behauptung die folgende Form: 
(1) "a ist ein P" 
Wenn die Theorie theoretische Begriffe enthält, dann kann der 
Wahrheitswert von (1) nur in dem Fall ermittelt werden, wenn 
man voraussetzt, daß die Wahrheit einer Aussage von der Form (1) 
bereits bewiesen worden sei. Somit führt der Versuch der Ermitt-
lung des empirischen Wahrheitswertes von-(1) zu einem Zirkel. 
Und das bedeutet zugleich, daß Theorien, die theoretische 
Begriffe enthalten, zur Formulierung von empirischen Hypothesen 
nicht geeignet sind. 
Sneed gelang es jedoch zu zeigen, daß Formeln von der 
Form (1) nicht als die empirischen Hypothesen einer Theorie 
betrachtet werden können. Eine solche Behauptung erhält man 
aber, wenn man (1) in sein Ramsey-Substitut überführt. Das 
Wesen dieses Verfahrens besteht darin, daß man in einem ersten 
Schritt die in dem Satz vorkommenden theoretischen Terme durch 
Variable ersetzt, und in einem zweiten Schritt dann diese 
Variablen mit Existenzquantoren bindet. Es ist bewiesen, daß 
dieser Ramsey-Satz gleichwertig mit der Originaltheorie ist. 
Da der Ramsey-Satz keine theoretischen Terme enthält, brauchen 
wir nur nichttheoretische Objekte zu untersuchen. Dementsprechend 
besteht also keine Notwendigkeit mehr, anzunehmen, daß eine 
andere Behauptung von der Form (1) bereits wahr sei. Sneed 
- 253 -
betont, daß der Ramsey-Satz die einzige bisher bekannte 
Lösung des Problems der theoretischen Terme darstellt. 
Deshalb ist das Gegenargument, daß der Ramsey-Satz 
irgendwie philosophisch verdächtig sei, nicht stichhaltig: 
er bietet einen notwendigen Bestandteil der Beschreibung des-
sen, wie Theorien in den empirischen Wissenschaften behandelt ' 
werden. 
Die Originalfassung des Ramsey-Satzes ergab eine äußerst 
komplizierte Formel. Der gegenwärtige Ansatz ermöglicht jedoch 
seine Reduktion auf einen atomaren Satz. Dies kann wie folgt 
angeführt werden. 
Sei n e n und j e m- Wir definieren dann vn(j) rekursiv 
wie folgt: v° (J) 2 j und vn+1 (j) = p.o(vn (</) ) • Es wird dann die 
folgende Definition angegeben: 
D8 Wenn u - <M .M ,M.C> ein Kern ist, dann 
P PP . . 
(1) die Funktionen r %: (M ) -»• V4 (M j sind induktiv 
P PP 
definiert für i e N wie folgt: r° (<n , . . . ,n ,t,...,t.>); X 771 K 
= <il3i...,Kn>; ri + 1(X) 5 {r'-(y) | 7 G X), für 
X 6 V"+J(N )> p 
(2) A(U) • = r2(KJ(M) n C); 
Die r n sind die Restriktionsfunktionen, die die 7 n 
theoretischen Terme aussondern. A(U) wird der empirische Ge-
halt von U genannt. Der empirische Gehalt enthält die Teil-
mengen von M , die sich durch Hinzufügung theoretischer Terme 
zu Teilmengen von M ergänzen lassen und die die Nebenbedingun-
gen erfüllen. Die Anwendungsfunktion A bildet demnach den Kern V 
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auf diese M ab. Nun gilt das folgende Theorem: 
Theorem: Uw hat einen empirischen Gehalt. 
Der Beweis ergibt sich unmittelbar, denn aufgrund von D3, 
D4, D5, D6 gibt es einen UW, so daß Uw = Mw , Mw, Cw>. 
P PP 
Damit ist die Bedingung von D8 erfüllt. 
Man nehme weiterhin die folgende Definition in Betracht: 
D9 Wenn <U,I> = T ein Theorieelement ist, dann ist die empi-
rische Behauptung von T der Satz I c A(U) . 
Der intuitive Gedanke hinter dieser Definition besteht 
darin, daß die empirische Behauptung einer Theorie (d.h., in 
der vorliegenden Terminologie, eines Theorieelementes) gleich-
zusetzten sei mit der Aussage, daß die Menge der intendier-
ten Anwendungen eine Teilmenge der Anwendungen des Kernes 
bilde. . 
Theorem: Sei Tw = <UW, 1W>, wobei lw C iw und I = {(¿),(2), o — o 
(3),(4)} die Menge ist, deren Elemente die paradigmatischen 
Beispiele der Theorie des Witzes bilden. Dann ist die empirische 
Behauptung von TW der Satz c A{VU). 
Der Beweis ergibt sich unmittelbar aus D9. 
Die ausschlaggebende Bedeutung der beiden Theoreme 
besteht darin, daß mit ihrer Hilfe die empirische Signifikans 
der Theorie des Witzes nachgewiesen werden konnte. Das ist 
aber nicht gleichzusetzten mit der Behauptung, daß der Satz 
" lw c A(U)" tatsächlich wahr sei - dies soll extra geprüft o — 
werden. 
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Theorem: Der Satz Iw c A(UW) ist wahr. Q _ 
Der Beweis ergibt sich aufgrund des folgenden Gedankenganges. 
Die Elemente von A(UW) sind genau die die sich durch • PP 
Hinzufügung von theoretischen Begriffen zu Teilmengen von Mw 
ergänzen lassen und die Nebenbedingungen erfüllen. Da diese 
Menge aufgrund von D4 nicht leer ist, gibt es anhand von 
D6{3) eine Untermenge I w der Potenzmenge dieser M^ . Und 
ist als diejenige Untermenge von l w definiert, die die Witze, 
d.h. die M (1),...,(4).enthält. PP 
Damit ist bewiesen, daß die empirische Behauptung der 
Theorie des Witzes wahr ist, d.h. daß die Theorie erfolg-
reich angewendet werden kann. 
Es soll weiterhin bemerkt werden, daß es nicht die 
Theorie (bzw. das Theorieelement Tw) selbst ist, deren 
Wahrheit nachgewiesen wurde, sondern die des atomaren Ramsey-
Satzes, denn die Wahrheit oder Falschheit kann nur von Sätzen 
ausgesprochen werden - eine Theorie ist dagegen nicht als 
ein Satz definiert worden, sondern als ein geordnetes Paar, 
dessen erstes Element eine mathematische Struktur und dessen 
zweites Element eine Menge von Objekten (in unserem Fall Tex-
ten) bildet. Damit hängt die Tatsache zusammen, daß die 
Theorie selbst immun gegenüber der Erfahrung ist, d.h. weder 
verifiziert noch falsifiziert werden kann - dies läßt sich 
47 nur in Falle der empirischen Behauptung vornehmen. 
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Die bisherigen Theoreme und Definitionen wurden verhält-
nismäßig ausführlich dargestellt, um die empirische Signi-
fikanz der Theorie des Witzes nachweisen zu können, die un-
seres, Erachtens die problematischste Aufgabe einer Texte 
untersuchenden Theorie ist. Das strukturalistische Theorien-
konzept bietet jedoch die Lösung zahlreicher anderer Probleme 
an, die im folgenden kurz angedeutet werden, ohne den Anspruch 
auf Vollständigkeit oder exakte Formulierung zu erheben. 
(3) Die Unterscheidung zwischen allgemeinen und speziellen 
Gesetzen. W. Balzer hat darauf hingewiesen, daß die Gesetze 
einer Theorie in derselben Form rekonstruiert werden können 
wie die Theorie selbst, d.h. als ein Theorieelement. Demnach 
kann der Begri-ff der Spezialisation erläutert werden. Die 
ursprüngliche Theorie stellt nun dasjenige Basiselement dar, 
das als Ausgangspunkt zu den Spezialisationen dient, die die 
speziellen Eigentümlichkeiten einiger spezieller Anwendungen 
erklären sollen. Demnach,, parallel mit der Entdeckung neuer 
intendierter Anwendungen wird es möglich, ihre neu entdeckten 
speziellen Gesetze zu behandeln. In unserem Falle ergibt sich 
daraus die Möglichkeit, die Theorie auch auf solche Typen des 
Witzes auszudehnen, die von unseren Analysen und dem deontisch 
logischen Modell nicht erfaßt wurden. 
(4) Die Theorienaynamik. Eine der wichtigsten Errungenschaften 
des strukturalistischen Theorienkonzeptes besteht darin, daß 
mit seiner Hilfe der diakronische Aspekt der Theoriendynamik 
exakt und präzise beschrieben werden kann. Es wäre demnach 
- 257 -
möglich, unsere Theorie in die Geschichte der Witztheorien 
einzuördnen und solche Begriffe zu klären, wie Paradigma, 
Normalwiosensahaft, wissenschaftliche Revolution. 48 
(5) Die pragmatische Erweiterung der Theorienelemente. Mit 
Anlehnung an einen Vorschlag von C.U. Moulines läßt sich die 
pragmatische Seite der wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit mit ein-
49 
beziehen. Bezeichnet man mit SC eine wissenschaftliche 
Gemeinscheft, und mit /¡ein historisches Zeitintervall, so 
gelangt man zu pragmatisch erweiterten Theor^ieelementen. Da-
durch können auch solche bestimmenden Faktoren der vorliegen-
den Theorie des Witzes geklärt werden, die außerhalb der 
immanenten Theorienstruktur liegen. 
(6) Die Theorienbeladenhelt der Beobachtungen. Das Problem 
lautet folgendermaßen: wie läßt sich unsere Theorie mit Hilfe 
von Daten überprüfen, die nur verständlich sind, wenn man 
wenigstens einen Teil der Theorie als wahr ansieht? Hier 
handelt es sich aber einfach um eine mögliche Formulierung 
des Problems der theoretischen Begriffe - und dieses Problem 
ist von Sneed gelöst worden. 
(7) Die Deskriptiyltät der Wissenschaftstheorie. Im Gegensatz 
zu dem Aussagenkonzept geht das strukturalistische Theorien-
konzept nicht normativ, sondern deskriptiv vor, indem es das 
tatsächliche Verhalten des Wissenschaftlers und den tat-
sächlichen Vorgang der Theorienbildung beschreiben will. Da-
durch wird ermöglicht, die Theorie des Witzes wissenschafts-
theoretisch zu fundieren, sie exakt und präzise zu beschrei-
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ben, ohne jedoch dabei von den Idealen und Desiderata der 
Naturwissenschaften geleitet zu werden. ^ 
(8) Einfachheit des Apparats. Da-anstelle von formalen Sprachen 
ein grundsätzlich informeller mengentheoretischer Apparat 
"verwendet wird, kann die umrissene logische Analyse einer 
Theorie in die Praxis ziemlich leicht umgesetzt werden, wo-
durch eine sprach- oder literaturwissenschaftliche Theorie 
leicht auf ihre empirische Signifikanz überprüft werden kann. 
4. Zusammenfassung 
Aufgrund der durchgeführten Untersuchungen lassen sich 
die anfangs gestellten Fragen folgendermaßen kurz beantworten. 
(1) Was die Eigentümlichkeiten und Funktionen des Witzes 
betrifft, so soll es genügen, auf die Thesen TT1-TT13 hin-
zuweisen, die über den Nachweis der Arbeitshypothese hinaus 
auch zur Klärung weiterer Grundeigenschaften des Witzes bei-
trugen. 
(2) Das durch semantisch-pragmatische Analysen fundierte 
-deontisch logische System verfügt Uber das angestrebte 
Merkmal: es ist fähig, sowohl die inkongruente, diskrepante 
Struktur des Witzes zu modellieren als auch seine Systemhaf-
tigkeit und Kongruenz auf einer anderen Ebene. Es ergibt sich" 
daraus, daß der Witz nur im Hinblick auf den Hintergrund der 
klassischen zweiwertigen Logik als inkongruent oder déviant 
hingenommen wird - wird der logische Bezugspunkt unter Be-
rücksichtigung der tatsächlichen logischen Struktur der kom-
munikativen Regeln gemäß ermittelt, so erweist sich der Witz 
als ein integrantes und funktionsreiches Element dieses Sy-
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stems. 
(3) Die Aufgabe der epistemischen Systematisierung besteht 
darin, die mit Hilfe einer bestimmten Methode gewonnenen The-
sen in Bezug auf allgemein epistemische Gesichtspunkte zu 
systematisieren, um damit die Grundlage zur Strukturierung 
der Theorie zu schaffen. Hier hat sich herausgestellt, daß 
sich zur Lösung der epistemischen Probleme, die die Unter-
suchung des Witzes aufwarf,, am besten eine modifizierte ko-
härentistische Systematisierung eignet, wodurch es ermöglicht 
wird, die Ergebnisse der vielfältigen pragmatischen Unter-
suchungen aufgrund der logischen Struktur des Witzes in ein 
eiheitliches epistemisches System kohärent zu integrieren. 
Auf dieser allgemein epistemischen Stufe, wobei die Auf-
gabe lediglich in der Systematisierung der Thesen, und nicht 
in ihrer Uberprüfung auf ihren Wahrheitswert besteht, erwies 
sich ein kohärentistisches Wahrheitskriterium als hinreichend, 
um die Aufnahme gewisser Thesen in das epistemische System 
entscheiden zu können. Die Uberprüfung auf den Wahrheitswert 
und den empirischen Gehalt wurde auf die Stufe der Theorien-
struktur überwiesen. Demnach liegt die wichtige Schlußfolgerung 
nahe, daß diese beiden Faktoren einander gegenseitig voraus-
setzten und erst zusammen zur adäquaten Theorienbildung 
führen können. 
(4) Das strukturalistische Theorienkonzept schien, im Gegen-
satz zu dem Aussagenkonzept, einen formal präzisen Rahmen 
zur wissenschaftstheoretischen Explikation der Theorie des 
Witzes zu liefern. Die einzige wichtige Modifikation, die da-
) 
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bei vollzogen werden mußte, bestand im Ersetzen der axiomatischen 
Systematisierung der Grundgesetze durch ihre kohärenti-
stische. Dabei konnten einige wichtige Probleme gelöst werden, 
vor allem die Bestimmung des empirischen Gehaltes und der empi-
rischen Behauptung der Theorie. 
(5) Hinsichtlich der einzelnen Methoden ergibt sich die 
Schlußfolgerung, daß diese auf den verschiedenen Stufen der 
Theorienbildung unterschiedlicher Bewertungen bedürfen. Auf 
der Ebene der Untersuchungsmethode des Witzes erwies sich 
ein axiomatisches System als fruchtbar, denn seine Unzuläng-
lichkeiten können auf den höheren"Stufen kompensiert werden. 
So ist es z.B. Aufgabe der epistemischen Systematisierung und 
nicht der Untersuchung der Texte, einen methodologischen Plura-
lismus zu rechfertigen, indem sie die Integration verschieden-
artiger, durch unterschiedliche Methoden gewonnenner Ergeb-
nisse in eine einheitliche Theorie zu integrieren vermag -
auf der Stufe der Textanalyse würden eklektische Methoden zu 
widersprüchlichen und von Anomalien beladenen Ergebnissen 
führen. Oder: es wird das, auf der unmittelbar methodologischen 
Ebene der Witzanalyse ungelöste Problem der Ausdehnung der 
aufgedeckten Gesetzmäßigkeiten auf solche Texttypen, die von 
dem ursprünglischen Modell nicht erfaßt wurden, auf der 
wissenschaftstheoretischen Stufe gelöst: falls bereits ein 
Strukturkern festliegt, besteht die Möglichkeit, immer neue 
Anwendungen dieses Kernes zu entdecken, die auf ihren 
empirischen Gehalt geprüft und mit Hilfe spezieller Gesetzte 
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beschrieben werden können. 
Die Nachteile der Axiomatisierung führen jedoch bei der 
epistemischen Systematisierung zu ihrer Preisgabe, indem sie 
sich auf den anderen Stufen nicht beheben lassen. Deshalb 
bietet sich hier ein methodischer Ansatz zur Kohärenzanalyse 
an-
Auf der wissenschaftstheoretischen Stufe wurde schließ-
lich die Grundstruktur der Theorie mit Hilfe eines mengen-
theoretischen Prädikats angegeben, deren Definition aus den 
i 
kohärentistisch systematisierten Gesetzen bestand. 
•Aus all diesen Erwägungen ergibt sich die Schlußfolge-
rung, daß die Stufen der Theorienbildung im Hinblich auf den 
Witz einerseits einander gegenseitig voraussetzten und erst 
zusammen zu den erzielten Ergebnissen führen können, anderer-
seits aber verschiedenartiger Problemstellungen, unterschied-
licher methodologischer und erkenntnistheoretischer Voraus-
setzungen und Präsuppositionen bedürfen, wodurch sie einen 
teilweise getrennten Zugang zu rechtfertigen scheinen. 
Verzeichnis der Symbole 
p, q, r, s propositionale Variablen 
v, •*•, = logische Konstanten 
0, P, F deontische Operatoren 
|- logische Konsequenz 
(,) HilfsZeichen (Klammern) 
Op monadischer O-Ausdruck 
0{v/q) dyadischer O-Ausdruck 
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T1,...,T4 Thesen der Standardtheorie 
WT1,...,WT4 Thesen der Arbeitshypothese 
TT1,...,TT13 Thesen der vorliegenden Theorie des Witzes 
W, G3 B episteraische Operatoren 
{... } geschweifte Klammern zur Angabe einer Menge 
<...> spitze Klammern zur Angabe eines geordneten 
n-Tupels 
F: K H eine Abbildung der Menge K in die Menge H 





6 Element von 
U Vereinigung zweier Mengen 
n Durchschnitt zweier Mengen 
x kartesisches Produkt 
M nichtleere Menge 
N Menge der natürlichen Zahlen 
0 leere Menge • 
Anmerkungen 
1. An Literatur wurde ansgewertet: Bausinger ( 1968), Brunwand 
(1972), Douglas (1968), Fischer (1871), Freud (1905), 
Grober-Glück (1959), Grothjan (1957), Hegele (1969), 
Höllerer (1976), Jonhson (1976), (1978), Jolies (1930), 
Langeweide (1956), LUthi (1970), Marfurt (1977), Moser-Rath 
(1969), Pocheptsov (1974), Preisendanz . (1970), Röhrich (1977), 
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Schmidt-Hidding (1963), Schweizer (1967), Ulrich (1978), 
Wellek (1949). Vgl. auch die Literaturangaben in Röhrich 
(1977). 
Es sei genügend, ein einziges typisches Beispiel zur 
Illustration dieser Auffassung anzugeben: "Indem der 
Witz das Verständnis von der sprachlichen Aussage löst 
und es doch zugleich an diese Aussage gebunden erscheinen 
läßt, realisiert Verknüpfungsmöglichkeiten und Gesichts-
punkte, die unter der Herrschaft des Ernstes, der Strenge, 
der Sachlichkeit versagt, verpönt, unverantwortlich sein 
müssen. Die Pointe ist der - im Grunde stets semantische -
Trick, durch den ein für die seriöse Ausrichtung und 
Einstellung unstatthafter Sinn so in die Lebensbezüge 
hineinprojiziert wird, daß die vom Ernst bestimmte Ordnung 
der Dinge gerade das für sie Belanglose, Ausgefallene, 
Nichtige zur Geltung bringen muß. Der Witz führt zu einem 
'collapse of the pattern of experience' (Max Eastman), 
zum Zusammenbruch eines Erfahrungsmusters; man muß hinzu-
fügen, zum Kollaps der dem Ernst, der Naivität, dem Enthu-
siasmus, der sachlichen Strenge, dem Zwang entsprechenden 
Erfahrungsmuster... Indem der Witz diese Bedeutungungen 
und Bewandtnisse relativiert, indem er das scheinbar 
ausgefallene und Nichtige gegen das anerkannt Wichtige 
und Erhebliche, das Verpönte gegen das Geheiligte aus-
spielt, indem er die normalen, konventionellen Gesichts-
winkel ignoriert und die selbstverständlich erscheinende 
Rangordnung der Werte und Akzente wenigstens für den 
Augenblick erschüttert r- in all dem ist der Witz ein / 
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unscheinbarer, aber klassischer Beweis für die Möglichkeit 
des Menschen, sich von Denk- und Realitätszwängen zu 
distanzieren, sich Uber die Reglementierung von Einstel-
lungen und Gefühlen hinwegzusetzen, sich in exzentrischer 
Position zu den Gegebenheiten und Ordnungen zu halten, 
Abstand zur Welt und sich selbst zu gewinnen." Preisendanz 
(1970). 
3. Dieses Vorgehen wird im Kapitel 4. gerechtfertigt. 
4. Zur Explikation des Begriffs der Witzsituation vgl. Marfurt 
(1977). 
5. Stalnaker (1973) S. 385. 
6. Ebert (1973). 
7. a.a.O. S. 425. 
8. Ducrot (1973) 
9. a.a.O. S. 251. 
10. Frege (1892). Vgl. auch: "Der Voraussetzungscharakter der 
Präsuppositionen eröffnet, wie schon Frege betonte, ein 
weites Feld rhetorischer und manipulativer Verwendungs-
möglichkeiten. Da sie als selbstverständlich, ohne weitere 
Begründung akzeptabel, gar nicht zur Debatte stehend 
unterstellt wird, richtet sich das Augenmerk des Hörers 
und damit auch seine Kritik weit weniger auf den Inhalt 
der Präsupposition als auf das betont Behauptete. Da der 
Hörer die Präsupposition dennoch akzeptieren muß, wenn er 
nicht grundsätzlich die gemeinsame Basis der Kommunikation 
zurückweisen will, kann er u.U. leichter zur Annahme 
einer präsupponierten als einer betonten Aussage gebracht 
werden." Franck (1973) S. 38. 
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11. Vgl. Stalnaker (1973). 
12. An Literatur wurde ausgewertet: Conte - Hilpinen - von 
Wright (Hrsg.) (1977), Hilpinen (Hrsg.) (1971), (1981), 
Kutschera (1973), (1976), Lenk (Hrsg.) (1974), Mally 
(1924), von Wright (1951). 
13. Zu einer Analyse von Regeln in Sprechakten, dem logischen 
Status nach, vgl. Kertész (1982). 
14. Vgl. Searle (1969). 
15. Vgl. Grice (1975). 
16. Vgl. Wunderlich (1974). 
17. a.a.O. S. 344. 
18. von Wright (1971). 
19. V'jl. ebenda. 
20. Ebenda, wobei im Zitat die Symbole unserer Verwendung 
entsprechend ersetzt wurden. 
21. Im folgenden wird von Wrights Beweis kurz zusammengefaßt. 
22. Zur eingehenden Analyse von verschiedenen Typen der Normen-
konflikte, die gewisse sprachliche Strukturen in kommuni-
kativen Situationen charakterisieren, sowie zu ihrer tempo-
ralen Bestimmtheit und Auflösbarkeit vgl. Kertész (1982). 
23. Vgl. dazu Kutschera (1982). 
24. Zur erkenntnistheoretischen Bewertung dieser Ergebnisse 
vgl. Stegmüller (1959). 
25. Vgl. Rescher (1973), (1979). 
26. Vgl. Rescher (1973). 
27. Diese Behauptung bezieht sich auf Rescher (1979). In 
Rescher (1973) ist eine formale Rekonstruktion des 
Kohärenzbegriffs von A.C: Ewing versucht worden. An 
- 266 -
dieser Stelle kann auf die Diskussion dieses Ansatzes 
nicht eingegangen werden, es sei lediglich soviel bemerkt, 
daß er den Desiderata der vorliegenden Arbeit aus Gründen, 
die teilweise schon erwähnt wurden, teilweise im Späteren 
behandelt werden, nicht genügt. 
28. Vgl. Rescher (1979). 
29. Ebenda. 
30. Ebenda. 
31. Vgl. Rescher (1973) S. 72-97. 
32. Vgl. Stegmüller (1979a). 
33. Der Begriff der "Familie" wird wie folgt erläutert. Sei 
I eine beliebige Menge, F:I Ii und n^ h F(i) für jedes 
i G J. Man schreibt dann statt Fil •* N gern <n •> und 
z i e i 
spricht von der Familie F aus Elementen von N mit der In-
dexmenge I. 
34. Vgl. Rescher (1979) S. 59-62. 
35. Ebenda S. 61; 
36. Quine (1948) S. 13. . 
37. Vgl. Ruzsa (1981) . -
38. Quine (1952) S. 3. 
39. Rapaport (1968) S. 452-458. 
40. Zur Darstellung des Aussagenkonzeptes vgl. Stegmüller 
(1970) und Kutschera (1972). 
41. Vgl. Montague (1962). 
42. Vgl. Sneed (1971), Stegmüller (1973), (1979b), (1980). 
43. "A theoretical term, properly so-called, is one which 
comes from a scientific theory (and the almost untouched 
problem in thirty years of writing about 'theoretical 
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terms' is what is really distinctive about such terms)." 
Putnam (1962) S. 243. 
44. Die im Kapitel 1.7. formulierten Thesen sind als Gesetses-
hypothesen der Theorie des Witzes zu betrachten, deshalb 
wird im Laufe der folgenden wissenschaftstheoretischen 
Diskussion das Wort "Gesetz" anstatt von "These" verwendet. 
45. Der Index "u" weist hier und im Weiteren darauf hin, daß 
das betreffende Symbol sich auf die vorliegende Theorie 
des Witzes bezieht. Mw bezeichnet beispielsweise: "die 
Menge der Modelle der Grundstruktur der vorliegenden 
Theorie des Witzes". 
46. Auf der Stufe der Theorienstruktur, wie auch bei der 
epistemischen Systematisierung spielen die Methoden, mit 
deren Hilfe die Gesetzte ermittelt wurden, keine Rolle 
mehr. Demnach lassen sich die Gesetze auch auf solche 
intendierten Anwendungen ausdehnen, die außerhalb der 
Tragweite der ursprünglichen Methode liegen. Diese Tat-
sache liefert die Berechtigung dafür, in dem vorliegenden 
Fall tatsächlich von einer Theorie des Witzes zu reden, 
und nicht nur von einer Theorie eines Typs der Witze. 
47. Vgl. Stegmüllers Ausführungen zur Immunität einer Theorie 
gegenüber widerspenstiger Erfahrung in Stegmüller (1979b) 
S. 50-57. 
48. Demnach handelt es sich bei der Theoriendynamik um eine 
exakte Explikation der Thesen von. T.S. Kuhn, indem diese 
sowohl vom Relativismus als auch vom Irrationalismus 
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befreit werden. 
49. Vgl. Stegmüller (1979b) S. 29-32. 
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SECRET AND COMMUNICATION 
A NEW APPROACH TO THE CONVERTIBILITY OF DE DICTO TO DE RE 
LASZLO TARNAY 
Attila Jozsef University, Szeged 
1. The concept of secret 
The ordinary use of "secret" is so diverse that it covers 
a vast field of meaning; to narrow it flown we can turn to the 
dictionary and take its various definitions as it starting 
point. Naturally, we then neglect some particular occurences 
of the words as a lexical item, though at the same time we 
presume that they could be classified under the following two 
definitions. 
The Oxford English Dictionary gives seven separata defini-
tions of the word "secret" as a substantive; among them two 
are very specialized (2. a prayer in liturgical use, 7. a coat 
of mail), two others do no more than specify things that can 
serve as the object of secret (4. a method, 5. a place), one 
lists only several phrases with the? word "secret", while the 
remaining two unfold the basic meanings of "secret" at once 
interrelated and contrasting:* "1. Something unknown or unreveal 
or that is. known only by initiation or revelation, a mystery 
chiefly pi., the hidden affairs or workings (of God, Nature, 
Science)" and "3. Some fact, affair, design, action, etc. the 
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knowledge of which is kept to oneself or shared only with 
those whom it concerns or to whom it has been confided, 
something that cannot be divulged without violation of command 
2 
or breach of confidence." 
According to the first definition the secret should 
correspond to an object beyond the bounds of knowledge. Then 
it is viewed as something existing like a real object, while 
the word "secret" expresses a negative epistemologlcal attitude. 
For in this sense we deal with the secret as an epistemological 
phenomenon the cause of which has yet to be discovered. Now 
the secret is not a linguistic but rather a scientific problem, 
though language cannot be wholly excluded for all our understan-
ding is closely related to speaking: there is no problem until 
we consider secret a thing that is totally unknown, but as soon 3 
as we obtain the minimal information on it and we name it al-
though we known nothing of its cause except its being, i.e. it 
exists, the over-discussed problem of analyticity arises, and 
the epistemological problem becomes a linguistic one too. For, 
as Searls pointed out, "the argument of defining the criterion 4 
of 'analytic' is self-defeating"; in other words, how can we 
name a thing without knowing the very essence of its existence 
(that is the criterion of applying the term to new cases) . Still 
the solution remains scientific: it is more relevant informa-
tion from empirical sources that we have to have for naming. 
So we cannot know a thing unless we possess the necessary 
information as to its cause, for knowing that it exists generally 
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is not enough. 
According to the third definition the secret should 
correspond to a way of communication; it describes a situation 
in which contact between potential addressers and addressees 
is prohibited. To this we may add some other cases when the 
break-down of contact is not intentional: the addresser and 
the addressee cannot get into touch because of reasons of 
time-and-space, or there is a physical contact but somehow 
they do not seem to speak the "same" language and so they * 
cannot understand each other. In this sense we deal with the 
secret as a linguistic phenomenon but we will inevitably intrude 
into the field of pragmatics as well.^ 
To sum up so far, we have two clear-cut definitions of 
"secret": 
a./ the first refers to an epistemological attitude, to a 
relation between things and human consciousness. Here we would 
like to put emphasis on the latter because we hold strongly 
the view that the secret can never be an attribute of things 
or a label attached to them by the human mind or a thing-in-
-itself; neither can it be a type of behaviour sanctioned by 
conventions. Briefly, it is not an entity but a system of rela-
tions. 
b./ the second definition refers to a type of communication: 
in this approach, it is less tempting to think of secret in 
terms of an ontological entity than to consider it as a 
communicative situation. For it is not the knowledge but the 
divulgation of it that matters; not the information in itself 
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but the fact that it is kept from others. So this type of 
communication will be describable in terms of those who keep 
the information to themselves .and .of those from whom it is 
kept; i.e. in terms of potential addressers and addressees. 
We aim at giving a general and unified description of sec-
ret based on the two definitions above. But then we encounter 
a very serious problem: What will the relation between the 
radically different definitions be: is it possible to for-
• 
mulate one without referring to the other? If yes, then they 
cannot be used as parts of a more general theory because we 
shall have to speak of two basically different concepts of 
"secret"; if no, then our argument will surely turn out, at 
cne point or other, to be self-defeating, though we have seen 
that this failure is due rather to analyticity than to a more 
particular theory of secret. In other words, we have to 
consider the relation of epistemology and communication. 
The situation is parallel with the problem of linguistic 
meaning and utterer's intention. In "Meaning and Truth" 
Strawson^ argues for the interrelatedness of a semantic and 
a communicational theory of language; if the utterer produces 
his utterance with a complex audience-directed-intention, 
involving the audience's thinking that he has a certain 
belief, there is no detached element corresponding to this 
expressing a belief with no such intention. But this does 
not mean that an Audience-Directed-Belief-Expression (ADBE) 
is a kind of logical compound of two simpler concepts of AD 
and BE and hence that BE is conceptually independent of ADBE. 
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What we can do is produce a description of a belief expres-
sion and imagine a case for it, although this description will 
depend on the description of the case in which the utterer has 
an audiance-directed-intention. This argument closely parallels 
our own in the following way: we can avoid the problem of the 
interrelatedness of our two definitions in two ways; either 
we exclude the first one from our analysis on the basis of a 
very strong argument; it lacks a criterion used in ordinary 
life when somebody considers something secret, i.e. there 
should be an intention not to reveal the secret to others; or 
we use the word "communication" in a wider sense: we consider 
every activity of an individual in getting new information on 
a certain thing as a type of communication - permitting that in 
some cases the addresser remains unknown or is not a definite 
person but a thing, Nature, Fate, Social Institute, etc. Then 
we may preserve our first definition as the description of 
certain conditions to be fulfilled for a successful communica-
tion of the secret. We choose the latter solution. Now the 
relevance of Strawson's argument should be clear: the defini-
tion referring to an epistemological attitude will correspond 
to a Belief-Expression and will then give the semantic descrip-
tion of "secret", what its meaning is, the definition referring 
to a type of communication will correspond to an Audience-
-Directed-Intention and will then give account of the pragmatics 
of "secret", what its use is like. And the two definitions 
together will serve as a framework for a theory of "secret" 
determining a certain speech-act which - as we will argue 
- 280 -
later - parallels the pragmatics of referring and needs the 
incorporation of some game-theoretical elements. In this 
approach we can avoid entering the field of ontology, and 
even the problem of the relation of epistemology and communica-
tion seems to evaporate: knowledge (and belief respectively) 
and communication (of this knowledge and belief) cannot be 
separated; knowledge cannot be conceptually independent of 
communication in general, i.e. our activity of knowing and our 
activity of communicating seem to run on parallel lines. 
However, they are not logically interrelated: there is no logical 
necessity between an epistemological attitude which turns on 
knowing (believing) a certain thing and the communicating of 
this thing as a secret. Rather we would say; the communication 
of a thing intended as a secret conversationally presupposes a 
certain epistemological attitude with respect to that thing. Or 
conversely, for every epistemological attitude with respect to 
a certain thing can be found a case in which it is associated 
with some intention to communicate that thing as a secret. Or 
more generally, the secret is a system of certain rules and 
conditions that orientates our activity to acquire knowledge. 
In the forthcoming analysis we argue that there is a 
common term for many of the debated categories of modal logic: 
quantification, referentially transparent vs referentially 
opaque, "de re" vs "de dicto", possible worlds, etc. So in 
explicating what this term means we can account for all these 
problems and on the very same basis: if they can be reduced 
to some well-known thing in ordinary life and if this then can 
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be described as specifying'certain relations logically, they 
all are given a unified and general explanation. It is for 
these aims that we recur to the word "secret". In conducting 
a conceptual analysis of it, instead of speaking of the inter-
relations of concepts, we make use of the interrelations of 
concrete individuals, i.e. when we define "secret" as "some-
thing kept unknown from someone by somebody", we say something 
like: there is a proposition p and there are at least two 
individúale x and y such that x=a and y-b, and a knows that p 
while b does not know that p, and a intends that b does not 
know that p.' Though this scheme will be amended later, it 
seems clear that we are in favour of a quantified modal logic. 
But the validity of this option can only be made apparent from 
a pragmatic point of view. 
A further comment should be made about the use of some 
terms of our analysis; we start with giving a framework for a 
general description of "secret" and we define two components 
of this conceptual framework, the semantics, which determine 
certain conditions and which can be specified within a simple 
modal logical system, and the pragmatics, which comprises certain 
rules for corresponding communicative acts when our defined 
semantic ideal becomes applied, and which even explains some 
reasonable cases of the logic of action. Throughout this ana-
lysis we use the terms epistemology and communication somewhat 
interchangeably; this does not mean that we hold them to be 
identical, but otherwise we cannot give a pragmatic account for 
some crucial semantic problems. Another minor justification 
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may be that we take over the instrumental idea of modal lo-
g 
gic, which, in turn, will have no sense unless its relation 
to a possible pragmatics is clarified; in accordance with this, 
we assume the point of view not of a single individual but of 
a whole community for we are concerned not with the ontology 
of notions but with their epistemic applicability, which, 
within a community, strongly involves communication. So it is 
very difficult to doubt the interdependence of these two 
concepts though surely there is no logical tie between them: 
the first can be specified within a possible semantic system 
of modal logic while the second can be delineated in virtue of 
certain governing rules conceived within a corresponding 
pragmatic system. But there is no necessity for the actual 
interplay of the two. So to explicate what the concept of 
"secret" stands for we have to state what the relation of 
epistemology and communication is like, i.e. the relation of 
certain conditions and rules. The rules should give us the 
intended type of communication while the conditions are prag-
matically presupposed in the rules of communication and hence 9 
making possible certain conversational implicatures and so 
not being conceptually independent of the total speech-act 
of secret. This may serve as a framework of a general descrip-
tion of the two different definitions. 
2. Secret as a system of epistemological conditions 
In this part we concern ourselves with epistemic logic in 
that we try to set down some semantic conditions of the function 
of secret. Though it has been thoroughly dealt with by many 
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logicians the basic ideas may still seem, if not at once 
paradoxial, at least questionable. All that we feel is that 
it is needed to explicate some concepts which are used in or-
dinary language. In trying to do this we will inevitably 
construct a system, a "normative ideal"'''® which being applied 
in certain cases will show some discrepancies; but these discre-
pancies will not invalidate our original system for it is not 
important whether everything in our theory corresponds to so-
mething in our empirical subject matter or vice versa (there 
is no empirical reality that could be fully and unquestionably 
conceptualized). It is enough for us that "in providing a for-
mal analysis of a cluster of concepts by developing a semantics 
and truth conditions for sentences expressing propositions 
about those concepts, we are interested primarily in the kinds 
of relations which may obtain among the entities which comprise 
our subject matter. For it is in terms of these relations that 
we construct the truth and denotation definitions for our for-
mal language and it is in virtue of these relations that the 
axioms of our theory will turn out to be logically true."'''1' 
So we aim at clarifying some logical relations that obtain 
between certain potential relata of our theory, and it is how 
such we can comprise in our theory without violating certain 
laws of consistency, compactness, well-formedness, etc. that 
will decide whether epistemic logic is worth the having. 
As we have seen that the modal conditions are strongly re-
lated to the operating rules of communication we have to make 
some general statements about the social relevance of the 
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problem. This also follows from the fact that modality should 
not be seen from the point of view of a single individual but 
of a whole community. We do not exclude cases when it is an indi-
vidual who seeks to know a certain thing but we have to concede 
that anyone of the community to which the given individual 
belongs may join him in the search, in this case secret can 
only function in a community. This community need not correspond 
to society; we consider a community every association of people 
with a certain purpose and so with a definite system of norms 
that helps any member of the community in deciding the truth-
-value of a piece of information in the event that the corres-
ponding verification of it might be hindered somehow. According 
to the specific system of norms involving e.g. initiation, 
structure of power, etc. different types of community can be 
established: religious, political, social, ethical, etc. The 
force of their normative systems may vary on a wide range; they 
can even cut off the members from any external sources completely 
debarring re-valuation. But this fact does not have any bearing 
on the analysis of secret; as the modal conditions relative to 
epistemological attitudes of certain members of the community 
are dependent on the rules of communication what will concern 
us is the fact of communicating certain beliefs to be specified 
later as different kinds of semantical strategies - and not a 
set of propositions either true or false; i.e. we let alone 
the problem of truth and falsity and consider some performative 
character of "secret". Then the clarification of the corres-
ponding system of norms can only aim at stating what may be 
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reasonably expected to be believed to be true, i.e. at descri-
bing a set of conventions relative to the content of beliefs 
while leaving intact the logical structure of the communica-
tion of secret. Then the epistemological conditions - to be 
called from now on "modal contexts" - will take over the place 
of simple propositions to be either true or false - which have 
nothing to do with the concept of "secret", though the defini-
tion of the above conditions will be made with respect to the 
same proposition. 
Now we turn to the construction of the modal contexts. First 
we introduce some logical terms: instead of information we 
speak about propositions, but we consider only such cases when 
they can be reformulated as fix) where x is a variable into 
which proper names can be substituted. To indicate the possi-
bility of substitution we write d/x where d is an individual 
constant. Now, let the form f(x) correspond to minimal infor-
mation that states the existence of a certain object while 
fid) corresponds to the maximal information that states the 
cause of its existence. Then if p is an arbitrary propositi-
on, p {d/x) does not say more than fix), i.e. p contains a free 
variable; while fid) will be indentical with the stronger 
formula p ld=x), which will certainly imply the former but not 
conversely. Then, on the basis of what has been said we can 
construct the modal contexts in the following way: in de-
scribing the propositional attitudes of the members of the 
community let us use the verb "to know"; there are many things 
that may.prompt this use; first of all it entitles us to gene-
- 286 -
ralize existentially in the modal contexts in a certain unprob-
lematic way, whereas with other epistemic verbs it might seem 
inappropriate; secondly, in communication what are pragmatically 
or conversationally presupposed on the part of the speaker are 
- according to the maxims of Grice - certain beliefs which are' 
to be taken adequately grounded to be true by the audience; 
thirdly, it is the communication of certain beliefs, presump-
tions, knowledge, etc. that interests us and not what kind of 
12 
beliefs, presumptions, knowledge, etc. can be communicated. 
So, we indicate with the capital letter K the verb "to know" 
and with the small latin letters a, b, a - figuring in the 
indices of K - the persons whose propositional attitude are 
being described. Now, if p = fix) is an arbitrary proposition, 
it can function as secret within a certain community, if and 
only if there can be defined three different modal contexts 
all of which will have p in their scope and which can be 
described as follows: . 
(i) let a stand for those and only for those individuals 
who know about a certain thing as secret in a given community 
but they do not know the solution to it; then they know /(x) 
but they do not know /(d); e.g. they know that x robbed the 
bank but they do not know that x is none other than the Great 
Ben; 
(ii) let b stand for those and only for those individuals who 
know about a thing as secret in a given community and who also 
know the solution to it; then they know f(d), too; e.g. if 
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p = ".%• killed the president" and x is the Great Ben, then b 
is entitled to make the following statement: "I know who killed 
the president" - only if he happens to know that the Great Ben 
was the murderer; 
(iii) finally let a stand for those and only for those indivi-
duals who do not know about a thing as secret in a given communi-
ty; then they do not know even f(x), e.g. they do not even know 
that somebody killed the president. 
In terms of a, b and a all the members of the community 
can be defined. Then, what we have said informally can be 
formulized in the following way: 
(1) (3a) Ox) [Kap(d/x) and - Kffp (d=x)] 
(2) (3b) Ox) [Xbp(d/x) and ¡<bp(d=x)) 
(3) (3c) Ox) ~ Kap (d/x) 
This can be seen as the result of a first general approach 
of the meaning of "secret". It is based on some theses of 
"Knowledge and Belief" and some other works by Hintikka where 
he makes a restriction on quantification in modal contexts 
using the surplus condition "y knows what a is" formulated as 
"y knows that x = a". The validity of this restriction on 
quantification has been questioned by others."'"3 To reject 
counter-arguments we can refer to McLane's paper emphasizing 
that this is to be considered as a "normative ideal", though 
a stronger reason for rejecting them is to be found - as we 
will see - in a pragmatic reconsideration of the same problem. 
What is important at this point in our analysis is whether the 
formulas of (1) and (2) are adequate to reflect the basic 
0 
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semantical problem for which the concept of "secret" was 
introduced. This results clearly from Hintikka's argument on 
analyticity and on model sets. It says that as soon as we 
speak about model sets a free singular term to be substituted 
into a variable bound by a quantifier will not pick out a 
particular individual and so the corresponding picture to be 
constructed on the basis of the prescriptions the given model 
set contains is never a unique one: there is always a multip-
licity of correlations, i.e. it represents reality in more than 
one way; and this is what our modal context (1) should mean. 
While the other context (2) should indicate an end-point in 
the corresponding picture construction with its stronger 
restriction (d=x), though this is a very limited process. 
Suffice now to say that the possibility of arriving at such 
an endpoint can never be defined semantically but only within 
a pragmatic framework."'"5. So this should be the real difference 
between (1) and (2): in the first case we contemplate a clear 
semantical aspect of the problem, whereas in the second we 
arrive at an extralinguistic aspect of the same problem, i.e. 
we have come across a deictic element. And this is just what 
the capture of the real author of a crime can amount to. But 
this means that (1) does not contain any successful reference 
- at least not with respect to the individual that is existen-
tially generalized in (3x) - for it lacks the final deictic 
element that should pick out unambiguously the individual to be 
substituted into x. This also explains the validity of 
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existential generalization: it is context (2) that contains 
reference to the right individual, then the use of the 
quantifier in (2) is adequately grounded; but as we strongly 
hold that the three contexts should never be separated (they 
will have no relevance to the meaning of "secret" if used 
separately) the x bound by the same quantifier in (1) as in 
(2) serves only to show that there are persons (indicated by a) 
who cannot refer successfully to the individual to which 
others (indicated by b) can refer unambiguously; i.e. x is 
introduced to show the different epistemological relations 
of different persons to the same object. We see again that we 
are interested in the relations that hold between subjects 
(individuals) and objects (other individuals) where the subjects 
differ and the objects remain identical. This identity is shown 
once and for all by the same letter x and it is the context 
(2) that makes valid quantification in all the three, provided 
they are always occur together. Then, (d/x) does not indicate 
a reference to the individual d if (d-x) contains the sufficient 
condition of referring. What an analysis of secret should show 
is that this condition is often lacking, i.e. (1) is possible. 
But then we have to concede that the modal context of (1) might 
be referentially opaque; and not only this but that it might 
even allow the substitution of another individual than d, say d1 
because it is possible that p(d'/x) is true, even if p(d'=x) 
is false. But clearly p{d'/x) has no sense unless it is 
indicated who thinks the substitution of d' possible. This is 
for what (1) has been introduced; it not only shows the identity 
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of objects with which the different epistemological relations 
of the subjects hold but - as being referentially opaque at 
the same time - it may contain a reference though not to the 
right individual d but to another one, to d'. This mistaken 
reference (with respect to x fully specified in (2)) is based 
on certain predicates that occur in the given proposition p and 
apply uniquely to the right individual d to be substituted 
into x. This is a clear case of misdescription: a predicate P 
uniquely applying to an individual d is made to describe an 
individual d' by a given subject a. In spite of misdescription 
a will, be referring to d1 and not to d (to whom the predicate 
applies). What a does then is a kind of "de dicto" specifica-
tion of the referent in that he takes a predicate P and sees 
what individuals belong to its extension. But he may be wrong 
as he has been above choosing d' instead of d (with respect to 
the contexts). That means that (1) can be re—written as a "de 
dicto" reading: 
(4) a knows that (3x)p(x) 
while (2) will correspond to a relative "de re" reading:'''® 
(5) (:Jx) that a knows that p (x) . 
But as reference depends on reading a context "de re", what a 
does when he misdescribes d' as x (fully specified in (2)) is 
to make a conversion of "de dicto" into "de re". But the 
result of this process is reference to d' and not to d. So we 
can either prohibit such a conversion and say that only a "de 
dicto" reading is possible - in which case it can be strongly 
- 291 -
doubted whether a is referring - or accept it as a possible 
conversion without the sufficient condition (d'=x) being 
fulfilled. But if so, then naturally the x. figuring in (1) and 
in (2) or in (4) and (5) will not be identical any longer 
(with respect to the contexts); and d will become a variable 
just like x. Once again the solution is pragmatical: it 
foreshadows the introduction of semantic strategies. 
3. The convertibility of "de dicto" in to "de re" 
We have seen that the modal contexts of (1) and (2) 
reflect the difference between a "de dicto" and a "de re" 
reading. The condition of reference is the possibility of "de 
re" reading while in describing the individuals all what we 
have is a set of predicates applicable to them, i.e. it suggests 
a "de dicto" gpecification; but then we always convert a "de 
dicto" reading into a corresponding "de re" one when we refer. 
So we should analyze some theses of the convertibility of "de 
dicto" into "de re" (or vice versa) stated by eminent philosop-
hers of our time. We have to deal with three different for-
mulations of the same problem. As we will argue later on, 
these different approaches - in spite of the diversity of the 
applied terms - describe the same phenomenon and so they run 
on parallel lines. In dealing with them we try to emphasize 
their most important characteristics focusing on the solution 
they give to the problem of the relation between the modalities 
"de dicto" and "de re". 
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But before treating these variations in detail we should 
mention that a criterion that makes the convertibility analytic 
is useless for us since it once for all excludes any kind of 
difference between (1) and (2) and thus the analysis of secret 
becomes impossible. Such a criterion is provided by what is 
known as the Barcan formula:*7 
(6) (x)L<f>x O L (x) <px 
the validity of which depends on the fact of whether there is 
a possible but unactual object in an arbitrary W w o r l d . Only 
when (6) ceases to be valid will it become relevant for us 
because it then allows the formulation of (1); however we are 
going to account for the possible but unactual object within 
a pragmatic framework. 
The first formulation of the problem is naturally linked 
with the name of Quine. According to him there are two diffe-
rent modal contexts: (i) transparent and (ii) opaque. Quantifica-
tion is only allowed in transparent contexts but then it will 
inevitably involve Aristotelean essentialism because to 
identify the variable x, which figures in the scope of a modal 
operator, with the x bound by, say an existential operator we 
need to select from all the possible features of a given 
individual to be substituted into x an essential feature that 
is known (believed, presumed etc.) by a, b, c figuring in the 
indices of the relative modal operator and this essential 
feature will serve as the basis of quantification into a modal 
context while quantification should be regardless of any kind 
of description of the individual. It is possible only if this 
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essential feature is among the features attributed in reality 
to the given individual. Then all the quantification is depen-
dent on a certain privileged description of a given object. 
From this argument it turns out that a purely transparent 
context is impossible for it will be true only "under a certain 
description" i.e. "necessity does not properly apply to the 
fulfilment of conditions by objects (such as the ball of rock 
which is Venus, or the number which numbers the planets), apart 
18 
from special ways of specifying them." So necessary fulfil-
ment of a given quantified proposition makes no sense as applied 
to physical objects x, but necessity attaches, at best, only to 
the connection between the given proposition and different means 
of specifying x. The conclusion is that modal contexts are a 
failure, at least transparently conceived, for they are opaque. 
But if this is just what opacity means then it is the same as 
modality "de dicto" applied to epistemic contexts. Still there 
are others who think that there is a crucial difference between 19 
the modality of necessity and propositional attitudes. The 
basis of their argument is that an arbitrary person may not know 
a given identity statement although identities are considered 
as cases of necessity. So propositional contexts lead to an 
infinite process of the splitting up of individuals. Still 
there efforts are being made to solve it within possible world 
semantics; the main difference, according to us, lies in 
choosing a relative point of view, be it our actual world, or 
a representative name, or the person himself whose proposi-
tional attitude is being described with the help of certain 
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possible worlds compatible with his set of beliefs (presump-
tions, knowledge etc.) - from which accessibility relations, 
substituion examples, etc. would be definable because, while 
necessity in many cases causes no problem, being valid for a 
whole class of entities (names, worlds) even in an absolute 
sense, with epistemic modalities we have to indicate certain 
sub-classes which can be given with respect to certain rela-
tive points of view. This latter is responsible for all accu-
sations of being committed to essentialism. This argument also 
shows why Kripke's semantics becomes exposed to such accusa-
tions only if being applied,'*0 but it is not dependent on a 
possible worlds semantics. The crucial problem in giving a 
semantics of propositional attitudes is that of referring. Just 
because of this do we consider the two kinds o.f modality 
("necessary" and epistemic) similar cases: they all turn on 
giving adequate criteria of reference. And this is what links 
the transparent-opaque distinction with that of "de dicto" -
"de re". Though we doubt that this problem could be solved 
within a semantic framework, we re-view some important approaches 
to try to account for the above distinction semantically, while 
at the end we give our reasons why this kind of analysis is 
doomed to fail. 
One of the most complete and thorough treatments of this 
21 
problem is given by Alvin Plantinga. His approach aims at 
giving the conditions of the convertibility of "de re" into 
"de dicto". He says: "Where x is an object and P is a property, 
the kernel proposition with respect to x and P (K) x, P( ) is 
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the proposition expressed by the result of replacing 'a:' and 
'p' in 'x has the complement of p' by the proper names of a: 
and P." And later he adds: "x has P essentially if and only 
22 
if x has P and K{x,P) is necessarily false." If essential 
properties are possessed necessarily, then the above require-
ment to explain modalities "de re" by modalities "de dicto" 
follows from the Quinean thesis that "necessity resides in 
the way we talk about things, not in the things we talk 
23 
about." Though this cannot be applied directly to proposi-
tional attitudes just because the modality of "necessary" 
involves "true in all possible worlds" and an epistemic one 
involves only "true in a possible world" (or worlds) compatible 
with the set of beliefs (presumptions, knowledge, etc.) of the 
person whose propositional attitude is being described". But 
as we have been interested in the relations that hold between 
subjects and objects (an epistemic analogue for modality of 
"necessary" could be an omnipotent subject) and in accordance 
with what we have said above on the privileged point of view 
in giving a semantics, these conditions of convertibility have 
to be applicable to epistemic cases, too. What matters here is 
that Plantinga's solution also fails in avoiding essentialism 
which is present in the requirement of certain favoured 
descriptions regardless of their being attributed to the object 
necessarily or of their being believed (presumed, known, etc.) 
to be attributed to it by a certain person. The convertibility 
of (7) in to (8) then turns on 'x is not a spy' which is being 
believed to be false by Ralph: 
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(7) (3x) (Ralph believes that x is a spy) 
(8) Ralph believes that Ox) (x is a spy). 
What seems to us a little disconcerting is what we may call 
an asymmetry of objects and properties; this means briefly 
that there can be certain properties.in a given world which 
are not instantiated by objects existing in that world 
although they do exist in it, while there are certain objects 
which, although they do not exist in a given world, do enjoy 
certain properties in it. Though this would not mean asymmetry 
with respect to all possible worlds, in Plantinga's work there 
is an implicit assessment: the properties not instantiated by 
objects existing in a given world need not correspond to those 
properties instantiated by objects not existing in that same 
world. This treatment runs the risk of considering properties 
to be objects and of so allowing that two kinds of objects 
exist side by side. This asymmetry may be due to the introdu-
cing of negation into the criterion of convertibility. For, 
given the two kinds of negation, then the complement of "being-
believed-by-Ralph-to-be-a-spy-in-V" - which is a world-indexed 
property and hence an essence - cannot be "being-believed-by-
Ralph-not-to-be-a-spy-in-f»'" because "the complement of P does 
not require that the object which it enjoys should exist in W; 
it is enjoyed by any object that either does not exist in W 
24 
or is non-P therein." 
The complement of a property P then is defined as a negation 
"de dicto" and this is exactly what the criterion of conver-
tibility prescribes. But then we are committed either to 
- 297 -
properties not instantiated by objects existing in U or to 
objects not existing in W but enjoying certain properties. 
The problem of epistemic and "necessary" modalities and of 
their "de re" - "de dicto" convertibility is merely transferred 
into the problem of negations "de re" and "de dicto". Hence a 
semantic account of this problem seems either to be self-
defeating or to require some, by no means unambiguous, postula-
tion of the "de re" - "de dicto" convertibility. If. we cannot 
give a valid argument, then at least we can postulate either 
that each instance is "de dicto" and some are "de re" or that 
25 all instances are "de re" and some are "de dicto". And even 
in Plantinga's works there is a very serious postulation; namely 
that he assumes the fact to be accepted that everything can be 
2 6 
baptized which is clearly a pragmatic assumption and taken 
as a semantic one. This has, for us, a rather unfortunate result 
in that every descriptive phrase is at once a referring one, 
too. But if so, then there is not the slightest need for a 
criterion of convertibility because, even if not overtly, it 
is already implied in one of the semantic postulations. But then 
within such a system the concept of "secret" will never be 
explicable. In order to see clearly that to make a relative 
semantic system consistent one has to postulate an absolute 
convertibility of "de-re" - "de dicto" or at least the possi-
bility of it with respect to a favoured point of reference we 
may have other examples. 
27 
Rolf A. Eberle aims at giving an account of all kinds of 
false beliefs and even ignorances; to explain the invalidity 
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of identities within epistemic contexts he introduces the 
notion of "representative name" which is "special in the ob-
jective sense"; but this is not enough because this class of 
names has to fall back on "subjectively representative ones" 
(which are representative for a given person). As the first 
kind of name implies that the object referred to exists and 
as the second kind involves knowing.the object under some 
description or name, we have a clear criterion of convertibi-
lity of "de re" and "de dicto" within a semantic system, even 
if restricted to a class'of "representative names": "If one 
knows T under some name or description, then one knows that T 
exists" (i.e. the corresponding term is a referring one); 
formally, At •* K(T=T), where A stands for "knowing under some 
description". This shows that the identity of "representative 
names" is informative in that it corresponds to stating the 
existence of the object referred to. 
Semantically, then,' the difference of "de re" and "de dicto" 
is annulled. If I know x by some description, then x should 
exist, i.e. it should have a representative name in the 
objective sense, and if I know that x exists, then I should 
know x under some dexcription, i.e. it should have a repre-
sentative name in the subjective sense. 
2 8 
Thomas Baldwin finds the modality of "necessary" unproblematic 
as interpreted transparently; he constructs a semantic system 
TL which has as an axiom: "Neo p" is true in L iff NecCp" is 
true in L) . But this introduces "Nec" into the meta-language 
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and imposes a too strong criterion on semantics ("these sen-
29 
tences have these meanings" ): all identities turn out to be 
necessary. Another approach could be to treat "Nec" as a 
property of propositions (and then we write NEC). This should 
mean: "Nec p" is true in L iff NEC(ref("that p" ,L)) , where L 
is a given language and ref ("that p",L) = that n; latin letters 
being variables of the object language and Greek ones variables 
of the meta-language. But even in this latter case identities 
again turn out to be necessary and we have the following formula 
as an axiom: Ref ("that p" ,1) = that n NEC(that refC'that p",/,) = 
= that u) . The reason is that "Talk of propositions, therefore, 
is sheer nonsense unless it is taken for granted that, for the 
things of which propositions are functions, all identities are 
necessary". Formally: 
(9) a = 0 (that = that 4>B) 
(10) a = B (that NEC (that <|ia) = NEC (that 0B)) 
(11) a = B NEC(that o = 6).30 
So both arguments render useless a difference between "de re" 
and "de dicto"; even a linguistic conception of the modality of 
"necessary" canno£ do without the "de re" assumption: 
(x) (x=a -> Nec (x=a) ) . So a "de dicto" statement is always 
dependent on a "de re" assumption with respect to those en-
tities the "de dicto" statement is about.. But this criterion 
is clearly inapplicable to epistemic contexts because "the 
semantic theory must be regarded as giving a priori analytic 
truths about part of the structure of language."3''' And then, 
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it will only account for epistemic contexts if the relevant 
speakers were expected to have a thorough knowledge of all 
the inferences of what they know. And this may be our conclu-
sion, too; a semantic system should either psotulate a conver-
tibility thesis or do without it completely and consider epis-
temic contexts opaque. But while we accept his conclusion about 
semantic systems, we cannot accept that every epistemic context 
is, therefore, a priori opaque. (Contexts of "necessary" have 
been thought of as opaque, too, but they relied on correspon-
ding transparent explanations.) 
The claim of considering epistemic contexts "de re" i.e. 
transparent was put forward by Tyler Surge in his paper "3elief 
32 
DE RE". His basic argument is that there are cases when a 
belief "de re" cannot be converted into a corresponding belief 
"de dicto". He is for a shift of perspective on "de re" attitu-
des. Though this shift is due to a philosophical assumption on 
his part that perceptual contact should be favoured against a 
conceptual description, though "perceptual contact is, of 
course, not present in every "de re" belief." But clearly, 
there are cases when "there will often be no term or individual 
concept in the believer's set of beliefs about the relevant 
object which denotes that object."33 "De re" beliefs have, 
then, a contextual, non-conceptual aspect, and they are 
necessary to individuate the object. So to vindicate the 
priority of the modality "de re" we can conclude "that 'de re' 
belief sentences are not definable in terms of 'de dicto' 
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sentences" and it is "equally potent against the view that 
for every 'de re' belief there is an accompanying 'de dicto' 
belief that fully individuates the object the 'de re' belief 
34 
is about." Now, we arrived at a clear explication of the 
failure of the convertibility thesis and, moreover, it is put 
forward not withinaa semantics - which, as we have seen, would' 
be paradoxical - but within, if not a pragmatics, at least an 
extra-linguistic framework. This means that not only the 
referential-attributive distinction but that of "de re" -
"de dicto" is a pragmatic one. Otherwise we could not help 
thinking that all instances of "de re" would be convertible 
into "de dicto", which is clearly false. 
To conclude our review of the semantic treatments of the 
convertibility thesis we would like to mention some interesting 
cases when the convertibility is by no means possible (at least 
not semantically); 
a./ as it is known, one of the criteria of reading a context 
"de re" is substitution of identical, terms; but there are some 
constructions that resist substitution and still they are to F- ^ 
be read "de re"; e.g. in "Alfred believes that the man in the 
corner is a spy" the description "the man in the corner" can 
be thought of as both specifying the referent (and so suggest-
ing a "de re" reading) and characterizing the believer's 
conception of him (and so being a "de dicto" belief), while 
substitution fails with respect to the believer's set of 
beliefs about the denoted person.35 
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b./ proper names are said to induce "de re" modalities; but 
with some ordinary proper names and even with some vacuous 
ones we have purely "de dicto" belief attributions; more often, 
when used with a demonstrative that can even be implicit in 
the given name, it can be taken under some description suggesting 
a "de dicto" reading: e.g. in "A believes ̂ that Pegasus was a 
real horse", "Pegasus" is "that Pegasus" (whichever one we are 
36 
talking about)"; 
c./ a belief "de re" is said to pick out a unique individual; 
but from what we have said in connection with the first example 
(a.) it follows that a "de re" context may have different free 
variables as referents: i.e. "contextually difference uses of 
names (or demonstratives) which refer to a given entity may 
succeed ... in producing different belief contexts"; 
d./ within a semantic framework, we have seen, it is generally 
required that for every "de re" there should be a corresponding 
"de dicto"; but there are cases when there is no such "de 
dicto": e.g. "the present moment", "the ball in the sky" and 3 8 
other examples of time-space coordinates can show the idea; 
e./ "de re" is needed to give an account for cases when there 
is no uniquely specific way of referring or when there is 
misdescription of the referent or shifts of perspective, and 
this is one reason why rigid designation is considered neces-
sary; but this may not make manifest the difference between 
"de re" and "de dicto" for there can.be misdescription with 
definite description i.e. with "de dicto" Specification: e.g. 
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an Englishman may say that the next president of the House of 
Representatives of the United States Congress will be from a 
southern state; then if he said so before Sam Rayburn became 
the speaker of the House, the Englishman would not have been 
referring to Sam Rayburn, though he intended to refer to the 
speaker of the House even if there is no particular person to 
whom he was referring; so this should be a case of opaque 
reference (a "de dicto" specification) with misdescription, 
although there is not possible a corresponding "de re" reading: 
to refer opaquely the believer does not need to recognize that 
the description he uses uniquely denotes the x he intends to 
* 4- 39 refer to; 
f./ finally the strongest reason against any analytic converti-
bility thesis may be the following: even if a description is 
uniquely specifying it may not allow existential generaliza-
tion; but what if we have n uniquely defining descriptions 
specifying the same referent? - or how many uniquely defining 
descriptions do we need to justify a "de re" reading": e.g. 
the police know an almost infinite number of uniquely specifying 
predicates with respect to the Ripper of Hampshire and still a 
"de re" convertibility was not allowed. 
So much for counter-examples; we think they clearly explain 
why only a pragmatic account of convertibility seems possible. 
But then the "de re" - "de dicto" distinction amounts to the 
40 
same as the referential-attributive one. So if we are going 
to explain the "de re" - "de dicto" distinction - which has 
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long been considered as a semantic problem - pragmatically it 
may seem that we should exclude the "de dicto" reading from 
the cases of reference. But already at this point of our 
analysis we have to emphasize that it is the possibility of 
the conversion that is the source of reference..Even an 
attributive use may be referring but it then presupposes the 
possibility of "de re" reading and its success will be context-
dependent. That means that a modal context such as (1) may be 
referring, but not necessarily, to the x fully specified by the 
context of (2); (1) presupposes a multiplicity of possible 
conversions, which, in turn, depend on the intention of the 
speaker. 
It is David S. Schwarz who gives a pragmatic account of 
41 
the convertibility. In "Naming and Necessity" he argues for 
a shift of perspective with respect to some over-discussed 
semantic problems. In his analysis semantics becomes reduced 
to being conversationally implicated by a total communicative 
act. All semantic problems become at once pragmatic: "What 
the pragmatic treatment does do, however, is to remove these 
concerns from the proper domain of the semantics for language 
- instead treating them as problems in explicating the proposi-42 
tions speakers express." He uses two terms (also Quinean) : 
notional and relational specification. But they reflect the 
same difference as transparent vs opaque, or "de re" vs "de 
dicto"; 
(12) There is someone John thinks is a spy 
(13) (3x) (John believes x is a spy) 
(14) John thinks that George is a spy 
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(15) John thinks (3x) (x is a spy) . 
What Schwarz does later in his book is similar to Plantlnga's 
treatment: his intention is to define relational belief 
(belief "de re") (12) and (13) in terms of notional (belief "de 
dicto") (14) and (15) . But as he is going to give a pragmatic 
account of convertibility he can avoid introducing possible 
worlds and other semantic entities. A first attempt to explain 
relational in terms of notional can have the following result 
when formulated: 
(16) [(3P) (Tr(P,b) and John B rthe P i s f 1 ] ] + C 4 3 
where P is a property that is true (Tr) of an object b, i.e. 
it is uniquely specifying and John has the notional belief 
t1^...1), while C stands for a non-notional link between John 
and the object b (e.g. a direct perceptual contact). So for-
mulated as a weak theory of reference, Schwarz can do without 
the thesis that there is a causal relation between the object 
b and a given person, John (unless it is C that specifies). 
Though this does not exclude rigid reference but the conditions 
of rigidity will be pragmatically presupposed: rigid reference 
is needed just because there is no way always to specify the 
referent relationally. So, notional specification (and notional 
belief respectively) is in need of a relational one, and this 
is just what Bürge claimed. Then, the pragmatic theory of 
reference can be explicated within a Gricean framework: 
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(17) (3/5) (3P^) {Tr.{P1,r) and S uttered X M-intending 
(3P2) (Tr (Pg, the P^) and A to think r(3P)(3P3) 
(Tr(P3, the P2) and (i) Corr (S, X, the P ) 
and (ii) S thinks rthe P ; has F 1) ) or C,1 or C^ ) 
44 
or C 
where A is an audience, Pj ... P and F are predicates, r is 
the referent of which the given predicates are true (Tr), 
Corr(S, X, the P^) expresses a correlation between the speaker 
(S) and the utterance (X) and a given predicate (P.), and 
«-intention is short for: (i) S intends by X to produce a 
response r in A, (ii) S intends A to recognize (i), (iii) S 
intends /i's fulfilment of (ii) to be part of 4's reason for 
fulfilling (i). This account is valid even for cases when the 
terms (uniquely applying predicates) in which the speaker and 
the audience think of a given object do not overlap and though 
there is a successful reference. The descriptions with respect 
to the speaker and to the audience need not be the same because 
referring is reduced to the speaker's intention and to its 
recognition by the audience. Vihat is important relative to our 
argument is that - in most.cases - the speaker is expected to 
specify his object relationally during the conversation, but 
generally he (and the audience, too) thinks of it in a notional 
way. This shows the difference in a logical analysis of epis-
temological attitudes and communication. As our prior aim is 
' 1 
to account for a communicative act, i.e. a pragmatic definition 
of "secret", we are - with Schwarz - in favour of a relational 
0 
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treatment of belief, and because of not having special detectors » 
to examine the speaker's or the audience's mind we account for 
notional specification as a kind of conversational implicature. 
4. Secret and the convertibility thesis 
What are the consequences of such a pragmatic approach to 
the usual semantic problems? How are they related to our argu-
ment? In the following way: the convertibility of relational 
into a corresponding notional specification is by no means 
always possible. We as speakers cannot make manifest every 
time all our notional terms and so we cannot but fall back on 
specifying the referent relationally. 
This is also a valid counter-argument to the thesis of proper 
names as disguised descriptions. Though naturally we cannot 
do completely without them, in spite of escaping their abundan-
ce in ordinary conversation with specifying relationally. In 
the case of secret it is these uniquely applying predicates 
that are highly relevant. What is then the criterion of con-
vertibility? - simply a Richness Condition of many uniquely 
defining descriptions pragmatically presupposed. If this con-
dition is not fulfilled, then the utterance containing a 
corresponding relational specification will be - according to 
Schwarz - unhappy. This unhappiness should be due to the 
speaker's uncooperativeness, or irony, or not being sincere, 
etc. One possible way to define convertibility more precisely 
is to say that there should be at least two loci in a given 
dossier D of uniquely applying predicates relative to a given 
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object, and these two loci are believed (presumed, known, etc.) 
by the speaker and the audience respectively. Furthermore, they 
should not be trivially instantiated, i.e. they should neither 
logically nor epistemológically imply one another; e.g. to go 
on to specify relationally the murderer of the president you 
have to have at least two clear pieces of evidence (1) his 
having been seen by someone at the time of the murder and (ii) 
the recognition that the gun, which killed the president, is 
his. Then, if you know that he is the person d (i.e. the two 
predicates are uniquely true of him), you can make a valid 
conversion of p(d/x) into p (d=x). From this it results clearly 
that in the case of secret it is just the prohibition of this 
conversion which is relevant. The prohibition of converting a 
notional belief into a corresponding relational one, i.e. (18) 
into (19) and (20) into (21): 
(18) John thinks that the tallest man in Dallas is a 
murderer 
(19) John thinks Oswald is a murderer (which is the 
some as "John thinks of Oswald that is a murderer) 
(20) John thinks (3a;) (x is a murderer) 
(21) (3x) John thinks (x is a murderer). 
If in an ordinary conversation it is the speaker's coopera-
tlveness that makes a relative utterance happy, in the case 
of secret we mean just that the speaker is intentionally 
uncooperative. This realizes a conversation in which certain 
pragmatic presuppositions are unfulfilled. This uneasiness. 
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which is felt when the speaker and the audience specify their 
object relationally in spite of thinking of it notionally, Is 
conveyed by a condition that Schwarz and others impose on or-
dinary conversation and we think that it is residual of a 
semantic claim about these pairs of notions we have been 
examining for so long - a condition saying that every notional 
specification is at once relational, too. Though it certainly 
44 
need not be rigid. We hold that this condition is very 
reasonable as far as ordinary conversation is concerned; it 
was just the basic criterion why a semantic account could 
have been given. But there is a relative difference between 
a semantic and a pragmatic formulation of the same problem: 
while in semantics such an assumption appears to be a norma-
tive ideal and obscures the point why, on what criteria, a 
conversion is possible, not considering that these criteria 
might change from case to case, in pragmatics such a condition 
reflects an intention of the audience (or the speaker) to go 
on to specify relationally in spite of not having adequate 
evidence, in spite of not knowing whether the corresponding 
descriptions are uniquely defining and even if some of Quine's 
theses are then violated. To see clearly the interdependence of 
notional and relational specification we allude to Castañeda's 
similar wording of the same idea: "the only uniquely defining 
descriptions believed by the speaker to be had by the subject 
of the proposition is not made known" and so "shared beliefs may 45 not correspond with respect to (an object) 0". But this time 
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the conclusion is different: the lack of notional specification 
makes a proposition opaque for we do not know in what terms a 
thinks óf B even if the proposition is referentially transpa-
rent. This new sense of "opaque" i.e. "propositionally opaque" 
comes to mean just the lack of any "de dicto" reading; while 
Burge, Schwarz and others prefer a relational specification, 
a "de re" reading to a corresponding notional "de dicto" one. 
Castañeda is in favour of the latter so that it makes possible 
a relative clarification of the terms we think of concerning 
the same individuals. For this reason he is concerned with indi-
rect speech, i.e. with reported propositional attitudes, the 
iteration of epistemic contexts. But this does not make any 
difference with respect to the speaker and the audience because 
the logical relations, the lack of overlapping predicates, the 
need for relational specification, etc. - that hold between 
them are the sames as those that hold between the reporter and 
the person whose propositional attitude is being reported. So 
what we have here is that again convertibility appears to be 
imposed on ordinary communication and reflects the interrela-
tedness of a conceptual and a non-conceptual approach to the 
universe. And we may choose which to prefer between the two 
ways with the philosophical background that motivates our 
choice. We do not want to judge once and for all the age-old 
battle of nominalists and realists; according to us the real 
problem is that we cannot describe what a relational ("de re") 
specification is for as soon as we are doing this we inevitably 
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fall back on a notional ("de dicto") definition of the object; 
just for this reason a relational specification can never be 
made manifest but only presupposed. It is the possibility of 
a conversion that matters: the possibility that we are speaking 
of the right individuals. In this framework "secret" refers to 
the interrelatedness of these two ways of specification, to 
the finding of the right individuals figuring in our universe 
46 
of discourse in our actual world but at the same time it 
alludes to the in-adequetaness of the search. 
In connection with the idea that every notional specifi-
cation is also relational, we have to deal with another argu-
ment which seems to contradict our original thesis about the 
three modal contexts to be defined as the conditions of "sec-
ret" and which seems to be even counter-intuitive to the con-
vertibility thesis, too. It runs as follows: though a concep-
tual framing of the universe is very important and has a 
crucial role in conversation, every such notional specifica-
tion can be embedded in a non-notional one (in other words it 
can be indexical). This is the idea of a symmetrical universe. 
But it says no more than there is in Bürge's paper about the 
priority of a "de re" attitude which is strongly based on 
perceptual contact. Then if non-notional specification is 
irreducible to a notional one, it might seem that the diffe-
rence between our contexts of (1) and (2) evaporates, for in 
cases of certain objects, ways of doing something, moments of 
time or place such as a hidden sword, a method of making gold, 
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the.time of meeting in a cave, etc. considered as secret, a 
notional and a corresponding relational specification cannot j. 
be distinguished (i.e. a direct perceptual contact is strongly 
needed). This is reflected in the relative grammatical con-
struction: to express such an idea in many languages a dif-
ferent verb is used, while in English it is the construction 
"know + direct Object" that shows the difference in meaning.47 
This is the case that Russell preferred for his logically 
proper names. But "we need not know the individuals when jud-
ging them: it need not be about a particular person" and "even 
if judging them we may do it on basis of (descriptive) 'knowing 
4 8 
who/what' not only of 'knowing him' (demonstrative)" ; i.e. we 
may know what the hidden sword is like, or we may know (guess) 
many things about making gold even without knowing that the 
prescriptions we know allude to a possible way of making it, 
or we may know that the meeting is on Saturday but we may not 
know-at what hour precisely, or we may know that the cave is in 
that forest but not know which path leads to it, etc. So there 
can always be certain parts of the given object, which are 
thought of as "not known", i.e. as "secret", that can be 
adequately or not, conceptualized, i.e. associated with uniquely 
applying predicates (even if they may contain a deictic 
element). So our original difference between the epistemic 
contexts of (1) and (2) can be preserved. This concludes our 
argument about the validity of conditions of convertibility. 
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5. Secret as a system of rules of communication 
When defining the epistemological conditions we have seen 
that the secret can never be equated with a given state of 
affairs or with propositions referring to them (i.e. with 
(3a;) (x killed the president)) but only with their embedding 
in a modal context (i.e. (3x) ~ (x killed the president)); 
this means that the secret cannot be considered as an entity 
but rather as a system of conditions and rules that govern 
the human activity of knowing and communicatingvThis governing 
mechanism will now be analyzed. 
The interrelatedness of conditions and rules means that 
every definable set of conditions determines certain applicable 
rules and conversely, every set of rules pragmatically presup-
poses certain conditions. With our three modal contexts we have 
given a semantic framework theory as a normative ideal. But as 
we have argued, it is strongly dependent on the total communi-
cative act which turns on the possibility of a pragmatic 
definition of convertibility. So it is this pragmatic possibi-
lity, and sometimes constraint, that makes our semantic system, 
valid and especially the existential generalization in the 
contexts (naturally the use of "to know" adds to this possibi-
lity) . If now, we substitute our variables a, b and o with 
their corresponding class-terms A, B and C, two different 
schemes of communicaton can be described: 
(22) ADDRESSER = A or Bj MESSAGE = (3x)p(d/x); ADDRESSEE = C 
(23) ADDRESSER = B; MESSAGE = (3x)p(d=x); ADDRESSEE = A or C. 
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The first scheme gives a rule which strengthens the function 
of secret within a community because it increases the number 
of those who know about the secret but who do not know the 
solution to it. This rule converts the elements of C into B. 
The second scheme gives a rule which annihilates the function 
of secret because it increases the number of those who also 
know the solution to it. So this rule converts the elements 
of A or C into B. More specific rules can be obtained by 
restricting in diverse ways the numbers of the classes, A, B 
and C. If A = o , B = 1, C = n, we have a borderline case: 
secrets of-diaries, private affairs, which are known only by 
those whom it concerns. Many say that we'can speak about 
secret if and only if B = 2, while according to others it is 
just the rule that prescribes that B should contain two 
elements what destroys any possible concept of "secret" because 
it violates the basic requirement of "secret": i.e. "Do not 
tell it to anyone!" But this approach neglects class A which, 
in fact, turns out to be the most important with respect to 
the function of secret; so the minimal necessary rule (or set 
of rules) should be the following: A = 1, B = 7-, C = n, or 
perhaps the weaker: A=l,B=o,C=n. What for us is the 
most important is that A = o and C = o cannot be conceded at 
the same time. Naturally the relative position of A, B and C 
may change from moment to moment: with the starting of commu-
nication individuals may shift from one class into another. 
This process may strengthen with the going-on of time, thus 
making it possible to define different sequences of triads of 
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contexts. This means that the contexts are time-related but 
only with respect to the individuals they contain in their 
scope, i.e. with respect to diverse types of instantiation, 
while their logical structure remains the same. 
Now we can try to incorporate the pragmatic feature of 
convertibility into our system of rules; then the first scheme 
would need some reformulation on the basis of the weak theory 
of referring explicated by Schwarz; we can say something like 
this: 
(24) OA) (3Pj) (Tr(P1,d) and S uttered x M-intending 
r (3P2) {Tr (F2, the P^) and A to think r(3F)(3P3) 
(Tr(P3, the Pg) and (i) Corr {S, X, the P3) and 
(ii) S does not think rthe P has f"1 ) ) or C J* or 
6 «5 
C * ) or C2. 
This means that the relevant information (P^) is withheld but 
not because it is conversationally implicated - as it is the 
case with the Richness Condition - for it is the speaker's 
intention to make A believe that he (the speaker) does not 
himself possess the relevent information; e.g. if "d is the P 
and ff rthe P. is a murderer"1" then it should entail "Nec ii is i 
[a: is a murderer]", where "N vs Nec" is a transcript for "notional 
vs relational necessity", but the speaker withholds P^ that 
should be needed for specifying d relationally (and generalizing 
4 9 
it existentially). The presence of "necessary" naturally 
does not influence the validity of our argument: it just 
indicates that there is a possible way of explaining necessity 
pragmatically as the inevitability of conversion. 
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The consequence of all this is that during a type of 
communication described in (22) and (24) two intentions 
collide: while the speaker, in contrast to the ordinary commu-
nicative situation, does not intend A to specify the referent 
relationally due to lack of the necessary information, the 
audience, wanting to fulfill the requirement imposed on ordinary 
communication with respect to A himself, intends to go on to 
specify the referent relationally and expects S to intend A 
himself to do so and expect S further to communicate the 
necessary information needed for a valid conversion. The 
collision of the two intentions is then due to the uncoopera-
tiveness of the speaker. While the speaker has changed his 
attitude with respect to the ordinary communicative situa-
tion, the audience does not recognize this; but then the 
opposite is also possible: the speaker remains faithful to the 
ordinary requirements of communication, but the audience does 
not do accordingly; he changes his attitude, now, and presuppo-
ses that S has violated another maxim of Grice, namely the maxim 
of Quality: A thinks that the necessary information, the uniquely 
applying predicate P. has been in fact communicated by S but it/he it 
does not define uniquely the referend d. Again two intentions 
collide but just in the opposite way as they do in the previous 
case. Then, there is the natural situation, when the two inten-
tions correspond; this is called ordinary communication; and 
there is the unnatural situation when the two intentions cannot 
collide because both the speaker and-the audience have changed 
- 317 -
their attitudes; this is the case of communication without 
mutual understanding so that it can hardly be called commu-
nication anymore, at least with respect to the referents of 
what the communication should be about. The pragmatics of 
"secret" then describe a situation that is mid-way between a 
normal communication and an abnormal one. The other scheme (23) 
then corresponds to a normal communicative situation and can 
be reformulated as the weak theory of reference. 
Concluding our whole argument, we can sum it up in that 
secret turns always on some kind of identity being known or not 
Identity statements have long been considered necessary, the 
fact of which, in turn, destroyed all attempts to formulate an 
epistemic logic just because there could easily be found cases 
when the speakers failed to have such ideal knowledge. We have 
seen that this failure is due to there being some pragmatic 
prohibition of convertibility of "de dicto" into "de re" or 
notional into relational. This is what the explication of the 
concept of "secret" can amount to: But then there may not be 
any logical failure in many semantic systems because the problem 
just lies elsewhere. It is in the interrelatedness of our concep 
tual and referential universe.50 And from this secret can also 
gain its force. 
- 318 -
6. Secret and literature 
In this section we would like to use these ideas in an 
analysis of narrative texts. The starting point could be the 
time relatedness of modal contexts (1), (2) and (3). Then one 
can define on every narrative text a sequence of triads of 
contexts with respect to the characters that figure in the 
text. These triads should correspond to states of affairs and 
each triad could be described with the relative configuration 
of A, B and C. One basic difficulty would be the selection of 
a crucial proposition to be embedded in the modal contexts. It 
seems that any selection would be ambiguous because it would 
involve a kind of interpretation as the chosen proposition is 
to be superimposed on the whole semantic structure of the text. 
At present this is really inevitableSurely there could be 
defined other indicators to make valid our selection. But at 
this present time we do not wish to go into this problem. Let 
it suffice that now.the definition of the triads of contexts is 
in principle possible. Then there is another aspect that may 
turn out more relevant; the abstract semantic description of 
the contexts - as we have stated - depends on some converti-
bility thesis but that can be given only within a pragmatic 
framework. This amounts to the description of the total 
communicative act. But soon we will see that it is not enough; 
the convertibility thesis is not important only for an abstract 
semantics but is perhaps more important for a corresponding 
logic of actions that defines certain states in the same given 
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text. What the convertibility thesis can do is to relate to 
each other the two kinds of sequence of states, that of modal 
contexts and that of actions. This correlation is based on 
strategies; to describe it we have to introduce game-theore-
tical elements into our analysis, though they have long been 
implied by our approach, which is similar to Hintikka's model 
set constructions. Now, the only thing we have to do is to give 
a game-theoretical definition of quantifiers: it is Hintikka's 
rule (G.E) which runs as follows: "If G is of the form (3x)Go, 
I choose a member of D, give it a name, say '«' (if it did 
not have one before). The game is continued with respect to 
G o(nA)." 5 1 
Where D is a domain of individuals, G is a substitution-
instance of a subformula of F. This is called "instantiation". 
Naturally nothing guarantees that our choice was correct. We 
may not have chosen the proper individual and then we may lose. 
So this rule can be correlated with our contexts (1), namely 
the situation when different persons, say a, guess who the 
murderer could have been without having adequate evidence. If 
our instantiation is correct and we win, then we can be corre-
lated with the context of (2). This can be the game-theoretical 
interpretation of (3x)p(d/x) and (3x)p(d=x) on an abstract 
semantic level. At the beginning of the game our chosen in-
dividual n need not be d, i.e. we may be wrong, just because 
the relevant information is withheld; we have to take a risk; 
but though we might violate the convertibility thesis - and 
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this is what often happens in the cases of secrets - our 
strategy, by which we have chosen the individual n, will 
determine our strategy, by which we perform an action; i.e. if 
we are reasonable beings - and this is really a restriction on 
our analysis - our logic of action depends on how we instantiate 
into given variables of propositons. Then it means that the 
strategy of action will be a function of the strategy of 
instantiation. Naturally the chosen individual need not be a 
particular individual. Still if it is one, it need not be the 
right one with respect to the given contexts; but then there 
seems to be no need for possible worlds to explain reference 
to non-actual individuals, for it is the multiplicity of 
strategies that can explain awáy the cases of referring to 
individuals which do not exist, presupposing that the conver-
tibility thesis has been violated. This completes our tentative 
account of cases when possible but non-actual objects are being 
referred to within a pragmatic framework; the failure of the 
Barcan formula is not due to a semantic paradox (that there 
exists a possible but non-actual object) but rather to having 
chosen a wrong strategy of instantiation though it is the 
end-point of the search, the actual finding of the individual 
that decides whether we are wrong. But let us look at an 
example. It is taken from a well-known criminal story but we 
think that.this does not imply any restriction on the applica-
bility of the theory. So, we are in the last but one scene of 
"Ten Little Niggers"; there are only two still living, a man 
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and a woman. 
The logic of action prescribes that the man should shoot the 
woman and then commit suicide. And he does so accordingly. 
But in the film based on the book he does not shoot. What are 
the differences and how can we account for his actions? The 
problem can be formulated as follows: in the above described 
part of the sequence of triads" of contexts we have to consider 
two individuals; the selection of the corresponding proposi-
tion seems to be manifest: it is (3a;) (x killed eight persons) , 
i.e. (ax)p(x). If the relative section of the sequence is i, 
then in the i-l-th section both individuals (let them be a^ and 
a2 respectively) belonged to class A. In the i-th section the 
man (a^) has moved into class B because he thinks of her as a 
murderer (a2) . Therefore, he shoots. Then if his strategy, with 
which he makes the instantiation of x as a^, is then his 
strategy, with which he acts is a function of 5, i.e. <f> (£) . 
Then at the end of the book, in the i+l-th section of the 
sequence, a^ changes his strategy and makes another instan-
tiation of x as i.e. he. thinks himself to be the murderer 
(here we can see how "illogical" someone's conversion into 
relational specification can be). Then, if his new strategy 
is n, his other strategy, according to which he should commit 
suicide, will be a function of it: <f> (n) - However in the film 
another thing happens: he does not shoot the woman; but just 
because his strategy of instantiation of x as a w i l l be 
substituted by another one, say a strategy according to 
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which x should be instantiated as an whoever particular person 
a n be: then, his strategy not to shoot the woman will be 4>(C). 
This means that they both remain in class A in the ¿-th section 
of the sequence. There is neither a correct nor an incorrect 
identity of individuals to be presumed. The corresponding game 
is not played to the end. This short example conveys our idea 
about the role of secret in narrative texts. As a conclusion 
we try to give the complete modal contextual analysis of a 
text, which this time will be a play, namely Racine's Phedre. 
Our approach is the same as that described above, though 
naturally the situation is more complicated with more indivi-
duals involved and even with different kinds of secret to be 
defined.. We consider the play well-known and are not going to 
re-tell its story. We restrict ourselves only to indicating 
the relevent modal triads and the strategies. A single triad 
will be called the i-th section of the sequence. If Theseus = 
= a, Phaedra = b, Hippolytus = e> Aricia = d, Oinone - e, 
Theramenes = f, Ismene = g, the secret can be defined as the 
following sentence: Phaedra loves Hippolytus and Hippolytus 
loves Aricia and Aricia loves Hippolytus; the last conjunct 
could be ommited because it will not change the course of 
analysis which, though, would in turn be too complicated (we 
do not want to deny that it may be as important as the others 
in the whole structure of the play). Another reason for this 
can be that within the play the relation of a and d as 
instantiated in "y loves z" is symmetrical. The formulation 
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of the above sentence can be something like this: (3a;) (3y) (3a) 
• (x loves y and y loves z and z loves y) , i.e. (3x) (3y) (3z)p(x, 
y, a), while its embedding in a modal context would result in: 
(3rc) (3x) (3y) (32) (Knp(b/x, o/y, d/z), though there are other 
ways to construct it depending on the person's (n) proposi-
tional attitude. Then we postulate that to belong to class b 
the given individual n should make all instantiations correctly, 
otherwise he will belong to class A or C. Then the three modal 
context are the following: 
(25) (3i)(3x) Oy)(3s)[K^p (b/x, o/y, d/z) and ~ K^plb^x, 
o=y, d=z)] 
(26) (3j) Ox) (By) (3b) [X .p (b/x, o/y, d/z) and K.p(b=x, 
J 0 
o-y , d=z)] 
(27) (3h) (3x) (3y) (3z) ~ Khp(b/x, o/y, d/z). 
An arbitrary section will be S^, while the whole sequence is 
SE. It the first section is S ̂ , then our analysis will begin 
always with S^-l section. The relative configuration of each 
section will be indicated first, and then the differenc stra-
tegies which are chosen by the individuals i, 3 and h. Then a 
rough scheme of SE of Racine's play can be given as follows: 
5-7 A = b, o 
B - o 
C = a, d, e, f, n 
Then, b and o COMMUNICATE their instantiatioir-propositipn to 
their confidantes, and so there results 
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A = b, a, e, f 
B = a 
C = a, d, g 
Then, b COMMUNICATES to a and then, c COMMUNICATES to d their 
instantiation-propositions, and so there results 
52 A = b, e, f, (g) 
B = Cy d 
C = a 
Then, b COMMUNICATES to a the instantiation-proposition 
suggested to her by e, so there results 
53 A - a, b, e, f, 
B = a, d 
C = o 
Then, if a's strategy to instantiate is 5, <fi(C) is to send 
his son away (who dies); if o's strategy to instantiate is £, 
<f> (C) is to obey his father; if d's strategy to instantiate is 
(the same as c*s, they know the same), $(£) is also the same: 
to go into exile; plus: e COMMUNICATES to b her instantiation-
proposition (suggested by a through a, i.e. there is a chain 
of communication), and so there results 
54 A = a, f, (g) 
B - b, a, d, e 
C - o 
Then, if the strategy of b to instantiate is 5, the i|i(£) is 
to commit suicide; but first she COMMUNICATES to a her 
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instantiation-proposition and so there results. 
S6 A = if), (g) 
B = a, (b), (a), (e) 
C = o. 
Naturally this is not the complete analysis of the strategies; 
we indicated those which are in close connection with the 
semantic strategies of instantiation. There are certain simplifi-
cations in the scheme for we have not defined all modal contexts 
with respect to all the possible different configurations of 
the elements of A , B and C; it could have been done on the 
basis of atomic propositions, i.e. if we had treated every 
single communicative act of every individual as a rule for new 
triad-construction; but this might have caused useless 
complications. The individuals in brackets are either dead in 
the section they figure ox it is difficult to define their 
epistemic contexts at that point of the sequence for there is 
no reference about them in the text. Though there are strategies 
that are the same as they are dependent on the same ways of 
instantiation, there is no reason a priori that the same 
strategy of instantiation determines the same strategy of 
action for there may be other determinents to be considered. 
Now, we only wanted to show one-to-one correlations of stra-
tegies. From the above scheme it is clear that there is no 
essential difference between a strategy (and an act, respecti-
vely) of communicating a proposition and a strategy (and an 
act) in the strict sense of the word. In the play, though, 
there is a turning point when the communicative acts switch 
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over into a series of "real" acts. But their logic remains 
the same, and this much can be the final conclusion: that 
the logic of communication and the logic of action are too 
interwoven to be treated distinctly in that they both are 
functions of semantic strategies of instantiation. 
Notes 
1 Their interrelatedness and contrast will be the object' of 
our forthcoming analysis; the previous is conceptual, while 
the latter is pragmatic. ' 
2 
James A. H. Murray, Henry Bradley et alii (eds.): The Oxford 
English Dictionary, vol. IX., Clarendon Press, Oxford (1961) 
pp. 357-358. 
3 An item of information is minimal if it informs us about 
the existence of ah object, and it is maximal (or adequate) 
if it also accounts for the reasons of its existence. 
4 Cf. Searle (1969) pp. 4-12. 
5 To make a distinction between semantics and pragmatics, 
nowadays, seems to be very problematic; we do not want to 
delineate exactly their proper domain but to indicate some 
relations of semantic terms and their pragmatic applica-
bility. . 
6 In Strawson (1971). 
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7 Hintikka (1973) p. 137. 
8 Cf. Merrill (1978). 
9 Cf. Walker (1975). 
1 0 Cf. McLane (1979). 
1 1 Merrill (1978) p. 321. 
12 
Although we do not want to deny one of the fundamental 
theorems of epistemic logic, namely that from "knowing 
that p" it follows that "p is true". 
1 3 Cf. Baldwin (1975). 
1 4 Hintikka (1973) p. 49. 
1 5 The concept of end-points of search parallels Rusell's 
concept of logically proper names, i.e. it presupposes 
the possibility of getting acquainted with the objects 
as the referents of the terms. 
^ A "de re" reading corresponds to an existential generali-
zation: cf. Hintikka-Carlson (1979). 
1 7 Cf. Hughes-Cresswell (1968) pp. 170-188. 
1 8 Linsky (1971) p. 27. 
1 9 Cf. Baldwin (1975). 
2 0 Cf. Plantinga (1974) pp. 248-251. 
2 1 Cf. Plantinga (1969) and (1974). 
2 2 Plantinga (1974). p. 30. 
2 3 Plantinga (1974) p. 26. 
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2 4 Plantinga (1974) p. 63. 
25 
These are the views of Hintikka and Smullyan; cf. 
Plantinga (1974) pp. 231-233. 
2 6 Plantinga (1969) p. 253. 
2 7 Cf. Eberle (1974) . 
2 8 Cf. Baldwin (1975) pp. 84-87. 
2 9 Baldwin (1975) p. 84. 
3 0 Baldwin (1975) pp. 86-87. 
3 1 Baldwin (1975) p. 104. 
3 2 Cf. Bürge (1977). 
3 a Bürge (1977) p. 352. 
3 4 Bürge (1977) p. 353. 
3 5 Cf. Bürge (1977) p. 342. 
3 6 Cf. Bürge (1977) p. 343. 
3 7 Cf. Bürge (1977) p. 344. note 7. 
3 8 Cf. Bürge (1977) p. 352. 
3 9 Cf. Ray (1980) pp. 441-443. 
4 0 Cf. Ray (1980) p. 435. 
4 1 Cf. Schwarz (1979) . 
4 2 Schwarz (1979) p. 185. 
4 3 Schwarz (1979) p. 6. 
4 4 . Schwarz (1979) p. 48. 
- 329 -
Castañeda (1977) p. 173. 
Cf. note 15. 
Some examples could be: French "savoir" vs "connaître", 
Italian "sapere" vs "conoscere", Hungarian "tud" vs 
"ismer". 
Cf. Hintikka (1974) Chapter XI. 
Cf. Schwarz (1979) p. 184. 
In other words, how far the end-point of the search can 
be foretold semantically. 
Cf. Hintikka (1973) p. 1Ô0. 
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COMPUTER ANALYSIS OF FOLK-BELIEFS 
ILDIKŐ FEHÉR 
József Attila University Szeged 
Computers are widely used today in different fields of 
the humanities, including folkloristics as well. The material 
one has at hand is immense. Such masses of data are, as one 
can guess, impossible to file manually. Computers, however, 
are ready to help, not merely with the files but also to 
discover new relationships. Although one should not expect 
wonders from applications such as these, we may have the 
promise of significant achievements, if we can formulate a 
problem in accordance with the characteristics of the machine. 
In the present paper I am going to describe two approaches 
which I have already put to the test, and which I have used 
in an attempt to ground a computer analysis of folkbeliefs. 
I ran the necessary programs as an experiment in PASCAL, on 
the R40 computer of the József Attila University Kalmár László 
Cybernetics Laboratory. 
I. Quantitative (statistical) applications 
Ethnographers describe their collected data together with 
several additional data such as the place of collection, the 
age, sex, religion, etc.of the informants (additional data 
will henceforth: be referred to as properties). Quantitative 
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summarizing of these properties can yield important results, 
for instance on the range of certain kinds of data in a given 
area (or in age groups, sexes or religious groups); we can 
further examine the existence of data occuring together, or 
occuring only in certain areas, and whether the occurence of 
the data is subject to subordination. Ethnographers have 
always done this sort of summarizing but hardly ever without 
manual labour. Machines, on the other hand, provide exact 
results within seconds after the data-input, and can even dis-
play them in a graphic way with the help of mathematical-statis-
tical methods (like frequency and correlation analysis). The 
utility of this kind of work is hardly debatable, as computers 
process only those properties of the data that are independent 
of feelings and can be described objectively. 
The most difficult and most highly responsible part of 
the work is coding, i.e. formulating the data in a way fit for 
computer processing. It is the ethnographer who decides what 
pieces of information he considers relevant describing data, 
and where to draw the line separating the different properties 
(i.e. what it is that he still includes in a property-group, 
and what it is that he does not). In the most frequently used • 
method of coding each property type corresponds with a column, 
and the possible property occurences, (within a column) with a 
sign (numbers, or number-letter combinations) 
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Eg: 1st column: Place of collection 
(within this) 01: Batya 
02: Kalocsa 
03: Dusnok 
2nd column: age of informant 
I (old) above 60 
K (middle aged) 30-60 
P (young) below 30 
3rd column: sex of informant 
F: male 
N: female 
If this cannot be done (because for example a piece of data 
has several properties of one property type), we can list the 
possible properties and put 0 against those not belonging to 
and 1 against those belonging to by the given piece of data. 
(This way of coding is not very space-economical, but is 
sometimes unavoidable.) 
The coding done, the collector transfers - if possible -
his data to some data-carrier (punched cards, magnetic tapes), 
so that he can have the machine sort out for him the data 
with given properties. Besides statistical processing the signi-
ficance of this method in terms of speed should also be appre-
ciated, as a lot of time can thus be saved in comparison with 
reading the files one by one. 
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II. Non-statistical applications 
The significance of non-statistical treatment may be more 
controversial than that of the former. Results - if any - can 
only be achieved by teamwork among experts. 
We have attempted such a novel application with a collection 
available to us, containing beliefs in connection with death. 
We examined omens of death from three areas far from each 
other. We drafted the data in a special form inspired by Minsky's 
frame-theory (2). Minsky regards as frames data-structures that 
describe stereotype situations. A frame consists of several 
parts and among other things, contains information as to the 
relationship of the frame with other frames. Below, we depart 
from Minsky's theory and will use frame in the following sense: 
(1) There are two types of frames: action type to describe 
actions, and state change type to describe changes of states. 
(2) A frame consists of the following five fields defined by 




5 possible result 
in the case of state change type: 




5 possible result 
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(3) Within either type fields 2, 3, and 4 can be further frames 
and any of the fields can stay blank. 
The belief-collection we used contains the beliefs in the 
same natural language code as they had been recorded on tapes. 
As we had to intention of examining the grammatical regularitie 
the frames thus defined were suitable for describing our data. 
Here is an example to illustrate the meaning of the 
individual fields: 




POSSIBLE RESULT: t 
FR-TYPE: -
state change 





(The first frame here is action type and its object field is 
another frame.) 
The coding looked like the following: 
The beginning of the frame is marked with a left parenthesis. 
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Then the type follows, then the fields separated by commas. If 
a field is blank, the comma is there, nevertheless. If a field 
is a further frame, it is parenthesized. End of frame is marked 
with right parenthesis. 
Our example coded: 
(action, dream, someone, (action, build, someone, house,), 
(state change,,someone,death,)) 
This formulation is apparently simple enough for coding 
belief statements quickly, and also contains sufficient 
information necessary for certain examinations. From the data 
so coded we can look up a belief e.g. on the basis of one of 
its words, or its frame-type; but also, the function of a word 
within the given belief can also be determined (e.g.: we know 
that in action type the word after the second comma after the 
initial parenthesis denotes the actor(subject)). 
The study we have done does not utilize all these possi-
bilities. We could have done well with simpler coding but our 
purpose was not to aim at results but only to illustrate 
possibilities. The way I formulated the data for storing in 
suitable for later, (and possibly better) treatment. 
Scrutinizing the data of the collection it stood out that 
some belief-statements contained "explanations" too, like 
building a house in one's dream meant death because it is 
but building a house in the other world; or if one weaves in 
a dream, she/he will die because the loom means a coffin. It 
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is obvious that the members of the "house - otherwordly-house" 
and "loom - coffin" pairs are iri some way related. This 
relation is called metonymy. Apart from this we have found 
two more sorts of relations among the words used for filling 
in the frames. One is a consequence-relation, with word-pairs, 
in which the second is the result of the first word, e.g. 
(tree) falls -+ dies. 
Semantic relation exists between words which are related by 
their meaning, e.g.: all the words (coffin, tombstone, 
priest, candle, grave, graveyard, other-world) belong to the 
same semantic field* and any two of them are semantically 
related. 
Following from this we put down all the word-pairs whose 
members were in some way related and fed them into the machine. 
A program made especially for this purpose constructed a graph 
of these connections, where angular points were the words 
used for the coding, and two vertices^ had edges between them if 
the two words represented by the vertices were in some way 
related. In such cases we labeled the edge with the relation 
type. 
e.g.: (part of the graph) 
0 
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From the point of view of application those words were considered 
relevant which did not belong to any of the following: action, 
state change, see, hear, dream, something, someone» A process, 
which fed in a belief description and picked two relevant words 
out of it, found a way between these two words in the graph 
previously constructed. First it found the first word, then 
setting out from it, started going around the graph in all 
possible ways, and displayed all routes which somehow led to 
the angular point symbolizing the other word. Thus, the essence 
of the application: with the help of the connections within the 
data we tried to find relations between the omens and their 
consequences. The result depends to a great extent on the quan-
tity and the quality of the material fed into the computer for 
the construction of the graph. Obviously, the addition of a few 
new connections to the graph may increase considerably the 
number of possible connections. In the case of a mass of data, 
the machine might give us clues to discover new relations 
which might have been difficult to trace by the human mind alone 
(not only because they are so complicated, but also because one 
has to consider to several things at the same time, to keep 
hundreds of relations in one's head and to apply them in the 
right place). The computer remembers all the relations and uses 
them at the appropriate places, too. 
The connections printed on paper should not be considered 
to be full explanations,.the less so as there are several 
different routes between two words. The ethnographer still 
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must do the lion's share of the work, examining the results 
he has obtained. These may just give him ideas how to go on. 
He can try out his own hypotheses too, seeing to what extent 
the number, length, etc, of the exploratory routes change 
after adding a new connection to or taking an old one out of 
the graph. 
A great number of possibilities exist besides those 
described above. 
Experts in different fields should work together so that 
these possibilities may be realized. 
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EVALUATION THEORY AND LITERARY THEORY 
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Introduction* 
One of the important areas of study in literary theory 
research is the characterization of literary texts. Such 
research allows the attainment of a scientific quality with 
the elimination of subjectivity: the text is replaced by a 




formalized text 4 = = (formal) 
literature theory 
Thus, there is no direct relation between the literary 
work and the reader. In contrast, the connection between the 
text and the formalized text finally contains the element of 
subjective selection, by formalizing an aspect which represents 
a value. 
The logical study of the possible fields assumes implicitly 
the consistency of the text as a value. 
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In the-present work, investigations are made with the 
aid and utilization of values. The level of science is 
attained not by regarding the values of the examiner as 
determining, but by disclosing the text - reader relation, 
taking into account both the values of the text and the 
values of the reader; instead of the above scheme, we have 
writer — text — reader 
literature theory 
Naturally, here too there is a need for the formalized 
text, but also for the formalized "reception". The formaliza-
tion is value-centred, i.e. the formalization is determined 
by the values. 
In the operations on the values, it is seen that the 
rules of logic do not hold for them. 
First, it is advantageous to exchange the dual-valued 
system for a many-valued one, and secondly to make use of the 
theory of many-valued decisions. With the introduced aggregative 
operator, it is shown that a derivation is not possible from 
classical logic. Thus, the transition of classical theories 
to the field of literature theory is only partially possible. 
Setting out from the tasks of literature theory, it is 
purposeful to construct the means. 
(Formal) literature theory renounces an essential category, 
"experience", since this can not be grasped only in the text, 
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whereas it is contained in the reader — text relation. 
Since the reception is not static, but proceeds in time, 
altered value relations arise in the reader in the course of 
the processing of the value relations of the work; these 
changes (or their recognition) may be interpreted as the basis 
of the experience. 
As a result of the strictness of its concepts, (formal) 
literature theory is completely divorced from the descriptive 
classical methods. Accordingly, literary works largely represent 
transitions between the various categories, and a characteriza-
tion must be introduced for the transitions, or the strictness 
and rigidity of the categories must be solved. Use is made of 
the connection of logic and set theory, and it is shown in this 
paper that this contradiction can be resolved with the "many-
-valued" set theory. 
The question arises as to how it is possible to determine 
and interpret values. All events may be taken into consideration 
from several aspects. Thus, there are legal, moral, religious, 
scientific, etc. aspects. These will be referred to below as 
fields (the field of morals, for instance). These values are 
in a conflicting situation, the outcome of which is the result 
of the decision. Our aim is to discover the correlations of the 
decisions and the values, without any application to the concrete 
value structures existing. 
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The fuzzy sets 
In the following an attempt is made to characterize 
decisions based on values. 
Even in the course of everyday decisions (e.g. relating 
to shopping) values are ascribed to objects. The most elementary 
form of evaluation is to carry out the characterization on 
the basis of the existence or non-existence of various properties. 
In reality, however, not only the existence of a property, but 
also the extent of its existence is determined. The true and 
false.values are succeeded by a structure of values. It is 
natural to assume that the values constitute an ordered set. 
Let us assume further that any two values (relating to the 
same property) can be compared (chain ordering). In fact, 
however, structures may occur in which not every value can be 
compared (lattice ordering). 
o e o .e 
d 
c b c 
b a 
a 
Chain and lattice ordering. 
The qualifications of the properties may be regarded as if 
we were dealing with a spectrum of logical values instead 
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of logically true and false ones (many-valued logic). This 
generalization has another advantage. A set of objects belonging' 
classical sense; the objects naturally feature with an evalua-
tion with respect to the property, and there is not boundary 
to the set, just as the set of "elderly people" is not an exact 
concept in everyday life. Thus, the classical mathematical 
concept of the set also becomes generalized. 
Classical sets may be typified via their characteristic 
functions. From the isomorphism of the operations performed 
on the set and its characteristic function: 
to the designation of a given property is not a subset in the 
1- if x e A 
0 if x £ A 
The isomorphism of the operations may be utilized to 
characteri ze inanimate sets by means of the generalized 
characteristic function (membership function): 
uA(x) : X [0,1] 
y y • 
x e old 
1 
x 
Classical and generalized characteristic 
functions 
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We shall now carry out examinations from the aspect of 
many-valued logic. This conceptual structure model is certainly 
appropriate for literature theory. 
Connectives of many-valued logic 
Many-valued logic is regarded as a generalization of dual 
logic. The principle of permanence holds for all generalized 
operations, that is if only values of 0 and 1 are used, the 
result should be the same as that obtained with dual logic, 
and should be continuous. 
It is customary to assume that a negation decreases 
strictly monotonously, and thus is order-reversing. To all 
such negations we may ascribe a neutral value v, for which 
v = v 
The negation transforms values below v to values above v, and 
conversely; by definition, v is left unchanged. The v value 
may be considered as an expectation level. 
Another two types of connectives are the "and" (A) and the 
"or" (v) (conjunctive and disjunctive operators). The operators 
are naturally monotonous according to the variables of their 
arguments. In the present work, for the sake of simplicity, 
only the strictly monotonous case is dealt with, and it is 
assumed that the arbitrary classification of the arguments 
participating in the logical operation (without a change in 
the sequence) does not alter the result, i.e. A and V are 
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associative: 
x A (y A z) = (x A y) A z 
(It is customary to use the notation x A y = c(x,y).) All 
such operators can be constructed with the aid of a generator 
function: 
x A y = r X(f c(x) + fc(y)) 




The aggregative operator The generator function of 
the conjunctive and disjunctive 
operators 
It holds for all such operators that 
x A y < min (x,y) x V y £ max (x,y) 
It may be seen that in the practical case when the 
connection of two values may lead to.a result between the 
two values, a dicision of a compromise nature is not satisfied 
by any operator. 
Since the monotonousness, associativity and continuity 
are natural restrictions, it.appeared appropriate to vary the 
permanence principle with dual logic. It may be assumed that 
the same result is given by the two different types of decision 
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relating to the properties of the object: that based on the 
goodness of the properties, and.that based on the avoidance 
of the goodness of the properties. 
x O y = x 0 y 
Such operators are termed aggregative operators, which 
can be constructed by means of a generator function: 
x * y = f"1 (f (x) + f (y)) ci Cl ci 
Generator function of the aggregative operator 
The aggregative operator is not compatible with dual 
logic, for the aggregation of 0 and 1 is not defined. 
Some properties of the aggregative operator: 
X I V = X 
x Q x = v 
i.e. the neutral value has a special role. The most interesting 
property of the aggregative operator is that if the two values 
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to be aggregated are smaller than v, then the aggregation 
functions as a conjunctive operator in the interval [0,v]. 
The aggregation of values above v is a disjunction in the 
interval [v,l]. The result is aggregative or a compromise in 
nature if the two values flank v. 
The generality of the aggregative operator 
If v = 1, then the aggregative operator is a conjunctive 
operator, and if v = 0 it is a disjunctive operator; this is 
confirmed by the shapes of the generator functions. At the 
same time, a new characterization of the logical operators 
may be given. The conjunctive operator may be applied in the 
event of a maximum expectation level. As an example, it may 
be mentioned that such a decision is involved when technical 
equipment is bought., If ideal values of all parameters are 
known, then every concrete object may possess only a poorer 
characteristic than this, i.e. the goodness of the properties 
is their less bad nature. The conjunctive operator is used in 
such cases and, in accordance with its property, the values 
are negative and hence weaken each other. (Scientific examina-
tions strive to maximize the expectation level.) For the 
disjunctive operator the expectation level does not exist. 
It is very difficult to find an example for this. However, 
analysis of a work of literature may be considered as such. 
The proposition of an expectation level is simultaneously the 
rejection of novelty and individuality, just as impressionism 
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can not be evaluated on the basis of the expectations of 
classical painting. Here only positive values exist, which 
strengthen each other. The laudatory attributes employed in 
textbooks on literature are consequences of this principle. 
It is another question that no guidance is given as to how to 
orientate in the plethora of modern works, and the students 
become sceptical. 
The most frequent decisional procedure is aggregation, 
where a lower or higher expectation level exists, but this is 
not the ideal (not conjunctive) and there is expectation (not 
disjunctive). 
The connectives can thus be derived from the aggregation, 
from a single operator (not derivable from classical logic), 
through the change of the expectation level or the transforma-
tion of the values. The logical function of the decision is 
therefore the successive application of various operators with 
neutral values. Decisions that are not "iogical" become 
interpretable. 
We next turn to the examination of another logical opera-
tion, implication. Similarly to aggregation, this can be given 
generally. 
Dual determination of the evaluation 
Works determine the values of different fields, i.e. at 
a given moment the relation to the values of the fields can 
be characterized. From the aspect of the reception, however, 
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these fields are of different importance as concerns the rele-
vance of their own existence. For just this reason, the evalua-
tions of the work are transformed during the reception, and 
the receiver performs operations on these transformed values. 
It may readily be demonstrated that the transformation 
is not independent of the operator applied in the decision. 
Even the simple law that the value should vary in a monotonously 
increasing manner with the importance can not be accepted 
generally. 
The possibility arises of the determination of these 
values of (secondary) importance. The answer is positive: the 
values can be determined (or more exactly, circumscribed) in 
the knowledge of global preferences. 
A similar problem has been raised by the mathematical 
establishment of shape recognition and medical diagnosis. In 
this latter context we propose a general model which may also 
be of use for literature theory. 
The problem of medical diagnosis (literature evaluation) 
relates to a group of given patients (literary works). These 
may be characterized via their symptoms (values of the fields), 
which can be described with a currently not more closely 
defined grammar). The diagnosis class must be sought to which 
the symptoms belong (it must be established how acceptable 
the work is to a reader). The importance of the symptoms may 
be ascribed to each diagnosis class from the aspect of the 
extent to each diagnosis class from the aspect of the extent to 
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which the given group of symptoms belongs to it. Further, 
the various intrinsic logical structures of the diagnosis 
classes are used to check the extent to which the described 
disease belongs to the diagnosis class. (The value structures 
of the readers are different from those of the works, and the 
degree of acceptance is determined by a different logical 
structure for every reader.) This structure can be described 
well by means of automata. The question, therefore, is the 
extent to which the given automata accept the grammatics. 
The degree of determination of automata is ensured by 
convention (and culture). 
The previously outlined conception requires further 
modification when literary works are examined. The process of 
acceptance and the automata themselves vary during the processing 
of the grammatics. Primarily the importances change, and 
consequently the subsequent processing is performed in a 
different manner, but the internal structure of the automata 
too may alter/Through the recognition of these changes and the 
description of the variations in state of the automata themselves, 
the experience permits a description of a concept that is 
difficult to grasp. 
Two points of interest may be mentioned. It has been 
seen that both the concepts and the values have moved away from 
the values of dual logic, and have given rise to indefiniteness 
and blurring. A measure may be introduced which determines 
the distance from classical logic (decisional measure). In the 
- 355 -
event of the application of an aggregative operator, its 
property means that the stability of the decision decreases 
in response to the use of the sharper data (the outcome of 
the decision varies following small changes in the values). 
Thus, the sharpness and the stability are complementary in 
character. The acceptance of this lack of precision is therefore 
virtually obligatory. 
The concept of classical mathematics connected with 
classification also requires modificat.ion (the principle of 
a uniform basis). The giving of a diagnosis is the giving of 
a classification, but all diagnoses consider a given fact in 
different ways. 
A system similar to this was selected for study: for the 
solution of shape-recognition problems; this operated with 
surprising effectiveness. 
The conception described here needs many more additional 
examinations. The research can be no means be said to be 
completed and finite. It is only to be hoped that a partial 
answer is provided to the questions raised by literature 
theory, and that further incentives are given as concerns the 
direction of subsequent development. 
The basic aim is to make an attempt to determine the 
framework of an appropriate system, setting out from literature 
theory, on the basis of the solution possibilities revealed 




* Thanks are due to Zoltán Kanyó, who requested the exposition 
and examination of this conception. 
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